Lippe v Hedderwick

High Court of Australia · 1922

SuccessionSuccession Framework

Lippe v Hedderwick (1922) 31 CLR 148

A woman signs a new will that turns out to be invalid, and after her death her earlier will cannot be found. Is the earlier will revoked, and who has to prove it?

What happened?

In February 1921 Mrs Lippe duly executed a will, which was left with her solicitors; one of the partners, Mr Hedderwick, was its executor. In May 1921 she had a document prepared in the form of a will that purported, among other things, to revoke all other testamentary dispositions. She signed it on 31 May in the presence of one witness, who also signed, and on the same day wrote to her solicitors asking them to send her will up so that she could look it over and make some alterations.

A second person signed the new document as a witness in her presence on the morning of 1 June. That day Mr Hedderwick posted her the February will, and it reached her about 7 June. On 9 June she sent the new document to Mr Hedderwick with a letter saying that she enclosed a new will that she wished kept unopened. She then went to Sydney, where she died on 14 June 1921.

The new document had not been properly executed as a will and could not be admitted to probate. After her death a search among her effects found no trace of the February will. Probate of a draft of that will was sought, and the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered that it issue. Her husband opposed. He said that she had died intestate, because the new document was informal and the February will had been revoked. To prove revocation he offered evidence that the February will had been traced to her possession on 7 June and could not be found among her effects, and argued that it should be presumed that she destroyed it with the intention of revoking it within the meaning of s 18(4) of the Wills Act 1915 (Vic). He appealed to the High Court.

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (Knox CJ, Powers and Starke JJ) dismissed the appeal against the order for probate of the draft of the February 1921 will. It varied the Supreme Court’s order only as to costs, so that the husband’s costs in the Supreme Court were paid out of the estate, and ordered him to pay the costs of the appeal, with the costs payable by and to him set off against each other.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Knox CJ gave the principal reasons; Powers J agreed with his judgment and the reasons he gave; Starke J gave short separate reasons on the facts.

Knox CJ began from the rule, which he took from Lord Penzance in Benson v Benson and Sir C Cresswell in Harris v Berrell, that when a will is proved to have been duly executed the court must be satisfied that it has been revoked before pronouncing against it, and the burden of showing revocation lies on the party who sets it up. It was admitted that the February will had been duly executed, and the later document, being ineffective as a will, had not revoked it. The remaining ground was destruction, and destruction is a ground of revocation only if it is done with the intention of revoking the will (animo revocandi).

On the facts, his Honour considered it clear from the evidence, especially the letter of 9 June to the solicitors, that after the second witness signed on 1 June Mrs Lippe was under the impression that the new document was a valid testamentary disposition, and that she must have believed that by executing it she had revoked her previous will. Assuming that she destroyed the February will, it must have been after 7 June, when she received it. The proper inference was that she destroyed it not for the purpose of revoking it but in the belief that she had already revoked it, so that it was of no effect whatever.

He did not regard the case as one of dependent relative revocation; it fell, he thought, within the cases dealing with destruction or obliteration of an existing will under a mistake of law or of fact, or of both, citing Perrott v Perrott as followed in Beardsley v Lacey. The appellant had therefore failed to establish that she destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.

Starke J treated the question as one of fact: was the February will destroyed with the intention of revoking it, or under the mistaken notion that she had completed another will when in fact and in law she had not? He thought the better view of the evidence was the second, and that destruction in those circumstances is ineffective.

Why does this case matter?

Students often treat a missing will as a revoked will. An examiner is looking for the step between “the will cannot be found” and “the will is revoked”, and for the student who identifies what has to be shown at that step and by whom.

Exam and application relevance

Cite Lippe for the burden of proof on revocation and the intention required for revocation by destruction. The decision was made under s 18(4) of the Wills Act 1915 (Vic), so an answer under a different or later Act should check the revocation provision of the governing statute before relying on the same reasoning. The result turned on the inference drawn from Mrs Lippe’s own letters and the timing of events, so argue from the facts of the problem: what the testator believed about any later document when the earlier will was destroyed.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices heard the appeal, and what did the Court do with the order of the Supreme Court?

2. According to Knox CJ, once a will is proved to have been duly executed, who must prove that it was revoked, and when is destruction of a will a ground of revocation?

3. Why did Knox CJ say that this was not a case of dependent relative revocation, and which line of cases did he place it in?