Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia

High Court of Australia · 1998

Equity And TrustsEquitable Remedies

Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 30

A court orders a stevedoring group to restore labour supply agreements it had ended while the employer companies are in administration. Do such orders make the court run the business, and can they sit beside the administrators’ powers?

What happened?

Until September 1997 four Patrick companies (the employer companies) carried on stevedoring at Australian ports and employed the waterside workforce. In September 1997 they sold their stevedoring businesses to another company in the same group for $314.9 million, became suppliers of labour under Labour Supply Agreements, and used a large part of the proceeds to repay intra-group debts and to buy back $60 to $70 million of their own shares ([6]-[10]). The agreements allowed the stevedoring company to terminate if the supply of labour was interrupted ([7]). After industrial action over the transfer of a dock to companies associated with the National Farmers’ Federation, the stevedoring company terminated the agreements on 7 April 1998, entered into new labour arrangements with other suppliers, and the employer companies were put under voluntary administration that day ([12], [14]-[16]; Gaudron J [87]).

The Maritime Union of Australia and its members applied in the Federal Court, alleging that the reorganisation and the planned dismissal of the workforce contravened s 298K(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and were the product of a conspiracy to injure them by unlawful means ([16], [19]-[20]). On 21 April 1998 North J made interlocutory orders, among them orders restraining the stevedoring companies from giving effect to the terminations (order 1), requiring the employer companies to treat the agreements as on foot (order 2), restraining the termination of the employees’ employment (order 5), and restraining other respondents from dealing with their assets other than in the ordinary course of business (order 6) ([22]).

The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal and made a further order about s 443A of the Corporations Law ([23]). Companies in the group other than the employer companies sought special leave to appeal to the High Court ([24]).

What did the Court decide?

Special leave was granted and the appeal was treated as instituted and heard instanter. The appeal was allowed in part: two of the Full Court’s orders were set aside, orders 2, 3 and 5 of North J were varied by prefixing the words “Subject to par 5A of this order”, a new par 5A, a liberty to apply on the ending of the administration, and an order that orders 1 to 5 lapse unless a further undertaking was given by 6 May 1998 were added, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the costs in this Court of the first to sixth respondents ([84]; Orders). Three sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ ([1]-[84]); Gaudron J ([85]-[154]); and Callinan J ([155]-[200]). The decision was given on 4 May 1998.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Interlocutory orders and the Administrators’ discretion ([27]-[72]). In the joint reasons of Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, the Federal Court had power under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), once its jurisdiction was invoked, to make interlocutory orders against the parties to the proceeding as needed to ensure the effective exercise of that jurisdiction and to prevent the frustration of its process ([27], [35]). That power is limited to orders that are “appropriate”, which directs attention to the rights and liabilities of the parties under the applicable law, including the Corporations Law ([41]).

Their Honours held that Pt XA of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and s 23 were not shown to be inconsistent with Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Law, that a law of the former kind should not be construed as affecting a regime protecting the interests of creditors unless it manifested a clear intention to do so ([42]-[43]), and that orders under s 298U(e) or s 23 ought not to interfere with the Administrators’ exercise of their powers provided they acted lawfully, which meant that they could not dismiss employees because they were members of the MUA ([44]).

The central difficulty with the orders of North J was that they took away from the Administrators the discretions conferred by s 437A of the Corporations Law and, on one view of their effect, would oblige the Administrators to continue to trade while the employer companies were insolvent ([53]); it was one thing to restrain Patrick Operations from giving effect to the termination of the labour supply agreements and very different to fetter the discretion of the Administrators and the creditors ([54]).

Order 5 precluded the Administrators from deciding whether, if trading were resumed, it would be feasible to retain the whole workforce ([61]), and a liberty to apply did not cure the error, because the Administrators could not be deprived of their discretion pending court approval ([62]). The orders in pars 2, 3 and 5 were therefore to be made subject to the powers of the Administrators ([64], [71]-[72]). Their Honours otherwise upheld the orders: the interests of third persons are weighed in the balance of convenience according to the circumstances, and North J was entitled to conclude that the injunctions against the members of the Group should be made ([65]-[66]); orders 1 and 4 were directed to Patrick Operations and order 4 was justified ([70]); and order 6, a form of Mareva injunction, had a foundation ([73]-[77]).

Gaudron J would have granted special leave and dismissed the appeal: she read the orders as not requiring the Administrators to carry on business ([141]-[142], [146]), accepted that orders 3 and 5 did fetter the Administrators’ discretion but with little practical impact, and found no error of principle in North J’s curtailment of it ([143]-[145], [154]). Callinan J would have allowed the appeal and discharged orders 1 to 6 ([199]).

