Bird v DP (a pseudonym)
Bird v DP (a pseudonym) (2024) 98 ALJR 1349
A bishop appointed a priest as an assistant parish priest in 1966. In 1971 the priest abused a five-year-old during pastoral visits. He was neither the diocese’s employee nor its contractor. Is the diocese vicariously liable?
Affirmed by AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2
In AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2 the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ record that AA accepted in the Court of Appeal that the primary judge’s holding that the Diocese was vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of Fr Pickin could not stand following Bird ([10]). The same reasons describe Bird as insisting on a threshold requirement of an employment relationship, record that the insistence had been and could be described as harsh, and say that Bird explained that the scope of vicarious liability could not be expanded in respect of one kind of relationship without destabilising the doctrine as a whole ([45]). AA was decided on a different route, breach of a non-delegable duty, on which the Diocese was held liable ([2]), so a claim against an institution for the wrong of someone who is not its employee needs each route analysed separately.
Qualified by legislation: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), from 25 February 2026
Part provisions inserted into the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Vicarious Liability for Child Abuse) Act 2026 (No 5 of 2026), s 3, from 25 February 2026, add a statutory liability for institutional child abuse. Section 93C(1) makes an institution (a relevant organisation within the meaning of s 88, or the State: s 93B) vicariously liable for the abuse of a child by an employee of the institution or an individual akin to an employee of the institution if the apparent performance of a role in which the institution placed that person supplies the occasion for the abuse and the person takes advantage of or uses that occasion to abuse the child. Section 93C(2) lists matters a court may consider in deciding whether an individual is akin to an employee, and s 93C(3) provides that an independent contractor is not such an individual. Under s 93A(3) the Part applies to a claim founded on or arising from abuse of a child whether the abuse occurs before, on or after its commencement. Bird continues to state the common law; for a Victorian claim of this kind, the statutory conditions are a separate route to be analysed. Other Australian legislatures have also legislated on institutional liability for child abuse, not consistently and in some respects only prospectively (joint reasons at [68]; Gleeson J at [148]), so the provisions in force in the relevant jurisdiction at the relevant time have to be checked.
Clarified by AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2
Bird did not decide whether a diocese owes a non-delegable duty. In AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2 the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ held that the Diocese was liable to AA for breach of a non-delegable common law duty of care it owed in 1969 ([2]-[3]), and held that the majority decision in Lepore that there can be no common law non-delegable duty in respect of harm caused by an intentional criminal act should be re-opened and overturned, so that the priest’s acts fell within the scope of the duty ([4]). Those Justices record that they, Gordon J and Edelman J agree that a non-delegable duty may be breached by the intentional conduct of the duty-holder or their delegate, and that Steward J reached a different result ([6]). The duty was recognised on the facts established in AA; whether a comparable duty is owed in another case depends on the relationship established in that case.
What happened?
In 1971, when he was five years old, DP was assaulted and sexually abused at his parents’ home in Port Fairy by Father Bryan Coffey, a Catholic priest from St Patrick’s, the local parish church, which is within the Roman Catholic Diocese of Ballarat ([1]). The first assault took place around March or April 1971, after Coffey offered to put DP to bed during a social gathering at the home; the second took place on 26 December 1971, in a tent in the backyard ([20]). In 2020 DP sued in the Supreme Court of Victoria, alleging that the Diocese was vicariously liable for Coffey’s acts and was also liable in negligence. The Diocese is an unincorporated association, so the claim was brought against its nominated defendant, the current Bishop of Ballarat, Paul Bird ([2]).
The primary judge’s findings about Coffey were not challenged in the High Court ([10]). Coffey was ordained in July 1960 and in 1966 was appointed by the then Bishop of Ballarat to St Patrick’s as an assistant parish priest. He was not employed by the Diocese or engaged by it as an independent contractor, and there was no finding that he was its agent ([11]). Their relationship was governed by Canon Law, which was legally unenforceable but permitted the Bishop to exercise control over Coffey that was at least as great as, if not greater than, that enjoyed by an employer ([12]). Pastoral visits to parishioners’ homes were an integral part of Coffey’s role, and the primary judge found that the provision of unsupervised pastoral care to families, including children, was part and parcel of it ([16]-[17]).
