Stalking and protective orders: offence elements and civil protection
How the Victorian stalking offence is built from a course of conduct and a two-limbed fault element, how a civil intervention order differs from a prosecution, and how the other seven States and Territories state the same offence.
Learning outcomes
- Decide whether a set of facts raises a prosecution for stalking, an application for a protective order, or both, and state which standard of proof the governing provision fixes.
- Apply the Victorian course-of-conduct definition to a sequence of incidents, distinguishing repetition from continuity of purpose.
- Argue the subjective and objective fault limbs of the Victorian offence separately, and say which of them requires the harm or fear to have been caused.
- Choose between the Family Violence Protection Act and the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act on the relationship between the parties, and identify when a breach of either order becomes an offence.
- Identify, before stating any test, how the stalking provision of another declared jurisdiction departs from the Victorian one.
Most stalking offences reach conduct by its repetition or duration rather than by any single act, although not every provision requires repetition, and the same conduct can be met instead by a court order restraining future behaviour without any criminal finding. Before stating a rule, a student must settle a prior question: is this a prosecution, or an application for a protective order? The answer fixes the parties, what must be established, the standard of proof and what follows. This article states the Victorian offence and Victoria’s two protective-order Acts, then compares how New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory state the offence.
Two routes to the same conduct
Victoria meets stalking twice over. Section 21A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)1 makes a course of conduct an offence carrying level 5 imprisonment (10 years maximum). Separately, a court may restrain future conduct by making an intervention order, on an application rather than a charge and without convicting anyone. A prosecution asks what the accused did and what the accused meant by it; an application asks what protection the applicant needs from now on.
The protective-order Acts fix their standard of proof in the text. A final order is made where the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities of the matters the Act specifies — words used in both s 74(1) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic)5 and s 61(1) of the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic)8. Section 21A fixes no standard of its own. The criminal standard comes from s 141(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)3: in a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Facts found on the balance of probabilities for an intervention order are not thereby proved to the criminal standard. The prosecution’s burden is discussed further in Offence elements. Both order provisions also look forward, requiring the court to be satisfied that the respondent is likely to continue the conduct or do it again.
What counts as a course of conduct
Section 21A(1)(a) requires A to engage in a course of conduct in relation to another person (B), and s 21A(1B) says what that means. Two things must be shown:
- Repetition or duration — A engaged in conduct on more than one occasion, or A engaged in conduct that is protracted. Either limb suffices, so a single protracted episode can be a course of conduct.
- Continuity of purpose — the conduct shows a continuity of purpose in relation to B.
The second requirement does the limiting work. Unrelated incidents involving the same two people can satisfy the first limb and fail the second, so a chronology of occasions is where the analysis starts rather than where it ends.
The course of conduct must also include conduct specified in s 21A(2). The list includes following B or any other person; contacting them by any means whatsoever; publishing material relating to them on the internet or by electronic communication; causing an unauthorised computer function in a computer they own or use; tracing their use of the internet or electronic communications; loitering near places they frequent; interfering with property in their possession; making threats to B; abusive or offensive words or acts; giving them offensive material; keeping them under surveillance; and — inserted in 2026 — causing or threatening to cause harm to an animal in the presence of B or another person, or where the harm or threat will be discovered by or brought to the attention of B or another person. Paragraph (g) is a catch-all: acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to cause physical or mental harm to B, including self-harm, or to arouse apprehension or fear in B for B’s own safety or that of any other person.
Mental harm includes psychological harm and suicidal thoughts (s 21A(8)). The offence also reaches across the border: conduct outside Victoria counts where B was in Victoria at the time, and B being outside Victoria does not matter where the conduct occurred in Victoria (s 21A(6), (7)).
The fault element
Section 21A(1)(c) is expressed in the alternative, and its two limbs are not two descriptions of one state of mind.
- Limb (i) — A intends that the course of conduct will cause a result described in s 21A(3), or believes that it will probably cause such a result.
