Fiduciary obligations: scope and limits

The two prior questions in a fiduciary claim: was there an undertaking to act in another’s interests, and over what subject matter did it extend. Built on four High Court decisions, including the divisions within them.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
fiduciary-obligations

Learning outcomes

  • Identify the undertaking that makes a relationship fiduciary, and explain why trust, reliance or unequal bargaining power is not a substitute for it.
  • Fix the subject matter over which a fiduciary obligation extends, and test the conduct complained of against that subject matter rather than against loyalty in the abstract.
  • Explain why Australian fiduciary duties are proscriptive only, and redirect a complaint of carelessness or non-disclosure to contract, tort or statute.
  • State the conflict and the unauthorised benefit with the precision the High Court has required, rather than asserting that a fiduciary position existed.

Equity’s fiduciary obligation is one of loyalty, but a complaint of disloyalty does not establish one. Two prior questions come before any question of breach: did this person undertake to act in another’s interests, and over what subject matter did the undertaking extend? The answers decide whether the claim lies in equity at all, or belongs in contract, tort or statute. The principles are general law stated by the High Court of Australia and apply in every State and Territory.

The undertaking, and the judges who disagreed about it

Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 411 states the indicia of a fiduciary relationship. An exclusive Australian distributor had used the distributorship to copy the manufacturer’s products and capture its market. Mason J identified the critical feature of the accepted fiduciary relationships as the undertaking to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect that person’s interests in a legal or practical sense, leaving that person vulnerable to abuse of the position.

That has to be read with the result, because Mason J was in the minority. Gibbs CJ, Wilson J and Dawson J held that no fiduciary relationship arose; Mason J would have held the distributor a fiduciary in respect of the manufacturer’s local product goodwill; and Deane J, not persuaded that one existed, would still have imposed a constructive trust for the breaches of contract. The appeal was allowed and the manufacturer left with contract damages. Mason J’s statement is nonetheless the one later Courts have applied: the majority in Pilmer set it out, and French CJ and Keane J set out his explanation of the duties’ protective rationale in Howard v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] HCA 214.

Two further points of Mason J’s are applied routinely: a person may be a fiduciary in some activities and not in others, and where there is a contract the fiduciary relationship must accommodate itself to its terms rather than alter the operation the contract was intended to have.

Why commercial and professional dealings are usually not fiduciary

Gibbs CJ identified what does not do the work. An actual relation of confidence — that one person subjectively trusted another — is neither necessary for nor conclusive of a fiduciary relationship, and inequality of bargaining power is not by itself enough. What has consistently mattered is the opposite indication: a purely commercial arrangement, the parties dealing at arm’s length and on an equal footing, which Gibbs CJ said the High Court has treated as important, if not decisive, against a fiduciary duty. Dawson J put it more strongly: to invoke the equitable remedies sought would distort the doctrine and introduce uncertainty into the dealings of parties occupying an equal bargaining position.

A professional retainer does not alter that. In Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 1653 accountants engaged to value a target company and give the independent expert’s opinion a listing rule required worked incompetently, and the trial judge found they had not been independent. McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ held he was right in principle to find no fiduciary relationship: the accountants were not agents, exercised no ascendancy or influence over the client and were not depended on by it in the relevant sense, and a client’s expectation of competent and independent work is a different thing. Kirby J dissented, holding that the duty existed and had been breached.

Fiduciary for what?

Characterising a relationship as fiduciary settles nothing until the subject matter of the obligation is fixed. In Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 712 a patient sought access to her doctor’s records. Brennan CJ accepted that a patient reposes trust in the doctor, but dismissed the fiduciary claim because there was no relevant subject matter over which the doctor’s fiduciary duty extended.

Howard makes the discipline explicit. Directors joined a joint venture in their personal capacities to buy and lease a golf course; the other venturers diverted it, the directors recovered equitable compensation, and one argued he held his share on trust for the company. French CJ and Keane J said that despite their broad judicial formulations fiduciary duties are not infinitely extensible, and that the scope of the duty accommodates itself to the underlying relationship so as to conform to that relationship’s own limits. Directors are frequently shareholders, and they do not breach their obligations merely because in promoting the company’s interests they are also promoting their own.

What loyalty does not require

The patient in Breen lost before all six judges, and the reason is the most important limiting principle in this area. Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that Australian courts recognise only proscriptive fiduciary duties: equity requires a fiduciary not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of conflict, and on breach to account for profits and make good losses, but the law of this country does not otherwise impose positive duties on a fiduciary to act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed. A right of access to records would have been a novel positive obligation, so fiduciary law could not supply it.

Gummow J added a distinction students regularly lose. A trustee’s obligations to observe the trust’s terms and to take the care of an ordinary prudent person of business arise from a characteristic of the trust, the holding of legal title with duties to deal with it for others, and not from fiduciary obligation in general; they found no quasi-tortious duty on fiduciaries generally to act solely in their principals’ best interests. The majority in Pilmer agreed.

Proving the breach, and what follows from it

Both rules require the student to say what conflicted, or how the benefit came from the position. On conflict, the majority in Pilmer held that the conflicting duty or interests must be identified. Past dealings do not show it, because completed dealings ordinarily end any duty or interest associated with them, and nor does a general hope of future dealings, since most professional advisers hope that doing the task well will bring the client back. Hayne and Crennan JJ said in Howard that applying the rule to directors is not achieved by the bare repetition of its terms.

On the second rule, Hayne and Crennan JJ asked whether the gain was obtained or received by reason or by use of the position, or of any opportunity or knowledge resulting from it. It was not: the opportunity came to the director as a joint venturer, and he conceded it had not come to him by reason of his office. French CJ and Keane J stated the negative directly: with no possible conflict, and no gain obtained by use or by reason of the position, there is no liability to account.

Where a breach is made out, Gummow J in Breen identified both responses: an account for the benefit or gain so obtained, and, where the breach causes a loss instead of producing a gain, an obligation resting on earlier authority to make it good by equitable compensation. Informed consent answers what would otherwise be a breach.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the undertaking first, and the power or discretion it gave this person over the other’s interests.
  2. Do not treat subjective trust, reliance or unequal bargaining power as a substitute for an undertaking.
  3. Read the contract first where there is one, and ask whether the alleged duty can conform to its terms rather than alter them.
  4. Fix the subject matter of the obligation, then test the conduct complained of against it rather than against loyalty in the abstract.
  5. Name the conflicting duty or interest, or trace the benefit to the position.
  6. Redirect a complaint that is really about carelessness or non-disclosure to contract, tort or statute.

Where the authority sits

All four decisions relied on here are decisions of the High Court of Australia and bind every Australian court, so the principles apply in each State and Territory. No legislation is cited: whether a fiduciary obligation exists, and how far it extends, are questions of general law. Two of the four divided on the result, and in all four the judges wrote separately, so attribute any proposition to the judges whose reasons state it.

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