Worth v Clasohm
Worth v Clasohm (1952) 86 CLR 439
An elderly woman is said to believe her relatives are poisoning her food, yet she signs a rational will after seeing two independent advisers. Does a doubt about her mind decide the matter, and who must dispel it?
What happened?
Mary Jane Worth, a widow with no children, died on 29 August 1950. She was 86 when she made the will in dispute, which was dated 14 December 1949. It was the fourth she had made that year: the first two were prepared by one solicitor in February and March 1949 and the third in October 1949 by another firm. The will in dispute was drawn by a solicitor whom the Court describes as her nephew and as one of her late husband’s relatives, and who was left the residue of the estate, with legacies of 500 pounds to her sister, several nephews and two friends. Before it was signed a doctor examined her and reported her mentally alert, and on the day of signing another solicitor who practised in the same building went through the will with her.
Her two brothers, who would have shared an intestacy, disputed the will. They said she had not been of sound mind, memory and understanding. At trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia, Reed J found that she was suffering from senile degeneration and that she had had a delusion that relatives with whom she lived were poisoning her food. Feeling unable to say that the solicitor had satisfied him judicially that the will was that of a free and capable testatrix, he dismissed the action (86 CLR at 441-442). The solicitor appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal in a single joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ, delivered as the judgment of the Court. It discharged the order of the Supreme Court of South Australia and pronounced in favour of the will of 14 December 1949, with the costs of the suit and of the appeal, as between solicitor and client, to be paid out of the estate.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court accepted that the trial judge was right to treat the circumstances as ones that ought to excite suspicion, and to examine the evidence vigilantly: the will had been drawn by the person it benefited (86 CLR at 442). It held that a doubt about the testatrix’s capacity had been raised, so the solicitor bore the burden of satisfying the conscience of the court that she retained her mental powers to the requisite extent. But he was not required to answer the doubt by proof to the point of complete demonstration or by proof beyond reasonable doubt; the Court said that the criminal standard of proof has no place in the trial of an issue as to testamentary capacity in a probate action.
The effect of a doubt, initially, is to require a vigilant examination of the whole of the evidence the parties place before the court. Once that examination has been made, a residual doubt is not enough to defeat probate unless the court feels it to be substantial enough to preclude a belief that the document is the will of a testatrix who possessed sound mind, memory and understanding at the time of its execution. (86 CLR at 452-453.)
On delusion, the Court set out two descriptions: a belief which is not true to fact, which cannot be corrected by an appeal to reason and which is out of harmony with the individual’s education and surroundings (from Halsbury), and a fixed and incorrigible false belief which the victim could not be reasoned out of (from Bull v Fulton). It then examined the evidence of delusion. Mrs Dugan’s account of how often the testatrix spoke of poisoning was not consistent, and she described nothing else suggesting irrationality; Dr Goode was a general practitioner whose evidence about the delusion was almost confined to 1946 and whose account of a conversation with the solicitor was found to be mistaken.
Against that evidence the Court set the content of the four wills made in 1949, the impressions of the solicitors who prepared and witnessed them, and the examination by Dr Erichsen, who thought her capacity quite good, and it concluded that there was ample ground to believe that the will was that of a testatrix of sound mind, memory and understanding, noting that she had appeared completely sane to many competent observers and had made a completely rational will. (86 CLR at 448-453.)
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Only selected propositions are annotated. An unmarked proposition has not been classified.
Proposition 1
Ratio · the Court (Dixon CJ, Webb and Kitto JJ), one joint judgment
Read judgment: pp 452–453 (opens in a new tab)
This statement of the burden and standard is the reason the Court gave for holding that Reed J’s residual doubt was not enough to refuse probate, so it is necessary to the ground on which the appeal was allowed.
Why does this case matter?
Students often write a capacity answer as a contest between a doctor’s label and the contents of the will. The marks are in the steps between those two, and the case gives a concrete set of witnesses to rehearse them on.
Exam and application relevance
Cite Worth v Clasohm for the Court’s statement of the burden of proof and standard of proof where a doubt about capacity is raised, and as an example of the Court weighing evidence of delusion against the contents of the wills and the observations of those who dealt with the testatrix at the time. The outcome rested on the particular evidence in the case, so an answer should argue from the facts of the problem as the Court did, naming what each witness actually said or did.
Check your understanding
1. Who delivered the judgment of the High Court, and what order did it make?
2. What did the Court say about the standard of proof an applicant for probate must meet once a doubt about capacity has been raised, and what did it say about the criminal standard?
3. What features of the evidence led the Court to differ from Reed J, even though it accepted that the evidence of Mrs Dugan and Dr Goode raised a doubt?