Land contracts in writing: the memorandum and part performance
What counts as a sufficient note or memorandum under the statutory writing requirement for land contracts, how part performance operates where there is none, and how electronic form is treated, stated for New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland.
Learning outcomes
- Identify the statutory provision requiring writing for a contract for the sale or other disposition of land in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and state how its wording differs.
- Apply Pirie v Saunders to decide whether a document is a sufficient note or memorandum of a concluded agreement.
- Explain, from Regent v Millett, the test for part performance and the status of taking possession, and say what that decision left undecided.
- State what s 54A(4) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) does and does not say about contracts made and signed electronically.
A contract for the sale or other disposition of land is subject to a statutory writing requirement in each of the jurisdictions covered here. Before asking whether such a contract can be enforced, a student must ask a prior question: which State or Territory’s provision applies, because the writing requirement is statutory and its wording is not the same everywhere. This article states the provisions of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and does not state the law of the other jurisdictions. It takes two questions that the general article on formalities leaves thin: what counts as a sufficient note or memorandum, and what the High Court has said about part performance as the way round an absent one.
The statutory bar in New South Wales
In New South Wales the requirement is in s 54A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).1 No action or proceedings may be brought upon a contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the agreement on which the action is brought, or some memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or by some other person lawfully authorised by that party. The section is framed as a bar on bringing an action. The text does not say that a contract without writing is void.
Three further subsections matter. Section 54A(2) provides that the section “does not affect the law relating to part performance, or sales by the court”. Section 54A(3) applies the section to land under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). Section 54A(4) provides that a contract referred to in s 54A(1) “is not invalidated or rendered unenforceable only because it has been created in electronic form and electronically signed or attested”. These are the words of the section as published on AustLII, which shows the Act as at 14 August 2026.
In Pirie v Saunders (1961) 104 CLR 149, discussed below, the defence pleaded that there was no memorandum or note in writing signed by the defendants, who were the parties sued.
Victoria and Queensland
The Victorian provision is s 126(1) of the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic).2 Its text differs from the New South Wales section. It provides that an action must not be brought upon a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land, and also upon a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person. It requires the agreement, or a memorandum or note of it, to be in writing signed by the person to be charged or by a person lawfully authorised in writing by that person. Section 126(2) declares that the requirements of s 126(1) may be met in accordance with the Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic); the content of that Act is not stated here.
The Queensland provision is now in the Property Law Act 2023 (Qld), which s 237 of that Act provides repeals the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld).3 The earlier writing provision of the 1974 Act was s 59. Section 7 of the 2023 Act provides that a contract for the disposition of land is not enforceable by action in a proceeding unless the contract is in writing or some memorandum or note of the contract is recorded in writing, and the contract, memorandum or note is signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced. It is framed as unenforceability by action, and it does not repeat the express reference to a person lawfully authorised to sign that appeared in the 1974 provision. Section 239A of the 2023 Act declares, to remove doubt, that omitting an express reference to signing by a lawfully authorised agent does not limit or otherwise affect the application of the general law of agency to the corresponding provision. Section 10(1)(b) provides that Division 1 of Part 2, in which s 7 sits, does not affect the application of the law relating to part performance. The commencement of the 2023 Act, which s 2 leaves to proclamation, and the transitional provisions for contracts made before it commenced are not stated here, so a problem about an older Queensland contract needs those checked.
The Victorian text stated here is Version No 123 incorporating amendments as at 6 September 2023, and the Queensland text is the version of the 2023 Act published on AustLII as at 28 April 2026. Later amendments to either are not covered, so check for them. The provisions of Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory are not stated here, and a student must find and read the provision of the jurisdiction in the problem.
What a sufficient note or memorandum requires
Pirie v Saunders (1961) 104 CLR 1494 is a decision of the High Court on s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), delivered as the judgment of the Court (Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ). The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement by the defendants to grant him a lease of shop premises. Before the Full Court and the High Court the only document he relied on was a solicitor’s note of the instructions the defendants had given for the preparation of a draft lease. It listed the parties, a property described as “part of Lot B Princes Highway, Sylvania Heights”, a term of five years with a two-year option, the rent, a premium and other items, and ended with a special condition to be checked. Neither defendant had signed it. A majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court had treated the defendants’ names on the document as signatures if the defendants recognised the writing as an authentic record of the earlier oral bargain.
The High Court allowed the appeal. The Court’s reasons, grouped here under three headings that are not the Court’s own, make the following points.
First, the document must be recognisable as a note or memorandum of a concluded agreement. The Court said that the principle applied by the majority “can ... have no application to any document which is not in some way or other recognizable as a note or memorandum of a concluded agreement”. The solicitor’s note purported to be, and was, a brief notation of instructions for preparing a draft lease for submission to the other side. The Court said that neither its existence nor its contents indicated the existence of any binding contract, and that it was consistent with the parties not yet having made one.
Secondly, the memorandum need not have been made after the contract. The Court said it did not mean that the note must always appear to have been made after the contract was made, because a written proposal or offer may, on being accepted, become recognisable by the conduct of the parties as a sufficient note of the resulting contract. The Court cited earlier English authorities for that, and held that the case before it was not such a case.
Thirdly, the Court gave further reasons why the note could not suffice, which it introduced by saying that even if its earlier objections were not properly founded there were several. The note did not specify the property beyond the description quoted above, which the Court thought “a fatal objection” by itself. It did not contain all the terms of the proposed lease, because it contemplated special conditions to be formulated after the requirements of the Board of Health were ascertained. And it could not support the agreement sued on, which was an agreement in the terms alleged in the declaration.