- Limb (ii) — A ought to understand, in all the particular circumstances, that the course of conduct will probably cause such a result, and the course of conduct does cause such a result.
Section 21A(3) states the results: physical or mental harm to B, including self-harm; and apprehension or fear in B for B’s own safety or that of any other person.
Read limb (i) against limb (ii). Limb (i) is satisfied by A’s own intention or belief, and the requirement that the conduct “does cause such a result” appears in limb (ii) alone. Limb (ii) substitutes what A ought to have understood for what A intended, then couples that objective standard with the actual result. An answer that argues limb (ii) without establishing that B suffered harm or came to fear for someone’s safety has left out half of it.
This structure is recent. Section 67 of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Stalking and Other Matters) Act 2026 (Vic)4 substituted s 21A(1) and s 21A(3), inserted ss 21A(1A) and (1B), and omitted from the end of s 21A(2) the intention wording that had sat inside the conduct list. It commenced on 26 April 2026 under s 2(2) of that Act. The consequence is that the fault element now sits in s 21A(1)(c), and the conduct list carries no state of mind.
Exclusions, defences and the onus
Two provisions take conduct out of the offence, and they fall differently on the burden of proof.
Section 21A(4)2 states that the section does not apply to conduct engaged in by a person performing official duties for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law, administering any Act, enforcing a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, executing a warrant or protecting the public revenue. That is an exclusion from the section’s reach.
Section 21A(4A) is a defence: “it is a defence to the charge for the accused to prove” that the course of conduct was engaged in without malice in the normal course of a lawful business, trade, profession or enterprise (including a news or current affairs publisher), for an industrial dispute, or for political activities, discussion or communication on public affairs. An exclusion and a defence are not interchangeable: under the first the prosecution cannot make out the offence; under the second the accused carries the burden. Where the accused carries it, s 141(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) sets the standard: the court is to find the case of an accused proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
The civil Act reaches the same subject matter by a third mechanism. Section 61(4) of the personal safety Act directs that the court must not make a final order if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent engaged in the conduct without malice for those same three purposes — a limit on the court’s power rather than a defence an accused must prove.
Victoria’s two protective-order Acts
Victoria divides protective-order work between two Acts by the relationship between the parties, not by the conduct complained of.
The Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) governs where the parties are family members. A final order may be made where the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has committed family violence against the affected family member and is likely to continue to do so or do so again (s 74(1)). Family violence is defined in s 5(1) as behaviour towards a family member that is physically or sexually abusive, emotionally or psychologically abusive, economically abusive, threatening or coercive, or that in any other way controls or dominates the family member and causes that member to feel fear for the safety or wellbeing of that member or another person; it extends to behaviour that exposes a child to the effects of such behaviour.
The Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic) governs the rest. Section 61(1) requires the court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities either that the respondent has committed prohibited behaviour that is likely to recur and that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety, or that the respondent has stalked the affected person and is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and also that the respondent and the affected person are not family members, and that an order is appropriate in all the circumstances. Section 61(1)(b) is the hinge of the scheme: the personal safety jurisdiction is closed where the parties are family members, which routes those applications to the family violence Act. The stalking ground carries no reasonable-person element; that requirement attaches to prohibited behaviour.
Stalking is defined for the civil Act by s 10 of that Act7, and since 26 April 2026 it has been built on the frame of the offence: s 10(2) uses the same course-of-conduct definition, and s 10(1)(c) with s 10(2A) the same fault limbs and results. So in Victoria the analysis of repetition and fault serves both routes, while the consequences of reaching the answer differ.
Breach is where a civil order meets the criminal law
An intervention order is civil to obtain and criminal to disobey. Section 123 of the family violence Act6 and s 100 of the personal safety Act9 are in the same terms: the person must not contravene the order, and the penalty is level 7 imprisonment (2 years maximum) or a level 7 fine (240 penalty units maximum) or both.
