Intention to create legal relations: onus, presumptions and government arrangements
What the High Court said about the language of presumptions and the onus of proof in Ermogenous, and how High Court authority treats government announcements and agreements when asking whether the parties meant to be legally bound.
Learning outcomes
- Explain what the joint reasons in Ermogenous said about the language of presumptions, the onus of proof and the risk that a generalisation hardens into a rule.
- Apply the objective inquiry into intention to create legal relations to the circumstances of an arrangement rather than to the label of the relationship.
- Identify the circumstances the High Court has treated as relevant when a government announcement or agreement is said to be a contract, and attribute each to the judgment it comes from.
This article takes up two things the earlier article on intention to create legal relations only gestures at: what the High Court actually said about the language of presumptions in Ermogenous, and how High Court authority has treated arrangements made with government. It rests on identified passages of three High Court decisions: Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002), Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1954) and Placer Development Ltd v The Commonwealth (1969), the last confined principally to the separate reasons of Windeyer J and one sentence of Menzies J. It does not cover family and social arrangements beyond what those decisions say, and it does not cover honour clauses or letters of comfort, because no authority on them is cited here. The practical point for a student is that “the presumption” is a label that hides two different questions, who must prove intention and what the circumstances show, and that a label for one setting can quietly harden into a rule for it.
What the objective inquiry asks
In Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95,1 Archbishop Ermogenous claimed annual leave and long service leave from the Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc, alleging that it had employed him. An Industrial Magistrate found for him. A majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia set the result aside, holding that there had been no intention to create legal relations. The High Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Full Court.
For explanation, the propositions in the joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [24]-[25] are grouped here into three points; the grouping is not the Court’s. First, they begin from the proposition that a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty is of the essence of contract. Second, they say the circumstances may show that the parties did not intend, or cannot be regarded as having intended, to subject their agreement to the adjudication of the courts. Third, they say that the inquiry takes account of the subject-matter of the agreement, the status of the parties, their relationship and the other surrounding circumstances, so that it would be wrong to formulate rules prescribing the kinds of case in which an intention to create contractual relations should or should not be found (at [24]-[25]).
The joint reasons also say that the word “intention” is used in this context in the same sense as in other contractual contexts. It describes what would objectively be conveyed by what was said or done, having regard to the circumstances in which those statements and actions happened. In their words, “It is not a search for the uncommunicated subjective motives or intentions of the parties” (at [25]). A party’s private belief that an arrangement was or was not meant to bind therefore does not decide the question.
What Ermogenous says about presumptions
The earlier article describes the commercial and domestic presumptions as starting points. Ermogenous is more specific, and it is worth reading closely because students tend to overstate it.
The joint reasons said: “we doubt the utility of using the language of presumptions in this context”. They explained that at best the language “does no more than invite attention to identifying the party who bears the onus of proof”. In that case issue was joined about the existence of a legally binding contract, and the joint reasons said there could be no doubt that it was for the appellant, the Archbishop, to demonstrate that there was one. Reference to presumptions, they said, may serve only to distract attention from that more basic proposition (at [26]).
They then identified a second danger. The language of presumptions may lead to treating one proposition, that an intention to create legal relations is not to be presumed, as equivalent to a different proposition, that an arrangement about the remuneration of a minister of religion generally or usually will not give rise to legally enforceable obligations (at [27]). That slide makes proof to the contrary seem especially difficult without saying how it is to be done, and the factor said to justify the second proposition, the spiritual role of a minister, can then be treated as the main reason for not finding intention while the matters pointing the other way are dismissed as collateral. The joint reasons said the second proposition “may rapidly ossify into a rule of law”, that there cannot be a contract of employment of a minister of religion, “distorting the proper application of basic principles of the law of contract” (at [27]). They added that no assumptions can be made that particular principles and practices of church governance, or a particular kind of relationship between clergy and a community, are “usual” or “general” (at [28]).
