Harkins v R
Harkins v R [2015] NSWCCA 263
A man held by two police officers in a car presses the accelerator to break free, and says he was intoxicated. When a court decides what he meant to do with the car, can his intoxication be taken into account?
What happened?
On the evening of 27 July 2013 Constables Conroy and Stennett responded to a call about an attempted break-in in Alexandria and identified a sedan stopped at traffic lights ([4]). The driver, Mr Toutou, got out and told them that the person they wanted was in the car, and they saw the appellant, Aaron Harkins, climbing from the back seat into the front seat and trying to start it while a passenger, Mr Nelson, tried to stop him ([4]). Constable Conroy gave evidence that he took hold of the appellant’s right arm, tried to remove him from the vehicle and tried to turn off the ignition, that the appellant struck his arm, and that the vehicle jumped forward and he was dragged for about ten metres before the appellant let go ([5]).
The appellant gave evidence that he had to get away and denied trying to knock the constable over, drag him along, hit him with the back of the car or run over his foot ([22]).
A District Court judge sitting without a jury convicted the appellant of using an offensive instrument, a motor vehicle, with intent to prevent the lawful apprehension of himself, contrary to s 33B(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ([1]). He accepted the Crown’s submission that it had to prove an intention to use the vehicle as an offensive instrument and an intention to prevent lawful apprehension ([11]). He found that the appellant was intoxicated at the relevant time and that the intoxication was self-induced ([15]). The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, seeking leave on a ground that the verdict was unreasonable and appealing on a ground that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the evidence of intoxication ([2]).
What did the Court decide?
On 29 September 2015 the Court of Criminal Appeal (Macfarlan JA, R A Hulme J and Wilson J) refused leave to appeal on the first ground and dismissed the application for leave to appeal and the appeal ([47]). The third ground, which sought resentencing on another count, arose only if the appellant succeeded on one of the other grounds ([3], [47]). Macfarlan JA gave the reasons ([1]-[47]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Macfarlan JA, with whom R A Hulme J and Wilson J agreed ([48]-[49]), held that the trial judge was correct to conclude that the appellant’s intoxication, which the trial judge had found to be self-induced ([15]), was irrelevant to whether he had the basic or general intent of using the vehicle as an offensive instrument ([40]). He treated s 33B as requiring two kinds of intent. The first is an intention to prevent or hinder lawful apprehension or detention, which is a requirement of specific intent because the relevant intention is to cause a particular result, so that s 428B(2) characterises s 33B as an offence of specific intent ([32]).
The second is an intention to use something as an offensive instrument, which is a general or basic intent relating to the doing of the act in question ([33]). Section 428C allows intoxication to be taken into account in determining whether the person had the intention to cause the specific result necessary for an offence of specific intent, and does not address the basic or general element, at least not expressly ([34]). Section 428D does not address it expressly either, because it concerns offences other than offences of specific intent and s 33B is one ([35]).
Section 428G does not assist, because it is concerned with whether the relevant conduct was voluntary ([36]). Section 428H, by abolishing the common law relating to the effect of intoxication on criminal liability, indicates that the common law principle in R v O’Connor cannot be used to answer the question ([37]). He reasoned that Part 11A, considered as a whole, manifests a legislative intention to preclude intoxication from being taken into account except in the circumstances it identifies, and that, although it does not expressly prohibit regard to intoxication in respect of the basic or general intent, it impliedly achieves that result ([39]-[40]).
The intention to prevent or hinder lawful apprehension is of the type that s 428C covers, but it was not in issue because the trial judge’s finding that it was present was not challenged ([39]). He said that any ambiguity remaining after applying the ordinary rules of construction should be resolved in the appellant’s favour because the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is a penal statute, but that in his view none existed ([40]). He did not regard R v Grant, in which murder in all its forms was held to come within s 428C, as inconsistent with his conclusion ([41]-[44]).
He added that, if the trial judge had misdirected himself, he would still have dismissed the appeal under the proviso to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), because the unchallenged finding that the appellant intended to prevent or hinder his lawful apprehension necessarily encompassed, in the circumstances, the intention to use the vehicle as an offensive instrument ([45]-[46]).
