Institutional child-abuse liability: common law and statutory exceptions
The statutory duty of care owed by an institution to prevent child abuse and the onus it reverses, the statutory answer to an institution that cannot be sued, the removal of limitation periods and the reopening of settled or decided claims, and how these fit with vicarious liability, non-delegable duty and direct negligence across the States and Territories.
Learning outcomes
- Plead and argue the statutory duty of care owed by an institution to prevent child abuse, and identify who bears the onus on breach once abuse by an associated individual is proved.
- Identify the proper defendant where the institution sued is not capable in law of being sued.
- Work out whether a limitation period, an earlier judgment or an earlier settlement bars a claim, and which court can set the judgment, order or agreement aside.
- Choose between the statutory duty, statutory vicarious liability, common law vicarious liability, non-delegable duty and direct negligence on a given set of facts, and say why the others do not answer them.
An institution sued over the abuse of a child in its care may be answerable by more than one route, and the routes do not stand or fall together. Three belong to the general law — vicarious liability, a non-delegable duty, and direct negligence — and are set out in vicarious liability and non-delegable duty. This article takes the statutory routes beside them: a duty of care imposed on an organisation responsible for a child, where proof that abuse occurred puts the organisation to proof that it took precautions; and a statutory vicarious liability reaching some people the employment category does not. Each State and Territory has its own provisions on the subject, similar in purpose and different in detail. Two further questions decide whether a claim can be brought at all: whether there is a defendant capable in law of being sued, and whether a limitation period, an earlier judgment or an earlier settlement stands in the way.
The statutory duty, and the onus it reverses
The statutory duty is not a new tort. Section 91(1) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) says the section “imposes a duty of care that forms part of a cause of action in negligence”,1 and the New South Wales, Tasmanian and Australian Capital Territory provisions say the same of theirs. The plaintiff still proves causation and damage; what the statute supplies is the duty and a presumption about its breach.
Victoria’s s 91(2) obliges a relevant organisation to take the care that in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to prevent the abuse of a child by an individual associated with it while the child is under its care, supervision or authority. On proof that abuse has occurred and that an associated individual committed it, s 91(3) presumes the organisation “to have breached the duty of care” unless it proves on the balance of probabilities that it took reasonable precautions to prevent the abuse in question. New South Wales reaches a comparable result in s 6F(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): once the plaintiff establishes that an associated individual perpetrated the abuse in connection with the organisation’s responsibility for the child, breach is presumed unless the organisation establishes that it took reasonable precautions.5
A statutory duty of this kind is enacted in seven of the eight States and Territories:
- Victoria — Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Pt XIII, s 91
- New South Wales — Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Pt 1B, s 6F
- Queensland — Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) Pt 2A, ss 33D and 33E6
- South Australia — Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) Pt 7A, ss 50E and 50F7
- Tasmania — Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) Pt 10C, s 49H8
- Australian Capital Territory — Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Ch 8A, s 114BBD9
- Northern Territory — Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) Pt 3A, ss 17D and 17E10
Western Australia is the exception. Part 2A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) addresses child sexual abuse actions by fixing the identity of the defendant, making assets available, setting the time a cause of action accrues and capping legal fees; it states no duty of care and no vicarious liability,11 so a claimant there argues the general law.
What the duty requires, and where the wording diverges
Two standards are in use, and the difference is in the statutes’ own words. Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory require reasonable care or “reasonable precautions”. Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory require “all reasonable steps”. Quote the standard the governing Act uses rather than treating the two as interchangeable.
Who the duty reaches is wider than employment, and that is the point of difference from a vicarious claim. Victoria’s s 90(1) takes in an officer, office holder, employee, owner, volunteer or contractor, and a religious organisation’s ministers, religious leaders, officers and personnel, and paragraphs (c) and (d) extend it through a delegation of care to another organisation or to a specified carer; the New South Wales s 6E is to similar effect and adds a carer authorised by a designated agency. The carve-outs are correspondingly important: Victoria’s s 91(6) excludes abuse committed “in circumstances wholly unrelated” to the individual’s association with the organisation and s 91(7) carries that exclusion through a delegation, and South Australia’s s 50E(2) and (3) do the same work. Tasmania frames the duty itself around the advantage the association gave, so that s 49H(3) presumes breach where the plaintiff establishes the abuse, the authority, trust or access the association conferred, and the use of it.
Scope differs too, and is checked before the standard. Part XIII in Victoria reaches physical abuse and sexual abuse as defined in s 88; the Queensland duty covers sexual abuse or serious physical abuse; Western Australia’s Part 2A is confined to child sexual abuse. The Northern Territory goes further than the others in one respect: s 17D(2) imposes a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent the abuse of a child by another child under the institution’s care, supervision or authority.