One way to put the point, which is a gloss and not a statement of the Court, is that a generalisation about a kind of relationship cannot stand in for examining the facts of the case in hand. The joint reasons applied the approach they had described to the Industrial Magistrate’s findings. They said he had examined “all of the objective circumstances which bore on whether the parties intended to make a contract, as distinct from an arrangement binding only in honour” (at [44]). They held that the Full Court’s inference, that there was no intention to create legal relations, was “an inference that was not open on the facts that had been found at trial”, because it depended either on an assumption contrary to the facts found, that the “church” was distinct from the Community, or on discerning from the decided cases a proposition more general or absolute than those decisions warrant (at [45]).
Three limits matter. First, the joint reasons doubted the language of presumptions; they did not hold that no court may use it, and they did not discuss the commercial presumption. This article does not say what Ermogenous implies for presumptions in other settings beyond the reasoning about generalisations set out above. Second, the High Court did not itself decide that the arrangement was a contract of employment. The joint reasons recorded that whether the contract found to have been made was a contract of employment remained for further argument in the Full Court (at [46]). Third, Kirby J gave separate reasons on the issue of intention. He concluded that a proved agreement to provide for the necessities of life of a minister of religion is not one that Australian law will refuse to enforce “because the law presumes a lack of intention to enter legal relations”, and he said that to the extent that English decisions reach a different conclusion on that subject they “do not express the common law of Australia” (at [67]). That is one Justice’s view about ministers of religion, and it should not be attributed to the joint reasons.
Arrangements with government
The earlier article says that government arrangements often lack intention to contract, without authority. The two older High Court decisions below supply some.
Australian Woollen Mills
In Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424,2 a wool manufacturer claimed that the Commonwealth had bound itself to pay a subsidy on wool purchases, relying on official announcements. The joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ held that it was impossible to hold that any contract was constituted binding the Commonwealth to pay a subsidy, and judgment was for the defendant (at 460, 466).
For present purposes the joint judgment’s statement of principle is the useful part. It said: “It is of the essence of contract, regarded as a class of obligations, that there is a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty.” In the setting of an alleged offer to be accepted by doing an act, it followed that what is alleged to be an offer must have been intended to give rise, on the doing of the act, to an obligation, and “in the absence of such an intention, actual or imputed, the alleged ‘offer’ cannot lead to a contract” (at 457). The joint reasons in Ermogenous quote the first of those sentences (at [24]).
The joint judgment then looked at the circumstances in which the announcements were made. It observed that the announcements came “not from a party having a commercial interest in the subject matter but from instrumentalities of a Government”, that the problem was the maintenance of a price structure, that the Government, which had not hitherto entered into any contract in dealing with that problem, was not shown to have a reason to bind itself by contract now, and that public moneys were involved. It added: “if there was an intention on the part of the Government to assume a legal obligation, one would certainly have expected statutory authority to be sought” (at 461). Those are circumstances the Court found relevant in that case. They are not a test. The joint judgment also deals with the question through offer and consideration, so intention was one strand of its reasoning rather than the whole of it.
Placer Development
In Placer Development Ltd v The Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353,3 the High Court considered a 1952 agreement between the Commonwealth and Placer Development Ltd (formerly Bulolo Gold Dredging Ltd), the New Guinea Timber Agreement, which provided for the establishment of a timber company and contained a clause 14 providing for a subsidy of an amount or rate determined by the Commonwealth. Five Justices sat and four judgments were delivered. The order answered “No” to question 4(a), whether the Commonwealth was obliged by the agreement to pay a subsidy, and Windeyer J was in the minority on that question: he would have answered that in the conditions stated in clause 14 the Commonwealth was obliged to determine a subsidy and pay it (at 374). Menzies J, in his own judgment, said of the agreement: “The Agreement is obviously one which was intended to create legal rights and obligations” (at 361). This article otherwise relies only on Windeyer J’s discussion of intention, which he gave before turning to the construction of the clause, and it does not rely on the result.