In reaching that conclusion Macfarlan JA set out Brennan J’s discussion in He Kaw Teh v The Queen of voluntariness, general intent and specific intent, and noted that Mason CJ, Brennan J and McHugh J in R v Falconer and the plurality in R v Lavender had approved it ([28]-[29]). Brennan J said that “voluntariness and general intent are distinct mental states” and that general intent and specific intent are also distinct: general or basic intent relates to the doing of the act involved in an offence, and special or specific intent relates to the results caused by the act done ([28]). Macfarlan JA applied that terminology to s 33B, treating the need to prove a general intent as distinct from the additional requirement that the relevant act be voluntary ([33]).
On the first ground, which was that the verdict was unreasonable, Macfarlan JA said that the trial judge had not based his conclusion that the appellant used the vehicle as an offensive instrument on a finding that the appellant was steering towards Constable Conroy, because the conclusion was expressly reached regardless of the direction of the vehicle ([19]). He read the trial judge as having concluded that the appellant used the vehicle as an offensive instrument because he accelerated in order to break the officers’ grips, or attempted grips, on him, and he said that the evidence supported that conclusion ([20]-[21]).
By accelerating the vehicle the appellant successfully used it to break himself free of the officers’ holds, and in his view that constituted use of the vehicle as an offensive weapon “regardless of the fact that he may not have intended that use to harm the police officers” ([23]). He said that the expression has a broad meaning that encompasses using an instrument in a positive fashion to achieve an object, which under s 33B is the prevention or hindrance of lawful apprehension ([24]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Macfarlan JA (R A Hulme J and Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: [32]–[44] (opens in a new tab)
Ground 2 was that the trial judge erred in holding intoxication irrelevant to whether the appellant used the vehicle as an offensive instrument. The conclusion that Part 11A impliedly excludes regard to intoxication on the general intent element of s 33B, and the reasons for it, were necessary to dismissing that ground ([40], [47]). R A Hulme J and Wilson J each agreed with Macfarlan JA ([48]-[49]).
Obiter · Macfarlan JA (R A Hulme J and Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: [45]–[46] (opens in a new tab)
Macfarlan JA says in terms that he would have dismissed the appeal under the proviso even if the trial judge had misdirected himself, on an assumption of misdirection that his reasons reject at [40]. It is an alternative that was unnecessary to the result.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Macfarlan JA (R A Hulme J and Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: [28]–[29] (opens in a new tab), [32]–[33] (opens in a new tab)
The classification of the two intentions in s 33B as specific and general, using the distinction between voluntariness, general intent and specific intent, was a step necessary to the conclusion at [40]. The words about distinct mental states are Brennan J’s in He Kaw Teh, quoted at [28]; Macfarlan JA relies on them and records that the High Court approved them in Falconer and Lavender ([29]).
Proposition 3
Ratio · Macfarlan JA (R A Hulme J and Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: [19]–[24] (opens in a new tab)
The reasoning that use of an instrument to achieve an object, here to break the officers’ holds, can be offensive use without an intention to harm is the reason given for holding the unreasonable-verdict ground without merit and refusing leave ([47]). It is reasoning given on an application for leave on a ground that the verdict was unreasonable, and the order is a refusal of leave, so it should be weighed accordingly.
Why does this case matter?
Intoxication problems are easy to answer from the older common law cases or from one section of the statute, and a student who does so can answer a different question from the one the facts raise. The scenario here, an intoxicated driver trying to get away from police, is a natural examination setting, and an offence with more than one mental element is a natural vehicle for it.
Exam and application relevance
In a New South Wales problem about intoxication, set out each mental element of the offence charged, and ask which provision of Part 11A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), if any, speaks to that element and what the answer is for the evidence of intoxication the facts disclose. Check whose words each statement of principle is before attributing it.
This decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal binds New South Wales trial courts and is persuasive elsewhere, but it does not bind the High Court. It concerned intoxication that the trial judge found to be self-induced ([15]) and Part 11A as the judgment sets it out ([10]); check the provisions in their current form, and remember that other jurisdictions have their own intoxication provisions. Its reasons on the first ground were given on an application for leave to appeal.
Check your understanding
1. What offence was the appellant convicted of, and what was the alleged offensive instrument ([1])?
2. What did Constable Conroy say happened when he tried to remove the appellant from the vehicle and turn off the ignition ([5])?
3. What did the trial judge find about the appellant’s intoxication, and what did he conclude about its relevance ([15])?
4. What two kinds of intention did the trial judge accept the Crown had to prove under s 33B ([11])?
5. Whose words are the statements that voluntariness and general intent are distinct mental states, and which High Court decisions did Macfarlan JA say approved that discussion ([28]-[29])?
6. What orders did the Court make, and what was the status of the third ground ([3], [47])?