Suing an institution that is not capable of being sued
Many of the bodies these claims are brought against are unincorporated, and an unincorporated association is not a legal person. In Victoria, an entity not capable in law of being sued is still a relevant organisation if it nominates an associated legal person under s 92, and s 92(2) and (3) permit that nomination after the abuse, with liability taken to have been incurred by the nominee from the date of the abuse. For a public sector body, s 91(5) makes the organisation the appropriate defendant if it can be sued and the State the appropriate defendant if it cannot. The Note to s 93C points to s 4 of the Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 (Vic), which covers an unincorporated non-government organisation controlling one or more associated trusts, whether the abuse occurred before or after its commencement.4
Other jurisdictions take comparable but distinct paths. The New South Wales s 6K(1) permits proceedings against an unincorporated organisation in its own name “as if the organisation had legal personality”. Queensland’s s 33H lets the institution nominate a defendant and, where there is no nominee or it lacks sufficient assets, lets a court order that the trustee of a trust that is or used to be an associated trust is the nominee — including where the trust was de-associated to keep its property out of reach.
Limitation periods, and reopening a judgment or settlement
The limitation bar has been lifted for these actions, though not in identical terms. Section 27P(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) allows an action to which its child-abuse Division applies to be brought at any time, except an action arising under Part III of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), for which s 27Q(1) sets three years from the date the cause of action is discoverable.3 Section 6A(1) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) is to similar effect and, by s 6A(4), applies whether the claim is brought in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise.12 Section 6A(2) of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) removes the period for child sexual abuse actions.13 Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory have also removed the period, each in its own terms. Section 11A(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) provides that an action for damages relating to personal injury resulting from the abuse of a person as a child may be brought at any time and is not subject to a limitation period under an Act or law or rule of law, and s 11A(6) defines abuse as sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child, or psychological abuse perpetrated in connection with either.14 Section 5B(1) of the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) allows an action for damages for personal injury arising from or related to the sexual abuse, or serious physical abuse, of a person when a minor to be brought at any time.15 Section 5A(2) of the Limitation Act 1981 (NT) provides that an action for damages for personal injury arising from child abuse may be brought at any time and is not subject to any limitation period under that Act.16 Queensland’s s 48(1) and Tasmania’s s 38A(2) each apply the change whether the right or cause of action accrued before or after the reform took effect. Lifting the period does not remove the court’s power to stop a stale proceeding: the Example to Victoria’s s 27R, the Note following the New South Wales s 6A(6), the Example to Queensland’s s 11A(5) and the Note for the Northern Territory’s s 5A(5) each say the provisions do not limit a court’s power to summarily dismiss or permanently stay proceedings where the lapse of time has a burdensome effect on the defendant so serious that a fair trial is not possible, and Tasmania’s s 5B(3) preserves the court’s jurisdiction and other powers in general terms.
Reopening reaches further than the limitation period. In Victoria, s 27QA(1) allows an action on a previously barred cause of action even though an earlier action was dismissed as out of time; s 27QA(2) allows an action on a previously settled cause of action; and s 27QA(1A), inserted in February 2026, allows an action even though judgment was given or an order made, including a dismissal, between 13 November 2024 and that amendment’s commencement. Section 27QA(3) withholds all of this from a National Redress Scheme deed of release or accepted offer of redress, and from a settlement taken into account in one. On an application under s 27QB, or otherwise in the proceeding, s 27QC(1) lets the court set the previous judgment aside wholly or in part if that is just and reasonable, and s 27QC(2) lets it take amounts paid or payable under it into account when awarding damages and costs.
Which court may set aside whose orders is expressly regulated, and it is the kind of detail a problem question turns on. A court other than the Supreme Court may not set aside a previous judgment of another court (s 27QB(3)). Under s 27R(2) a court may set aside a settlement agreement, judgment or order of that court but not one of another court; under s 27R(3) the Supreme Court may set aside one of the Supreme Court or of another court, other than the High Court.
Queensland and the Northern Territory also allow a judgment given on limitation grounds before their reforms to be revisited. Under s 48(2) and (3) of the Queensland Act, an action on a previously barred right of action may be brought even if a judgment was given on the ground that the limitation period had expired, and the court hearing it may set that judgment aside if it decides that is just and reasonable; the Supreme Court may do so on application even when it is not hearing the action (s 48(4)), and a court other than the Supreme Court may not set aside another court’s judgment (s 48(5)). The Northern Territory’s s 54 is to similar effect, with the same Supreme Court rule in s 54(6) and (7), but s 54(3) allows no new action where a court had given judgment in final determination of the matter on grounds other than the expiry of a limitation period.
