Barton v Armstrong
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104
A director is threatened with death by the man he is negotiating to buy out. The trial judge finds the threats were made and feared, but that he signed because the deal seemed good business. Must he prove he would not have signed otherwise?
What happened?
Landmark Corporation Ltd was a public company. Barton was its managing director and a substantial shareholder, and Armstrong was its chairman and, with his family companies, its largest single shareholder, holding 300,000 shares. One of Armstrong’s family companies also held mortgages securing 400,000 dollars of unpaid purchase price owed by a company in the Landmark group that was developing the Paradise Waters estate. Relations between the two men deteriorated, and Barton and the other directors moved to exclude Armstrong from the management of Landmark. Armstrong was removed from the chairmanship on 17 November 1966.
On 10 December 1966 the lender financing the project, United Dominions Corporation, told Barton it would not advance the money after all. Negotiations followed between Barton and Mr B H Smith, Armstrong’s financial adviser, and led to a deed of 17 January 1967. Landmark was to pay Armstrong 140,000 dollars in cash and the balance of 300,000 dollars within a year, and Barton and others were to buy Armstrong’s shares for 180,000 dollars, 60 cents a share at a time when the market price was about 40 cents. Landmark was soon in serious financial difficulty and was wound up.
Barton sued for a declaration that he had executed the deed under duress exerted by Armstrong. Street J heard the case over 56 days. As the majority judgment recounts his findings, Armstrong was a totally unreliable witness who had on many occasions threatened Barton with death, and Barton was justified in taking the threats seriously and was in real fear for himself and his family. But Street J found that the threats did not in fact coerce him into the agreement, which went through for what Street J called the primary and predominant reason of commercial necessity.
The Court of Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed Barton’s appeal (Mason JA and Taylor A-JA, Jacobs JA dissenting). The judges there agreed substantially on the facts and differed on a question of law about the causation that Barton had to show. Barton appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
What did the Court decide?
The Judicial Committee allowed the appeal. It declared that the deeds were executed by Barton under duress and were void so far as concerned him, left open any effect on the rights of the other parties to the deeds, and ordered that Armstrong and the first to sixth respondents pay Barton’s costs of the hearing before Street J, and that Armstrong pay his costs of the appeal to the Board.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Lord Cross of Chelsea delivered the majority judgment of the Judicial Committee. The majority identified the question of law on which the judges of the Court of Appeal Division had divided: whether Barton had to establish that he would not have executed the deed but for Armstrong’s threats. They said that the old common law authorities on duress were not of any real assistance, and relied instead on the analogy of equity’s approach to dispositions procured by fraud, where “the Court does not allow an examination into the relative importance of contributory causes”.
They concluded that the same rule should apply to duress: if Armstrong’s threats were a reason for Barton’s executing the deed, he was entitled to relief “even though he might well have entered into the contract if Armstrong had uttered no threats to induce him to do so”. They held that no onus lay on Barton to show that he would not have made the agreement but for the threats; “it was for Armstrong to establish, if he could” that the threats and unlawful pressure “in fact contributed nothing to Barton’s decision to sign”.
The majority considered that the rule about concurrent findings did not apply, because the Appeal Division had varied some of the trial judge’s findings and it was unclear that Street J had directed his mind to the question of law debated on appeal, and they reached their own conclusion on the facts found by Street J as modified by the Appeal Division. Proceeding on the footing that Barton’s confidence in the project was genuine and that he thought the agreement a satisfactory business arrangement, they said that it would be unrealistic to hold that the threats played no part, and drew the inference that, although Barton might have executed the documents even if Armstrong had made no threats, the threats and unlawful pressure in fact contributed to his decision to sign.
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale dissented in a joint judgment. They regarded the issues as “essentially issues of fact” about motivation and credibility, on which Street J had made clear findings, concurred in by the Court of Appeal Division, that a second court of appeal should not review without a miscarriage of justice or a manifest and important error of law. On causation, they said that for the purposes of the case, and reserving their opinion as to other contexts, they were prepared to accept as the formula most favourable to the appellant the majority’s test that the illegitimate means used was a reason “(not the reason, nor the predominant reason nor the clinching reason)” why the complainant acted as he did.
They also accepted that a decisive answer is not obtained by asking whether the contract would have been made even if there had been no threats. They would have dismissed the appeal, because the findings of Street J and the Appeal Division that Barton acted from commercial motives were not open to disturbance.
Why does this case matter?
The result depended on how the Board dealt with facts found at trial that the plaintiff’s own evidence did not support. Students should be able to say what was decided, by whom, and on what footing, before they use the case for a general statement about causation.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the pressure said to be illegitimate, and the evidence of the claimant’s own reasons for contracting, including any commercial reasons said to explain the decision to contract.
Attribute each statement to the judge or judges who gave the judgment it appears in. The printed judgment has unnumbered paragraphs, so identify a passage by the judgment it comes from and its subject, and cite the report, Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104.
The pressure here was a threat to kill. If a problem involves pressure of another kind, ask what the case itself says about that kind before relying on it.
Check your understanding
1. What positions did Barton and Armstrong hold in Landmark, and what happened to Armstrong’s chairmanship before the deed was signed?
2. What did Street J find about Armstrong’s threats, and what did he find about why Barton signed, as the majority judgment recounts those findings?
3. On what question of law did the judges of the Court of Appeal Division divide, and how did Mason JA and Taylor A-JA differ from Jacobs JA?
4. What did the majority say about the common law authorities on duress, and to what did they turn instead?
5. Who delivered the majority judgment, who delivered the dissent, and on what ground did the dissenting judges say the appeal should be dismissed?
6. What declaration and costs orders did the Board make?