Windeyer J noted that the agreement had been expressly made subject to the approval of Parliament and was approved by an Act that appropriated money “for the purpose of meeting the liabilities of the Commonwealth arising under or out of the Agreement” (at 365). He described his view of the general question as follows. Whether there was a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty in a particular case “is not to be decided by asking whether or not the parties had expressed or exhibited an actual and positive intention that their agreement was to result in legal obligations”; it depends on an inference drawn from the subject matter and nature of the agreement and the other circumstances (at 366-368). He said that social engagements and domestic arrangements are outside the realm of contract law “simply because the parties to them must be regarded as intending that their mutual promises, whether kept or broken, are not to land them in Court”, and that agreements between an individual and the Government are sometimes said to be in the same position, although in his view for a different reason, which was that promises made by Government were historically not justiciable against the Crown. He continued: “But in Australia today these considerations have disappeared” (at 366-368).
On the agreement before him Windeyer J said it seemed unnecessary to ask whether the parties intended it to create legal rights and obligations, because he thought they obviously did. He considered that Parliament’s approval and the appropriation, “when added to its essentially commercial character and its language”, were enough “to rescue it from the unenforceability which a purely political arrangement has, and to give it a contractual character” (at 366-368). He also noted that in Australian Woollen Mills the Court had said statutory authority would be expected if the Government intended to assume a legal obligation, and that here it had been sought and given (at 366-368).
This is the reasoning of one Justice, who was in the minority on the outcome of question 4(a). It should not be read as the Court’s view on intention. The passage is useful for the factors it identifies, not as the holding of the Court on intention. It shows, together with Australian Woollen Mills, that the High Court has treated the existence of statutory authority and the commercial character of an arrangement as relevant to whether a government arrangement was meant to bind. It does not establish a rule that arrangements without such authority are unenforceable, and it does not address State or Territory governments.
Where the authority sits
All three decisions are decisions of the High Court of Australia. The joint reasons in Ermogenous and the joint judgment in Australian Woollen Mills are reasons of the Court, but the passage relied on from Placer Development is the reasoning of one Justice, who was in the minority on the outcome of one question, and it is persuasive reasoning and not a binding holding of the Court. The decisions state common law principles, which this article treats as not specific to any State or Territory, subject to any statute that deals with a particular arrangement. No such statute is cited here, and the article does not state what any statute provides. Ermogenous is a 2002 decision, and Australian Woollen Mills and Placer Development are older, so a student should check for later treatment of each, and for the later history of Australian Woollen Mills itself, before relying on this article for a current problem; no later treatment of any of them is cited here.
Applying this in a problem question
- State what is in dispute and who asserts that there was a contract. On the reasoning in Ermogenous, the party asserting a contract carries the onus, as the Archbishop did in that case where issue was joined about the existence of a contract.
- Do not begin from the label of the relationship. Identify the subject-matter, the status of the parties, their relationship and the surrounding circumstances, and ask what a reasonable person would conclude from what was said and done. A private, uncommunicated belief about enforceability does not settle it.
- If you reach for a presumption, say whose onus it describes and what facts support the conclusion. The joint reasons in Ermogenous doubted the utility of the language and warned that a generalisation about a type of relationship can harden into a rule, so a statement that “such arrangements are usually not binding” needs facts behind it.
- If one party is a government, ask what the circumstances show about whether it meant to assume a legal obligation. Consider whether the document came from a party with a commercial interest or from an instrumentality of government, whether public moneys are involved and whether statutory authority was sought, as the joint judgment in Australian Woollen Mills did, and the commercial character and wording of the arrangement, as Windeyer J did in Placer Development. Say that the passage from Placer Development is the view of one Justice, who was in the minority on the outcome of one of the questions, and that the other Justices’ views on intention are not stated here.
- Reach a conclusion on the whole of the circumstances and state what the authorities cited here do not establish, for example how later cases have treated these decisions.
Self-check
- Have I said who bears the onus, rather than only naming a presumption?
- Have I based my conclusion on the facts of this arrangement rather than on a generalisation about the kind of relationship?
- Have I attributed the statement about English decisions in Ermogenous to Kirby J alone, and the doubt about presumptions to the joint reasons?
- Have I treated the factors in Australian Woollen Mills and the passage from Windeyer J as relevant circumstances, not as a test or a holding of the whole Court, and said that Windeyer J was in the minority on the outcome of question 4(a)?