Placer Development Ltd v The Commonwealth

High Court of Australia · 1969

ContractContract Formation

Placer Development Ltd v The Commonwealth [1969] HCA 29; (1969) 121 CLR 353

A government promises a subsidy ‘of an amount determined by the Commonwealth from time to time’. Is that a promise the courts can enforce, or a promise that is only as good as the government’s own choice?

What happened?

The New Guinea Timber Agreement of 20 May 1952 was made between the Commonwealth and Bulolo Gold Dredging Ltd, later Placer Development Ltd, which became the plaintiff. It provided for a timber company to produce plywood and other timber products in the Territories. The Agreement took effect only once Parliament approved it, and it was approved by the New Guinea Timber Agreement Act 1952. (Menzies J, at p 361; Windeyer J, at p 365.)

Clause 14 provided that, if customs duty was paid on the importation of the company’s products into Australia and was not remitted, the Commonwealth would pay the company a subsidy on exportation of an amount or at a rate determined by the Commonwealth from time to time. The subsidy could not exceed the duty paid and not remitted. (Kitto J, at p 354; Taylor and Owen JJ, at p 358.)

From 1959 to 1963 more than three quarters of the company’s products came in free of duty, and duty was paid and not remitted on the balance. No subsidy was paid for those years, and no amount or rate had been determined. (Kitto J, at p 355; Taylor and Owen JJ, at p 359.)

The plaintiff asked the Court, on a case stated, to declare its rights under clause 14. The questions were whether the Commonwealth was obliged to determine a subsidy that recouped the duty, whether it was obliged to pay such a subsidy, and whether it was obliged to pay a subsidy at all. Question 4(a) named the plaintiff as the payee. Kitto J treated that as a mistake for the timber company and answered the question on that footing (Kitto J, at pp 355-356).

What did the Court decide?

The Court answered questions 2, 3 and 4(a) No. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the Commonwealth’s costs of the case stated. The Justices did not all answer the fourth question alike, and the reasons are separate.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

A promise to pay an amount that the promisor will later fix in its own discretion, where the agreement gives no criteria for the amount, creates no enforceable contractual obligation to pay anything. Kitto J held that a governmental promise of this kind is in substance a promise to pay what Parliament decides. Taylor and Owen JJ held that the clause was illusory because nothing identified how the amount was to be determined. Menzies J and Windeyer J dissented on the fourth question. Menzies J held that the clause obliged the Commonwealth to determine a subsidy and pay it. Windeyer J held that Parliament’s approval and appropriation, and the agreement’s commercial character, gave the promise contractual force, and that proof of actual intention was not required. He held that the Commonwealth’s discretion over the amount did not extend to fixing an illusory subsidy.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Kitto J

Read judgment: p 357 (opens in a new tab)

Kitto J held that a promise of a governmental subsidy whose quantum is left to the Commonwealth has no criteria by which a court could fix the amount, so the promise is in substance one to pay whatever Parliament decides, and creates no contractual obligation. That is the ground for his answer to question 4(a), so it is ratio for his reasons.

Ratio · Taylor and Owen JJ

Read judgment: p 361 (opens in a new tab)

Taylor and Owen JJ treated the clause as an illusory promise, following Pollock and the master-and-servant cases, because the agreement supplied no identifiable criteria for the amount. They concluded the clause was no more than a promise to pay what the Commonwealth thought fit, and was wholly unenforceable. Their reasons are a separate ground from Kitto J’s, and they answered question 4(a) No for it.

Separate reasoning · Menzies J (dissenting on question 4(a))

Read judgment: pp 364–365 (opens in a new tab)

Menzies J held that the question is one of interpretation: clause 14 requires the Commonwealth to determine a subsidy and pay the subsidy determined, and the answer to that question should be Yes. He did not regard a promise to determine a subsidy within a stated limit as illusory. He would have answered question 4(a) Yes, so his reasons are a dissent on the outcome of that question.

Separate reasoning · Windeyer J (dissenting on question 4(a))

Read judgment: pp 366–368 (opens in a new tab), pp 369–374 (opens in a new tab)

On intention, Windeyer J held that whether there was a voluntary assumption of a legally enforceable duty does not turn on an actual and positive intention, but on an inference from the agreement’s subject matter, its nature and the surrounding circumstances; Parliament’s approval and appropriation rescued the agreement from being merely political. On the illusory argument he rejected the view that a discretion over amount made the promise illusory, but he limited the Commonwealth’s discretion: an absolute discretion to determine the subsidy, yes, but not a discretion to determine an illusory subsidy. He answered question 4(a) Yes, with 4(b) Yes and 4(c) unnecessary. He dissented on that outcome.

Why does this case matter?

A student may assume that a promise is enforceable whenever it uses the language of obligation and is in writing. This case asks whether a promise to fix an amount has any content at all when the promisor alone decides the amount. The answer shapes how a court treats an agreement that leaves the price to one party, and the Justices who answered it differently did so on different grounds.

Exam and application relevance

Use Placer for an agreement that leaves a sum, a rate or a term to one party’s discretion, especially a government or a statutory body. Set out the three questions the case turns on: whether the promise is illusory, whether the agreement can be read as a duty to determine and pay, and whether the government context changes the answer. Keep the majority and dissenting reasons apart, and state the outcome of each question separately. Do not present Windeyer J’s intention analysis as the Court’s ground, since the Court did not adopt it on the outcome.

Check your understanding

1. On the fourth question, which Justices answered No, and which would have answered Yes?

2. Why did Taylor and Owen JJ regard the clause as illusory, and how did Menzies J distinguish the cases they relied on?

3. What did Windeyer J say was required to find a contractual obligation in an agreement with the Government, and what did he find sufficient here?