Each section carries a precondition that is easy to read past. Section 123(1) applies where the person has been served with a copy of the order or has had it explained to them under s 57(1), 60G(1) or 96(1); s 100(1) applies where the person has been served or has had the order explained under s 40 or s 76. An order that has been neither served nor explained does not support the contravention offence. The maximum imprisonment under s 123 or s 100 is 2 years, against 10 years under s 21A.
One Victorian reform in this area is enacted but not yet operative, and a dated answer has to say so. Section 37 of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Stalking and Other Matters) Act 2026 (Vic) would insert s 53AAA into the family violence Act, requiring the court, as far as practicable, in considering whether to make an interim order under s 53(1), to have regard to whether the respondent has been misidentified. It sits in Division 3 of Part 2, which s 2(3) and (4) of that Act bring into operation on a day to be proclaimed or, failing an earlier proclamation, on 10 November 2026. The latest consolidation of the family violence Act, incorporating amendments as at 30 September 2026, does not record s 53AAA, so the provision was not in operation at that date and an answer about a hearing before it commences must be given on the unamended Act.4
How the other jurisdictions state the offence
Section numbers and tests do not travel. Each of the seven other jurisdictions covered here states the offence in its own way, and each has its own penalty structure — but the imprisonment maxima are not all distinct, so the figure alone will not tell you which jurisdiction you are in. New South Wales sets five years for the s 13 offence, and five years is also Queensland’s maximum for a basic offence under s 359E(2), South Australia’s maximum for an aggravated offence under s 19AA, and the Australian Capital Territory’s maximum under s 35 for an offence other than an aggravated one where a court order was contravened or the offender possessed an offensive weapon; South Australia’s three years for a basic offence is in turn the Australian Capital Territory’s maximum for an aggravated offence in any other case. Western Australia’s three years for the crime in s 338E(1) when it is not aggravated, and the Northern Territory’s five years under s 189(2)(b), repeat figures already in that list.101112151316 It is the elements, not the number, that distinguish them.
New South Wales. Section 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)10 makes it an offence to stalk or intimidate another person with the intention of causing that person to fear physical or mental harm, and s 13(3) establishes that intention where the person knows the conduct is likely to cause fear. The inclusive definition of stalking in s 8(1) states no requirement that the conduct be repeated or protracted.
Queensland. Section 359B of the Criminal Code (Qld)11 requires conduct intentionally directed at a person, engaged in on any one occasion if protracted or on more than one occasion, and that either would cause the stalked person apprehension or fear of violence reasonably arising in all the circumstances, or causes detriment so arising. That final element is objective: the section requires no intention or belief about the result.
South Australia. Section 19AA of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)12 requires conduct on at least two separate occasions, and either an intention to cause physical or mental harm or serious apprehension or fear, or that the person ought reasonably to have known that such harm or fear would be caused. That objective limb is close to Victoria’s in wording, but the section does not condition it on the result having been caused.
Western Australia. Section 338E(1) of the Criminal Code (WA)13 makes it a crime to pursue another person with intent to intimidate that person or a third person. Section 338E(2) makes it a simple offence, carrying a lower penalty, to pursue another person in a manner that could reasonably be expected to intimidate, and that does in fact intimidate, that person or a third person. That second offence pairs an objective standard with the result, as Victoria’s limb (ii) does, but as a separate and lesser offence rather than an alternative route to the same one. Under s 338D(1), “pursue” includes repeatedly communicating with the person, repeatedly following the person, repeatedly causing the person to receive unsolicited items, and watching or besetting the place where the person lives or works or happens to be; “intimidate” includes causing physical or mental harm or apprehension or fear, preventing or hindering the person from doing a lawful act, and compelling the person to do an act the person is lawfully entitled to abstain from doing. Repetition is written into most of those forms of pursuit but not all: watching or besetting is not expressed to require it, and any of them done in breach of a restraining order or bail condition counts whether or not repeatedly. Section 338D(2) also lets the accused prove that on a particular occasion the accused did not intend to communicate with or follow the person, or did not know the place watched or beset was such a place, and an occasion so proved is not counted. Section 338E(3) gives the accused a defence, which the accused must prove, of having acted with lawful authority.
