Writing a structured problem answer

A worked answer to a hypothetical materiality problem, with the reasons for each choice, showing how to put the conclusion first, spend words on the issue in dispute, state assumptions and calibrate the conclusion.

Learning level
Application
Jurisdictions
au-national, au-commonwealth
Subjects
legal-research-and-method
Topics
legal-reasoning-and-problem-solving

Learning outcomes

  • Write a problem answer that states its conclusion first and then spends its words on the issue that is actually in dispute.
  • State each rule with its authority and the judges whose reasons state it, checking for a later restatement by the High Court.
  • Apply a rule to the facts, answer the strongest counter-argument and say what the conclusion depends on.

A structured answer is built backwards from the question: before writing, decide what you must establish to answer it and which parts of that are actually in dispute. This article shows one worked answer, with the choices behind it explained. The facts are hypothetical, and the answer applies Commonwealth law as stated by the High Court of Australia in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123 and LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12, both decisions about migration decisions reviewed for jurisdictional error. The facts follow the structure of Hossain with different details. The answer teaches method, and a real problem would also need the statute in question read in full.

The problem

A Commonwealth Act says that a delegate must refuse a licence unless satisfied that two criteria are met. Criterion A requires the application to be made within 28 days of a previous licence ending, unless there are compelling reasons for not applying it. Criterion B requires the applicant to hold insurance, unless satisfied that arrangements to obtain it have been made. A delegate refused Dana’s application. On review the tribunal also refused it. It found that there were no compelling reasons under criterion A, assessing them as at the date of her application, and that criterion B was not met because Dana admitted she had no insurance and no arrangements, although she said she intended to obtain it. Dana accepts that the tribunal misread criterion A, and asks whether the decision can be set aside for jurisdictional error.

The answer

Short answer. Probably not. The tribunal made an error of law on criterion A, but the findings about criterion B probably show that the outcome would inevitably have been the same, so there is probably no realistic possibility of a different outcome, and the error is probably not material and not jurisdictional.

Issue. The error on criterion A is conceded, so the answer does not argue it. The contestable issue is whether that error was material.

Rule. In the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ in Hossain, a statute that impliedly requires a condition to be observed is ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating “a threshold of materiality” in the event of non-compliance, and a statute on its proper construction might set a higher or lower threshold (at [29]-[30]).1 The High Court’s agreed guidance is now in LPDT, where six Justices said that in most cases an error is jurisdictional only if there is “a realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred” (at [7]).2 The applicant must prove the facts of what decision was made and how, and materiality is determined by inferences from the evidence (at [10], [13]). The question is whether the decision “could, not would” realistically have been different, and meeting that threshold “is not demanding or onerous” (at [14]). Unless there is “a basis on which it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same” had the error not been made, the threshold is met once an error and a realistic possibility of a different outcome are shown (at [16]). The answer assumes that the same principles govern the hypothetical Act and that nothing in the Act sets a different threshold.

Application. The Act required refusal unless both criteria were met. The tribunal was not satisfied of criterion B, and on its findings Dana had no insurance and no arrangements, and her stated intention did not meet the criterion. Even if the tribunal had read criterion A correctly, criterion B would still have required refusal. That is a basis for concluding that the outcome would inevitably have been the same. In Hossain the joint reasons reached the same position on comparable reasoning: the breach “could have made no difference” because the tribunal could not reasonably have been satisfied of the other criterion (at [35]). Dana has to show a realistic possibility of a different outcome, and on these findings she probably cannot.

Counter-argument. Dana’s best argument is that, without the error, the tribunal might have delayed its decision so that she could obtain insurance, and the LPDT threshold is not demanding. In Hossain a similar suggestion “rises no higher than conjecture” because the tribunal was not asked to delay and did not believe the applicant’s stated intention (at [36]). On that reasoning the argument is weak unless she had asked for time or the tribunal had reason to accept that she would obtain cover. LPDT also warns that a court must not assume the decision-maker’s function (at [15]). Dana could point out that some errors are material whatever their effect, but LPDT gives apprehended or actual bias as an example (at [6]), and a misreading of one criterion is not like that.

Conclusion and confidence. On these facts the better view is that the error was not material and so was not a jurisdictional error. The conclusion depends on the finding about criterion B being one the tribunal could reasonably make, and on Dana not having asked for time. Because the LPDT threshold is a low one, the answer is less secure than a bare reading of Hossain suggests, and if either fact changed, so might the answer.

Why the answer is built this way

The short answer comes first so that a reader can see where the reasoning is going. The conceded error is stated and set aside, so the space goes to materiality, which is where the marks and the uncertainty are. The rule is taken from the later, agreed statement and the earlier case is used for its application, because a student who states only the earlier formulation states the law accurately and incompletely. The rule is attributed to the judges who stated it. The application uses the facts: the finding that criterion B was not met is just part of the reasoning, and the answer goes on to show why that finding closes the question. The counter-argument is the strongest one available, and it is answered with authority. The conclusion says what it depends on.

Common faults

  • Reciting the rule and then announcing a conclusion without applying it to the facts.
  • Arguing a point the problem concedes, at the cost of the issue that is in dispute.
  • Stating the rule from an earlier case without checking whether the High Court has since restated it.
  • Leaving out the counter-argument, or stating a weak one so that it is easy to answer.
  • Concluding with more confidence than the facts allow.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Read the question and decide what you must establish to answer it.
  2. Say at the start what you conclude, then list the issues in the order a court would take them.
  3. Remove what is conceded or not in dispute, and state any assumption that you make.
  4. State each rule with its authority, say whose reasons state it, and check for a later restatement.
  5. Apply the rule to the facts one element at a time, and give the strongest argument against your view.
  6. End with a conclusion that says what it depends on.

Self-check

  • Does my first paragraph answer the question?
  • Have I put my words where the dispute is?
  • Does every rule have an authority, and have I said whose reasons state it?
  • Have I stated my assumptions?
  • Would a different fact change my conclusion, and have I said which?

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

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