The primary judge held the Diocese vicariously liable ([3]). The negligence claim failed, because the primary judge did not accept that the Diocese knew or ought to have known of the risk before or during 1971, and DP did not appeal that finding ([3]). Damages were assessed at $230,000 ([3]). The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the Diocese’s appeal, describing the relationship between a diocese and an assistant priest as sui generis ([23], [25]). The Diocese was granted special leave to appeal ([3]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court heard the appeal on 14 March 2024 and gave judgment on 13 November 2024. It allowed the appeal, set aside orders 2 and 5 of the Court of Appeal made on 3 April 2023 and, in their place, allowed the Diocese’s appeal with costs, set aside the Supreme Court’s orders of 25 January 2022 and 28 February 2022, and ordered that the proceeding be dismissed with costs. The appellant was to pay the respondent’s costs of the special leave application and the appeal ([72]).
Seven Justices sat. Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[72]). Gleeson J ([73]-[183]) and Jagot J ([184]-[257]) gave separate reasons, and each agreed with the orders ([80], [257]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ, in joint reasons, held that in Australian common law vicarious liability in its proper sense, liability attributed to a defendant for the wrong of another, requires a relationship of employment: an employer may be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, but there is no such liability for the acts of those who are not in an employment relationship but, for example, are independent contractors or in a relationship “akin to employment” ([5], [45]-[46]).
They declined to extend the doctrine to relationships akin to employment ([47]). Their reasons included that the High Court has repeatedly refused to extend the boundaries of the doctrine, so that an extension would require it to revisit Hollis v Vabu and Sweeney v Boylan Nominees and at least aspects of Scott v Davis and New South Wales v Lepore ([49]); that the English expansion in Christian Brothers began from propositions that were not the law in Australia and rested on contestable policy choices of a kind the High Court has repeatedly rejected as a basis for developing the law ([55], [62]); that a threshold of akin to employment would produce uncertainty and complicate the distinction between employees and independent contractors ([65]-[66]); and that the issue is squarely in the hands of the legislatures ([63], [67]).
They also held that the expression vicarious liability is inapposite for liability that arises where an agent’s acts are attributed to the principal and for breach of a non-delegable duty, which are primary or direct liability ([31], [36]); that the agency pleaded by DP was not made out because there was no finding that Coffey was the Diocese’s true agent ([35]); and that the Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018 (Vic) deals with legal personality and does not alter the substantive law of vicarious liability ([69]).
Coffey was not employed by the Diocese, so the Diocese was not vicariously liable; the second issue, whether the assaults were committed in the course of the relationship, was not reached ([5], [11]). Jagot J, separately, agreed that the extension should not be adopted ([185], [241], [251]). Gleeson J, separately, disagreed with the joint reasons that relationships akin to employment do not attract vicarious liability ([79]) and would have held the relationship between the Diocese and Coffey capable of attracting it ([80], [183]), but agreed with the orders because the assaults were not committed in the course of Coffey’s role ([80], [181]-[183]).
Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ, in joint reasons, refused to entertain DP’s notice of contention that the Diocese was liable for breach of a non-delegable duty to protect him from the risk of sexual abuse by its priests ([38]-[43]). The duty was not raised on the pleadings or addressed in the evidence in the courts below, its nature and content were not identified or pleaded, the Bishop’s submission that the Diocese would be irremediably prejudiced if the duty were advanced for the first time on appeal was accepted, and the contention might have required the Court to reopen and overrule Lepore ([38]-[42]).
Jagot J, separately, refused leave to raise the new claim, because the Diocese could have adduced evidence about the existence and breach of the asserted duty and the duty as framed was indeterminate, and said that further observations on a non-delegable duty of that kind should await a case where the issue is properly raised ([254]-[256]). Gleeson J recorded that the case was not concerned with whether the Diocese is liable for breach of a non-delegable duty ([155]). The Court therefore dismissed the contention without deciding whether the Diocese owed DP such a duty ([5], [43]).
In describing the area, the joint reasons said that a non-delegable duty is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken rather than merely to take reasonable care, that it arises where the defendant has assumed particular responsibility to ensure that care is taken, and that liability for its breach is direct and not vicarious ([36]-[37]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [5] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [44]–[49] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
The question the Diocese raised was whether vicarious liability could attach without a relationship of employment, and the Court of Appeal’s decision for DP rested on the answer that it could. Holding that employment is the threshold, and declining to extend it, was necessary to allow the appeal and dismiss the proceeding, because Coffey was not an employee.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [50]–[71] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs give the reasons for declining to extend the threshold: the English and Canadian developments, the contestable policy choices, the uncertainty an akin-to-employment test would introduce, the role of the legislature and the Victorian statutes. They are the joint reasons’ grounds for the holding and are part of the ratio of the five Justices.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [31]–[35] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)
DP pleaded that Coffey was the Diocese’s agent and relied on Colonial Mutual Life. Rejecting agency as a route for attributing Coffey’s conduct was necessary to the result, because a true agency would have been a separate basis of liability.