Tasmania. Section 192 of the Criminal Code (Tas)14 requires intent to cause physical or mental harm including self-harm, extreme humiliation, or apprehension or fear, pursued through a course of conduct that s 192(2)(a) defines as conduct that is sustained or occurs on more than one occasion. Section 192(3) deems that intent where the course of conduct causes the result and the person knew or ought to have known it would be likely to. Extreme humiliation is a Tasmanian result and is not among those in s 21A(3).
Australian Capital Territory. Section 35 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)15 prohibits stalking with intent to cause apprehension or fear of harm, to cause harm, or to harass, and s 35(2) defines stalking as doing one or more listed acts on at least 2 occasions. Section 35(4) takes that intent to be present where the person knows that, or is reckless about whether, stalking would be likely to cause apprehension or fear of harm or to harass.
Northern Territory. Section 189 of the Criminal Code (NT)16 defines stalking as engaging in conduct that includes repeated instances of, or a combination of, listed acts (following, contacting, loitering near places the victim frequents, interfering with property, giving offensive material, keeping the victim under surveillance, or acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to arouse apprehension or fear), with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the victim or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for their own safety or that of another person, where the course of conduct actually did have that result. Section 189(1A) supplies the intention where the offender knows, or in the particular circumstances a reasonable person would have been aware, that a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause such harm or arouse such apprehension or fear. Unlike Victoria’s limb (i), the Territory offence requires the result even where intention is proved.
Two patterns are worth carrying away. On repetition, the Victorian, Queensland, South Australian, Tasmanian and Australian Capital Territory provisions each require conduct that is repeated, protracted or sustained, in their own words, and the Northern Territory requires repeated instances or a combination of listed acts; Western Australia writes repetition into most, but not all, of the forms of pursuit in s 338D(1); and in New South Wales the limiting work falls on the intention element instead. On fault, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory require intention, extended by a knowledge or recklessness provision; Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania add an objective standard as an alternative; Western Australia makes intent to intimidate the crime and puts the objective standard, coupled with the result, in a lesser simple offence; the Northern Territory requires intention, extended by s 189(1A) to what the offender knew or a reasonable person would have been aware of, together with the result; and Queensland states no fault as to the result, putting an objective element in its place.
Applying this in a problem question
- Decide whether the facts raise a prosecution, an application for a protective order, or both, and say which, because the standard of proof and the outcome differ.
- Identify the jurisdiction and go to that jurisdiction’s provision. Do not carry a section number or a test across a border.
- In Victoria, list the occasions, ask whether they were more than one or protracted, then ask separately whether they show a continuity of purpose under s 21A(1B); match at least one act to a paragraph of s 21A(2) and name the paragraph.
- Argue the fault limbs separately: limb (i) on A’s intention or belief, limb (ii) on what A ought to have understood plus proof that the course of conduct did cause harm or fear.
- Check the exclusion in s 21A(4) and the defence in s 21A(4A), and say in each case who must prove what.
- For a protective order, ask whether the parties are family members: if they are, the application is under the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic); if not, under the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic), by s 61(1)(b). Then address the forward-looking element.
- If an order already exists, confirm service or explanation under s 123(1) or s 100(1) before treating a breach as an offence.
Self-check
- Have I said whether the question is about an offence, an order, or both, and named the standard of proof the governing provision states?
- Have I treated repetition and continuity of purpose as separate requirements, and argued each fault limb on its own terms?
- Have I said which party bears the burden for the exclusion and for the defence?
- Have I chosen between the two Victorian Acts on the relationship between the parties, and checked whether the other jurisdiction’s provision requires repetition at all?