Timbury v Coffee
Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277
A husband gave his solicitor clear, businesslike instructions for a will and signed it sober. He believed his wife unfaithful on improbable stories. Did a will that looked rational at signing show capacity?
What happened?
Angus Coffee, a grazier at Roma in Queensland, died on 7 November 1939 aged about forty-three. He had married a widow with four children in October 1936 and made four wills between October 1937 and October 1938. The first left everything to his wife. The second, in February 1938, gave her the income of his estate while she remained a widow and left the capital to his sister. The third, in August 1938, again left her everything. The fourth, on 22 October 1938, reverted substantially to the second.
He was a dipsomaniac. He suffered repeated drinking bouts, was taken to hospital more than once with delirium tremens and delusions, and in between appeared active, intelligent and businesslike. He also became suspicious of his wife and accused her of unfaithfulness with several men, including a disabled soldier who had been a friend of her family and stayed at the property. When he made the last will he was sober and rational in demeanour, and he had written to his usual solicitor with clear instructions. No medical evidence was called by either side.
The executors named in the last will sued to establish it, and the widow counterclaimed for probate of the August will. A jury found that the testator was not of sound mind, memory and understanding when he executed the will of 22 October 1938, but that he was when he executed the will of 20 August 1938. Probate was refused of the last will and granted of the August will. The executors’ motion to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland, for judgment or a new trial, failed, and they appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court (Rich ACJ, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ) dismissed the appeal with costs. It allowed a cross-appeal about costs and varied the Full Court’s order by discharging the direction that the appellants’ costs of their appeal be taxed as between solicitor and client and paid out of the estate. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, those of the respondent Mrs Maher as of a submitting respondent.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Each of the four Justices gave separate reasons for upholding the jury’s finding on capacity.
Dixon J gave the fullest. He observed that, but for the testator’s statements about his wife and his liability to bouts of alcoholism, nothing would have suggested incapacity: the will followed a clear and intelligent letter of instructions to his usual solicitor and he was sober and rational in demeanour when he signed. He held that the jury was nevertheless right not to be reasonably satisfied, on the proofs offered, that the testator had testamentary capacity when he made the will.
He took from the cases the principle that a will rational on its face and duly executed is presumed to be the work of a person of competent understanding unless circumstances counterbalance the presumption, and that in the end the tribunal must be able affirmatively, on a review of the whole evidence, to declare itself satisfied of the testator’s competence at the time of execution. He said that the burden of proof of testamentary capacity lies finally upon the executors where the evidence leaves the matter doubtful.
Dixon J said that the question was not how far a rational man, suspicious by nature, might have formed the same views from his wife’s conduct and associations. On the evidence the testator was an alcoholic paranoiac. With the withdrawal of alcohol such a person may be perfectly normal in perceptions, rational in his train of thought and good in memory while his judgment remains disordered for a considerable time, and the Court is not bound to apply views held a century earlier about mental disturbance and to disregard modern understanding. The balance of probability was that the testator’s suspicions, distrust and hostility towards his wife were the characteristic consequences of his alcoholism, and a finding that they showed a judgment too disturbed for a finding of capacity on 22 October was not inconsistent with a valid will on 20 August, made during an intermission in the obsession.
McTiernan J agreed that the onus rested on the appellants and that there was substantial evidence of capacity in the instructions and the testator’s conduct of his affairs, but held that the evidence of persistent drunkenness and of suspicions about his wife that so far exceeded anything her conduct could explain as to amount to pure fantasy was enough for the jury to find an insane delusion that influenced the will of 22 October; the earlier will showed no sign of that influence, so the jury could find that it was made in a lucid interval.
Williams J, applying the language of Cockburn CJ in Banks v Goodfellow, held that the jury was entitled to find that the testator’s estimate of his wife was so irrational as to be due to an aberration of his intellect, more than the natural outcome of an intensely jealous mind whose underlying judgment was sound, and that the plaintiffs had to establish the testator’s competence to make the will and the jury’s answer showed that they had failed to do so. Rich ACJ treated capacity as a question of fact and held that the facts warranted the jury’s conclusion.
On the cross-appeal Rich ACJ, Dixon J and Williams J held that the Full Court should not have ordered that the unsuccessful appellants’ costs be paid out of the estate; McTiernan J would have dismissed the cross-appeal.
Why does this case matter?
Students often treat a will that reads sensibly, drawn on clear instructions and signed by someone who seems normal, as one that must stand unless the opponent proves insanity. An examiner looks for the step between “he seemed rational” and “he had capacity”, and for the student who asks what a doctor or a court would make of the history.
Exam and application relevance
Cite Timbury for how the Justices approached capacity where the will is rational on its face and the testator appears normal when he makes it but has a medical history that bears on his judgment, attributing each step: Dixon J for the statements of the tribunal’s task and of the burden and for the point about modern medical understanding, McTiernan J and Williams J for their reasons on the delusion, and Rich ACJ for treating capacity as a question of fact. The decision was on a jury’s finding on the evidence in that case and no medical evidence was led, so argue from the facts of the problem rather than treating alcoholism or suspicion as incapacity in itself. The case is a 1941 decision on the general law of testamentary capacity, so check the governing statute and any later authority on capacity before relying on it for a current problem.
Check your understanding
1. How many separate judgments were delivered, and what did the Court order on the appeal and on the cross-appeal?
2. According to Dixon J, what must a tribunal be able to say about the testator’s competence at the time of execution, and who bears the burden where the evidence leaves the matter doubtful?
3. Why did the jury’s finding that the August 1938 will was valid not contradict its finding about the October will?