Constant supervision as a question of degree ([78]-[82], [190]-[198]). In the joint reasons of Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, the Court saw in the orders no defect “which sometimes is expressed as the involvement of the court in ‘constant supervision’ of continued conduct” ([78]). Their Honours said that reservations of that nature have been expressed in decisions of the Court (citing JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey and Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 at 298 and H Jones & Co Pty Ltd v Talbot) but that “questions of degree rather than absolute restrictions upon the scope of curial relief are involved” ([78]).

They described the significance of Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd as the acceptance by the House of Lords that the concept of “constant supervision by the court” by itself is no longer an effective or useful criterion for refusing a decree of specific performance, the stress being placed instead on whether a person subject to a mandatory order attended by contempt sanction knows with precision what is required, and on discouraging repeated applications for rulings on compliance with orders to carry on a business over a period ([79]).

Reference to constant court applications should not be misunderstood: the courts are well accustomed to supervisory jurisdiction on applications by trustees, receivers, provisional liquidators and others responsible for administrations, and a reservation of liberty to apply is in no way out of the ordinary ([80]). The orders did not, in form or in substance, require the Administrators to carry on business activities in the sense with which Argyll was concerned, nor did they leave those bound by them not knowing what was expected of them ([81]); and they left the factual position as it was before 7 April 1998 if the Administrators decided to resume trading, so that no supervision by the Court was required to give practical operation to the legal rights affected by orders 1 to 5 ([82]).

Callinan J held that one matter immediately fatal to them was that their operation involved commercial dealings and business decisions on a day to day basis, so that there could be no certainty about how they could be carried out and further applications to the Federal Court would be inevitable ([190]); he applied Lord Hoffmann’s observations in Argyll, which he thought equally apposite to interlocutory injunctions of this kind ([191]-[194]), said that the Court was likely to become enmeshed in the business of the parties ([196]), and concluded that the orders were of insufficient certainty to justify their making and that the parties should be left to their remedies in damages ([198]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [35] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [41]–[44] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab), [53]–[54] (PDF p 39) (opens in a new tab), [61]–[64] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab), [71]–[72] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the Federal Court’s power to make interlocutory orders and the limit that orders must not take away the Administrators’ discretion under s 437A; they are the ground for varying orders 2, 3 and 5 and are reflected in the orders at [84].

Separate reasoning · Gaudron J (would have granted special leave and dismissed the appeal)

Read judgment: [139]–[146] (PDF p 72) (opens in a new tab), [154] (PDF p 75) (opens in a new tab)

Gaudron J reached a different disposition: she read the orders as leaving the Administrators the choice whether to carry on business and saw no error of principle in the limited curtailment of their discretion.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J (would have allowed the appeal and discharged orders 1 to 6)

Read judgment: [199] (PDF p 108) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J dissented from the disposition and would have discharged all the orders of North J.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [78]–[82] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs reject the objection that the orders involved the court in constant supervision, as a question of degree, and are part of the reasons for upholding orders 1 to 5 as varied. They concern interlocutory orders and are not a ruling on specific performance of a contract.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J (would have discharged the orders)

Read judgment: [190]–[198] (PDF p 100) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J treated the uncertainty and the court’s likely entanglement in day-to-day business decisions as fatal to the orders; this is his own route and a different conclusion from the joint reasons.

Why does this case matter?

Remedies problems about a business in distress invite two shortcuts: asking only about the plaintiff and the defendant, and relying on the label “supervision”. An answer that avoids both identifies everyone whose rights or statutory powers the order touches and says what policing the order would need in practice.

Exam and application relevance

Name the court and the stage. The decision was given on interlocutory orders of the Federal Court, applying Pt XA of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Law as they stood in May 1998; it was not a decision on the final enforcement of a contract. Neither statute is in force in that form: the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) has been repealed (AustLII lists it among the Commonwealth repealed Acts, with a last compilation dated 6 January 2009), and the Corporations Law has been replaced by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The reasoning about the Federal Court’s power to make interlocutory orders and about constant supervision does not depend on those provisions, but the current industrial and insolvency legislation must be checked before the decision is applied to a present problem.

Attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is, using the paragraph numbers of the Court’s reasons, and keep the joint reasons separate from the reasons of Gaudron J and Callinan J.

Check your understanding

1. What did the stevedoring company do on 7 April 1998, and what happened to the employer companies that day ([12], [16])?

2. Which of North J’s orders did the joint reasons make subject to the powers of the Administrators, and what was the central difficulty they identified ([53], [64], [84])?

3. What did the joint reasons say about the objection that an order involves the court in “constant supervision” of continued conduct, and what did they take from Lord Hoffmann’s speech in Argyll Stores ([78]-[79])?

4. How did the joint reasons answer the point about repeated applications to the Federal Court ([80]-[82])?

5. What did Callinan J treat as fatal to the orders, and in what way did his conclusion differ from that of the joint reasons ([190], [198], [199])?