Breen v Williams
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
A former patient needed her surgeon’s notes for a class action overseas. He would release them only if she released him from any claim against him. Did equity give her a right to see them anyway?
What happened?
In 1977 Ms Breen had silicone breast implants inserted by another surgeon. In 1978 she consulted Dr Williams, a plastic surgeon, who after several consultations operated on her in November 1978. In 1984 a different doctor found that silicone gel had leaked from one implant and operated (Dawson and Toohey JJ; Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
In 1993 Ms Breen became involved in United States class action litigation against the manufacturer of the implants. To opt in to a proposed settlement, claimants had to file copies of their medical records. Her solicitors asked Dr Williams for copies of his records about her. He replied that the records were his property and that he would release them if she supplied a document releasing him from any claim that might arise from his treatment of her. She declined.
She did not seek the records by discovery, subpoena or letters rogatory, but sued in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a declaration that she was entitled to access to her records and an order for access and copies. At the trial, Dr Williams made an open offer of a written report covering the history, examination findings, investigation results, diagnosis and proposed management plan, treatment or advice; she did not accept it (Dawson and Toohey JJ; Gummow J).
Bryson J refused relief. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed her appeal by majority (Mahoney and Meagher JJA); Kirby P, dissenting, held that the doctor owed her a fiduciary duty entitling her to inspect or copy the records (as recorded by Gaudron and McHugh JJ and by Gummow J, who sets out the declarations Kirby P would have made).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal with costs, so Bryson J’s refusal of relief stood. Six Justices sat and delivered four sets of reasons: Brennan CJ; Dawson and Toohey JJ jointly; Gaudron and McHugh JJ jointly; and Gummow J.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
The fullest statement of the limit on fiduciary obligations is in the reasons of Gaudron and McHugh JJ. “In this country, fiduciary obligations arise because a person has come under an obligation to act in another’s interests. As a result, equity imposes on the fiduciary proscriptive obligations - not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of conflict.” On breach, the fiduciary must account for profits and make good losses, “But the law of this country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed”.
Contrasting Canadian decisions, which treat fiduciary obligations as both proscriptive and prescriptive, they said “Australian courts only recognise proscriptive fiduciary duties”, and that “McInerney cannot be regarded as a persuasive authority”. If there were a general fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interests, a doctor would have to tell the patient of the doctor’s own negligence or breach of contract, and “That is not the law of this country.”
Gummow J agreed with their observations on the Canadian tendency. A trustee’s duties to manage a trust business with care “arise from a particular characteristic, not of fiduciary obligations generally, but of the trust”, and do not support “a quasi- tortious duty to act solely in the best interests of their principals”. In his words, “It would be to stand established principle on its head to reason that because equity considers the defendant to be a fiduciary, therefore the defendant has a legal obligation to act in the interests of the plaintiff”.
On the relationship itself the Justices differed. Brennan CJ accepted that a doctor acquires an ascendancy over the patient, who reposes trust in the doctor, but said it is necessary to identify the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend, and “There is no relevant subject matter over which the respondent’s fiduciary duty extended.” Dawson and Toohey JJ said duties of a fiduciary nature on a doctor “are confined and do not cover the entire doctor-patient relationship”; in treating and advising, a doctor acts “not as a representative of the patient, but simply in the exercise of his or her professional responsibilities”, which contract and negligence govern.
Gaudron and McHugh JJ said the doctor-patient relationship “is not an accepted fiduciary relationship” and that any fiduciary obligations “could only attach in respect of matters that relate to diagnosis, advice and treatment”. Gummow J went further than the others in holding that the relationship of medical practitioner and patient “is a fiduciary one”, but its subject matter was the provision of treatment, and refusing access involved no gain to the doctor beyond his fee and no conflict between his interest and his duty.
Why does this case matter?
Problem questions often supply a relationship of trust, dependence and confidential information, such as a doctor, an adviser or a carer, and a claimant who wants the other party to do something the contract does not require. The tempting answer labels the relationship fiduciary and treats the label as deciding the claim. Breen is the High Court case against which that move is tested, and it is especially useful where a claimant treats the fiduciary label as enough to establish the particular duty asserted.
Exam and application relevance
Work through the claim in order: is there a fiduciary relationship, what is the subject matter over which any obligations extend, and what exactly is the defendant said to have done? Then attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons support it, because in Breen different steps were taken by different Justices. The fiduciary argument was not Ms Breen’s only one: each set of reasons also rejected an implied contractual term giving access and a proprietary right or interest in the records or the information in them, and Gaudron and McHugh JJ rejected an innominate common law right of access, so an answer on access to records should deal with contract and property as well.
Keep the decision to its question. Some Justices gave examples of circumstances in which a doctor might come under fiduciary obligations: Dawson and Toohey JJ gave the example of a financial interest in a hospital or pathology laboratory, and Gummow J an undisclosed interest in a private hospital or undisclosed side-benefits from a drug manufacturer. Two further limits. Brennan CJ would have implied into the contract a narrower duty to disclose information about the patient’s history, condition or treatment on a reasonable request where refusal might prejudice the patient’s health and reasonable reward is tendered, which he distinguished from a duty to give access to the records. And the question was the general law: no statutory right of access was relied on, and Gaudron and McHugh JJ said that if a right of access is to be created, “it must be made by the legislature”.
Check your understanding
1. What did Dr Williams offer Ms Breen before the litigation, on what condition, and what did he offer at the trial?
2. On which bases did Ms Breen claim a right of access, and what did the Justices say about each?
3. How did Gaudron and McHugh JJ describe the obligations equity imposes on a fiduciary, and why did they not follow McInerney v MacDonald?
4. Gummow J held that the relationship of medical practitioner and patient is fiduciary. Why did that not help Ms Breen, and how does his view of the relationship differ from that of Dawson and Toohey JJ?