Separate reasoning · Jagot J
Read judgment: [185] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab), [226] (PDF p 92) (opens in a new tab), [233] (PDF p 94) (opens in a new tab), [241]–[242] (PDF p 98) (opens in a new tab), [251] (PDF p 104) (opens in a new tab)
Jagot J answered the extension question no and agreed with the orders of the joint reasons, by her own route: the Court of Appeal’s analysis extended rather than applied the law, no common law pathway to vicarious liability exists other than employment or true agency on her analysis, and Hollis, Scott and Sweeney stand against the extension. She concurs in the result and in the refusal to extend; her reasons are her own.
Separate reasoning · Gleeson J
Read judgment: [79]–[80] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab), [151]–[152] (PDF p 66) (opens in a new tab), [181]–[183] (PDF p 73) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson J disagreed with the joint reasons on the threshold: she would have held that relationships akin to employment attract vicarious liability and that the Diocese’s relationship with Coffey was capable of doing so. She agreed with the orders because the assaults were not committed in the course of that relationship. This is a view of a minority on the principle, not the Court’s holding; she concurs only in the orders.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [38]–[43] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)
Dismissing the notice of contention was an operative part of the disposition: it is why the Diocese’s appeal succeeded without any finding about a non-delegable duty. The grounds (not pleaded, nature and content unidentified, prejudice, possible reopening of Lepore) are the reasons for that dismissal.
Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [36]–[37] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
The account of what a non-delegable duty is and why its breach is direct liability is the joint reasons’ statement of settled law, given to explain why the expression vicarious liability is inapposite for it. It was not necessary to the order, because the Court did not decide whether any such duty was owed.
Separate reasoning · Jagot J
Read judgment: [252]–[256] (PDF p 104) (opens in a new tab)
Jagot J agreed that the new claim should not be entertained and gave her own reasons, including that the asserted duty was indeterminate as framed and that observations on such a duty should await a case in which the issue is properly raised.
Separate reasoning · Gleeson J
Read judgment: [155] (PDF p 67) (opens in a new tab)
Gleeson J accepted, as explained by the joint reasons, that the notice of contention would raise an issue not addressed below, and recorded that the case was not concerned with whether the Diocese was liable for breach of a non-delegable duty.
Why does this case matter?
A common error in a problem about an organisation’s responsibility for a wrongdoer who is not its employee is to build the answer from principle in other countries, or from a view of what would be fair, without asking what the Australian common law requires and whether legislation applies. It was the first time the High Court had been asked whether a diocese or a bishop may be held vicariously liable for a priest who sexually abuses a child ([5]), so it is the starting point for that question. The area has also moved since 2024, by legislation in Victoria and by a further High Court decision in 2026, so the date of the events and the jurisdiction of the claim matter to the answer.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the route by which the claimant says the organisation answers for the wrongdoer, and analyse each route on its own terms: the relationship between the wrongdoer and the defendant, the authority the defendant may have given the wrongdoer, duties the defendant itself owed to the claimant, and statute. For each point say whose reasons it comes from: the joint reasons of the five Justices at [1]-[72], or the separate reasons of Gleeson J or Jagot J.
State the jurisdiction and the dates of the events and of the claim. Bird states the common law, and the Victorian provisions in ss 93A to 93C of the Wrongs Act 1958 apply to child abuse claims against institutions, including abuse before their commencement; in another jurisdiction, identify and apply the legislation in force there, and say so if you have not been able to confirm its current text. If a point was not raised in the courts below, ask what the court would need to know before it could decide it.
Check your understanding
1. What did the primary judge’s unchallenged findings say about Coffey’s legal relationship with the Diocese, and what did they not find ([11])?
2. Which three issues did the joint reasons identify, and which of them did the Court not reach ([4], [5])?
3. In the joint reasons, in what three different senses is the expression vicarious liability used, and in which of them is its use apposite ([30]-[37], [44])?
4. Why did the joint reasons refuse to entertain DP’s notice of contention ([38]-[43])?
5. Why did Gleeson J agree with the orders proposed in the joint reasons ([80], [181]-[183])?
6. What does s 93C(3) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) say about independent contractors, and from when does the Part apply to abuse that occurred earlier (s 93A(3))?