Settlements are addressed separately elsewhere. New South Wales Part 1C lets a person prevented by an “affected agreement” commence proceedings and apply to set it aside if the court thinks it just and reasonable (s 7D(2)); by s 7F the agreement is void so far as it relates to the applicant, and money already paid is not recoverable but may be taken into account in determining damages. South Australia’s s 50W is similar and excludes a National Redress Scheme deed of release and a contract of insurance from what may be set aside; the Australian Capital Territory’s s 114K(3) turns on whether there were legal barriers to full compensation when the agreement was made, or the agreement is not just and reasonable now. Queensland’s s 48(5A) allows an action on a right of action settled before the reform commenced but after the limitation period had expired, if a court sets the settlement aside as just and reasonable; the settlement and any related agreement other than a contract of insurance are then void, money paid cannot be recovered, and amounts paid or payable may be taken into account in damages and costs (s 48(5B), (5C)). Tasmania’s s 5C, which reaches a right of action settled before s 5B commenced but after a limitation period had expired, asks instead whether setting the agreement aside is in the interest of justice, directs the court to the amount of the agreement, the parties’ relative bargaining strength and any oppressive conduct by or on behalf of the organisation before the settlement, and does not apply to an offer of redress accepted under the National Redress Scheme (s 5C(2), (3), (8)).
Which route a given set of facts engages
Statutory vicarious liability exists in six jurisdictions and not in Queensland or Western Australia: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Pt XIIIA,2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 6G and 6H, Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 50G, Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) ss 49I and 49J, Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 114BC and 114BE, and Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 17G. Each asks a version of the occasion question that the principal joint reasons in Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC (2016) 258 CLR 134 put at the centre of the common law inquiry — a question the Court stated but did not itself apply, the appeal having been allowed on the limitation point —17 and each directs attention to authority, power or control over the child, the child’s trust, and the ability to achieve intimacy with the child. Edelman J, writing separately in AA ([338]), would treat the objective factors that Prince Alfred College described as part of an inquiry into vicarious liability as “concerned with a non-delegable duty rather than (true) vicarious liability”. That is one Justice’s view and not an overruling; the leading reasons of Gageler CJ, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ observe only that the occasion factors are “those very factors which may indicate the existence of a relationship between a duty-holder and a plaintiff sufficient to give rise to a non-delegable duty” ([43]). So apply the occasion question as stated, and expect the doctrinal home of those factors to be argued.18
Where they diverge is the person the relationship category reaches. Victoria’s s 93C(3) provides that an independent contractor is not an individual akin to an employee. New South Wales s 6G(3) and Tasmania’s s 49I(3) instead exclude a role carried out for a recognisably independent business, and New South Wales also excludes an authorised carer acting in that capacity. The Australian Capital Territory’s s 114BC(2) states the inclusive test with no equivalent statutory exclusion, leaving that subject to regulation. The Northern Territory’s definition excludes an activity carried out under a contract for services by an individual or corporation independent of the institution. Identically named categories are not identical categories.
These provisions run alongside the general law rather than replacing it: the New South Wales, South Australian, Tasmanian, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory sections each provide that the section does not affect, and is in addition to, vicarious liability at common law, and Victoria’s s 93A(1) provides that nothing in Part XIIIA limits Part XIII. Where both statutory routes are run, New South Wales s 6B(2) and the Northern Territory’s ss 17E(5) and 17G(4) require an award under one to take account of an award already made under the other.
The three general-law routes stay distinct, and merging them is the commonest error here. Vicarious liability is derivative: the institution answers because its employee committed a wrong. A non-delegable duty is personal — a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken — and since AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2 it may be breached by the intentional conduct of the duty-holder or their delegate, while remaining a duty to ensure reasonable care is taken rather than absolute liability.18 Direct negligence is the institution’s own failure in selection, systems or supervision, and it can survive the failure of both.
Timing decides which routes are open. Victoria’s Part XIIIA applies whether the abuse occurs before, on or after its commencement on 25 February 2026, so it reaches historic abuse; Part XIII applies to abuse occurring on or after the commencement of the Wrongs Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2017. A historic Victorian claim can take the statutory vicarious route while the statutory duty does not reach back to it, so each route’s application provision is read against the date of the abuse.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the jurisdiction, locate its institutional child-abuse provisions, and check scope first: is the conduct within that jurisdiction’s definition of abuse, and was the child under the institution’s care, supervision or authority?
- Date the abuse and read each route’s application provision against that date, because the statutory duty and the statutory vicarious liability do not reach back equally.
- Run the duty route in the statute’s order — establish abuse by an associated individual, then put the institution to proof of the standard its own Act states, whether reasonable precautions or all reasonable steps.
- Check that jurisdiction’s carve-outs, including abuse in circumstances wholly unrelated to the association, and the limits of its akin-to-an-employee category.
- Ask who can be sued: where the institution is unincorporated, work through the nomination, appointment or associated-trust provisions before naming a defendant.
- Deal with limitation, any earlier judgment and any earlier settlement, identify which court can set aside the order or agreement, and plead the general-law routes in the alternative.
Self-check
- Have I named the governing Act and jurisdiction before stating any standard?
- Have I used the standard the Act uses — reasonable precautions, or all reasonable steps — rather than a paraphrase?
- Have I checked whether the jurisdiction has a statutory vicarious liability provision at all, and whom its akin-to-an-employee category excludes?
- Have I identified a defendant capable in law of being sued?
- Have I asked which court may set aside the judgment or settlement standing in the way?