The Court also considered that nothing in the evidence suggested that the defendant who gave the instructions knew what the solicitor wrote down, so that no inference that he recognised the writing as a record of an earlier oral bargain could be drawn from his having “stood by”. The Court did not decide whether an oral contract had been made. It said that it would not be proper at that stage to examine the evidence on that question.
Part performance
Where there is no sufficient writing, equity’s doctrine of part performance may allow the contract to be enforced. In New South Wales s 54A(2) preserves it, by providing that the section does not affect the law relating to part performance.
A High Court statement of the doctrine is Regent v Millett (1976) 133 CLR 679.5 The reasons were given by Gibbs J, and Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ each agreed. The respondents alleged an oral agreement that, in consideration of their paying off the mortgage over a house the appellants owned and repaying the appellants $1,000, they would live in the house and have it transferred to them. They went into possession, effected repairs, carried out renovations and made mortgage repayments. The appellants pleaded s 54A, and there was no suggestion that the agreement was evidenced in writing, so the only question was whether there was part performance. The appeal against the order for specific performance was dismissed.
Gibbs J’s reasons include the following points.
- The test. He accepted the statement of Lord Selborne LC in Maddison v Alderson that the acts relied on must be “unequivocally, and in their own nature, referable to some such agreement as that alleged”. He rejected the narrower submission that the acts must be such a performance as necessarily implies the existence of the contract. It is enough that the acts are unequivocally and in their own nature referable to some contract of the general nature of that alleged.
- Possession. He held that the giving and taking of possession was by itself sufficient part performance on the facts, and so found it unnecessary to consider whether the other acts would also be enough. He quoted a description of change of possession from Williams’s work on the Statute of Frauds as “the act of part performance par excellence”, and noted that it may be proved that the taking of possession was referable to some other authority than the contract alleged.
- Acts not required by the contract. The contract did not require the respondents to take possession, but Gibbs J said that if acts of part performance had to be done in compliance with a requirement of the contract, the utility of the doctrine would be reduced to vanishing point. If a vendor permits a purchaser to take the possession to which a contract of sale entitles the purchaser, the giving and taking of possession will amount to part performance even though the purchaser was entitled rather than bound to take it.
Gibbs J said that if the reasoning in Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536 were accepted, the appellants’ arguments must fail, but that it was unnecessary to consider the questions raised by that case. A student should therefore not cite Regent v Millett as deciding what the Australian position is on the questions Steadman v Steadman raised.
Regent v Millett was decided on s 54A of the New South Wales Act, which expressly preserves part performance. In Queensland, s 10(1)(b) of the Property Law Act 2023 (Qld) provides that Division 1 of Part 2 does not affect the application of the law relating to part performance; no Queensland decision on part performance under that Act is cited here. Whether and how the doctrine operates against s 126 of the Victorian Act is not stated here.
Electronic form
Section 54A(4) of the New South Wales Act answers the question whether a land contract made and signed electronically can satisfy the section: such a contract is not invalidated or rendered unenforceable only because it was created in electronic form and electronically signed or attested. The word “only” matters. The subsection does not say that every electronic document is a sufficient memorandum, and the requirements of s 54A(1), including that the writing be signed by the party to be charged or an authorised person and that it be a note or memorandum of the agreement, still have to be met. In Victoria s 126(2) refers to the Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic), the content of which is not stated here. The text of s 7 of the Queensland Act says nothing about electronic form, and Queensland’s electronic transactions legislation is not stated here. No decision on email, text message or an electronic signature as a sufficient memorandum is cited here.
Applying this in a problem question
- Fix the jurisdiction and the subject matter. If the contract is for the sale or other disposition of land or an interest in land in New South Wales, Victoria or Queensland, identify s 54A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 126(1) of the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic) or s 7 of the Property Law Act 2023 (Qld) respectively; for any other jurisdiction, find and read its provision before stating a rule.
- Identify the party to be charged, as the provision words it (in Pirie v Saunders the defendants), and look for a writing signed by that party or by a person authorised as the provision requires.
- Ask whether any document is recognisable as a note or memorandum of a concluded agreement, and not only a record of negotiations or instructions for a draft contract. If a document is relied on, check that it identifies the property and contains the terms of the agreement sued on, as Pirie v Saunders did.
- If there is no sufficient writing, consider part performance. In New South Wales s 54A(2) preserves it and in Queensland s 10(1)(b) of the 2023 Act does; for Victoria, say that this article does not state how the doctrine operates against s 126. Ask whether the acts relied on, such as taking possession, are unequivocally referable to a contract of the general nature alleged, and whether they can be shown to be referable to some other authority.
- If the contract or signature was electronic, state the jurisdiction’s electronic transactions provision and say that it does not by itself make every electronic document a sufficient memorandum.
Self-check
- Have I named the State or Territory and the section before stating that writing is required?
- Have I said that the New South Wales text bars an action and does not say the contract is void?
- Have I tested the document against Pirie v Saunders, including whether it is recognisable as a note of a concluded agreement and describes the property?
- Have I attributed the part performance reasoning to Gibbs J, with the other Justices agreeing, and noted what Regent v Millett left undecided?
- Have I avoided stating the Victorian position on part performance, which the authorities cited here do not establish?
Where the authority sits
The writing requirement is statutory and differs between jurisdictions. Pirie v Saunders and Regent v Millett are High Court decisions on s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), and they bind on what they decided; in other jurisdictions, and under the Queensland Act of 2023, their application depends on the provision in issue. This article does not cover guarantees, equitable estoppel as an alternative to part performance, deeds or regulatory formalities; the general article on formalities touches on them.