WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23
A coal miner worked a fixed roster for almost four years under six written ‘casual’ contracts. What would have to be in his contracts, and what does not count, for him to be something other than a casual employee?
Qualified by legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), from 26 August 2024
Section 15A of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), substituted with effect from 26 August 2024 (item 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes No. 2) Act 2024), requires the absence of a firm advance commitment to be assessed on the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the employment relationship, and provides that a firm advance commitment can be a mutual understanding or expectation that does not rise to a contractual term, which may be inferred from conduct after the contract is made or from how it is performed (s 15A(2)(a)-(b), (3)(a)). Rossato’s holding that only enforceable terms count, and its refusal to examine the real substance of the relationship, therefore no longer states the test under the Act. Its account of the contractual materials in that case, and the point that a regular roster is compatible with casual employment, remain illustrations of how a contract can lack a firm advance commitment.
What happened?
WorkPac, a labour-hire company, supplied workers to Glencore’s coal mines at Collinsville and Newlands in Queensland ([1]). Mr Rossato, an experienced production worker in open-cut coal mining, was employed by WorkPac between 28 July 2014 and 9 April 2018, when he retired, under a series of six contracts, each called an “assignment” and set out in a document entitled a Notice of Offer of Casual Employment ([2], [13]). WorkPac treated him as a casual employee throughout ([2]). His hours were set by shift rosters issued by Glencore, up to a year ahead, in patterns such as seven days on and seven days off ([18], [20]); apart from some stoppages and absences, he was never asked by WorkPac or Glencore whether he intended to attend on a rostered day, and never enquired whether he would be required to attend ([21]-[22]). His contracts described the rates he was paid by reference to a casual loading ([77]-[80]).
On 16 August 2018 the Full Federal Court held in WorkPac v Skene that a worker employed in similar circumstances was not a casual employee for the purposes of s 86 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ([3]). Relying on that decision, Mr Rossato wrote to WorkPac claiming that he had not worked as a casual employee and was entitled to be paid for untaken annual leave, public holidays, and personal and compassionate leave ([4]). WorkPac sought declarations that he had been a casual employee under the Act and the enterprise agreement ([5]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Bromberg, White and Wheelahan JJ) concluded that he was not a casual employee for those purposes and made declarations that he was entitled to the payments claimed ([8]).
Between the filing of WorkPac’s appeal and its hearing, Parliament inserted a definition of “casual employee” into the Act. The joint reasons recorded that WorkPac did not seek to rely on the amendments in its argument about the proper construction of the term ([10]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed WorkPac’s appeal and set aside the Full Court’s orders. In their place, it declared that Mr Rossato was a casual employee for the purposes of ss 86, 95 and 106 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in respect of each of the six assignments, and a “Casual Field Team Member” for the purposes of the enterprise agreement (orders; [107]). Because of that result, it was unnecessary to consider WorkPac’s alternative ground about set-off and restitution ([9]). There were two sets of reasons: the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ ([1]-[108]), and the reasons of Gageler J, who agreed with the orders ([109]-[119]). The question the Court addressed was whether Mr Rossato was a casual employee for the purposes of the Act and the enterprise agreement.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The parties accepted, before the Full Court and in the High Court, that a casual employee under the Act, before it defined the term, is an employee with no “firm advance commitment as to the duration of the employee’s employment or the days (or hours) the employee will work” ([32]). The joint reasons held that the search for the existence or otherwise of a firm advance commitment “must be for enforceable terms, and not unenforceable expectations or understandings that might be said to reflect the manner in which the parties performed their agreement” ([57]).
Something that is not binding cannot meaningfully be described as a commitment, and an “amorphous, innominate hope or expectation falling short of a binding promise enforceable by the courts” is not sufficient to deprive an agreement for casual employment of that character ([61]). Mutual undertakings may be express or implied, but implied undertakings cannot be inconsistent with express terms, and undertakings inferred from conduct may take effect as contractual variations; it is because contracts, as originally agreed or as varied, create binding obligations that they constitute firm advance commitments ([65]).
Where the parties have committed the terms of the employment relationship to a written contract and thereafter adhered to those terms, it is to those terms that one must look to determine the character of the relationship, and the Full Court in Skene, in looking to “the real substance, practical reality and true nature of that relationship”, strayed from the orthodox path ([66]-[67]). The joint reasons also treated provisions of the Act that contemplate casual employment on a regular and systematic basis (ss 65(2) and 384(2)) as strong indications that a mere expectation of continuing employment, however reasonable, is not a basis for distinguishing the employment of other employees from that of a casual employee ([49]-[53]).
Applying that approach, the joint reasons held that clauses 5.1, 5.3 and 5.5 of the General Conditions were critical. They made the employment “assignment-by-assignment”, let Mr Rossato accept or reject an offer of an assignment and left WorkPac under no obligation to offer any further assignment, so that on their plain and ordinary meaning the parties deliberately avoided a firm commitment to ongoing employment once an assignment was completed, and on the test the parties accepted Mr Rossato was a casual employee ([88]-[89]). Clauses 5.6 and 5.12, which allowed variation and termination of an assignment on one hour’s notice, pointed the same way ([90]), and cl 5.4, under which Mr Rossato agreed to complete an assignment, could not be understood to impose an obligation to work beyond the completion of an assignment ([91]-[92]).
The fixing of his hours by rosters up to a year in advance was of limited significance. The regularity and systematic organisation that the rosters gave each assignment were entirely compatible with casual employment; what was absent was a firm advance commitment to continuing work beyond the particular assignment, and a reasonable expectation of continuing employment on a regular and systematic basis was not such a commitment ([93]-[96]). The label “casual” in the contracts was not determinative but might influence the interpretation of the parties’ rights and obligations, and the express agreement to pay a casual loading in lieu of entitlements whose rationale presupposes an ongoing working relationship was “a compelling indication” that the relationship did not include such a commitment ([97]).
The joint reasons rejected the submissions that status should be assessed when the statutory entitlements arose, or by reference to the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship, because the parties could not then know their obligations at the outset ([98]-[99]).
Gageler J agreed with the orders ([119]). He said that the new statutory definition had stripped the decision under appeal, and the earlier decision on which it was based, of precedential effect, which justified reasoning no more expansive than strictly necessary ([111]). Whether the firm advance commitment was limited to an enforceable contractual obligation could not, in his view, be resolved merely by reference to the nature of the relationship of employment or of judicial power, and he would have given greater attention to the statutory context and industrial usage had resolution been necessary ([113]-[114]).
He found it unnecessary to resolve the issue because the rights of the parties could be determined without doing so ([115]). Mr Rossato relied on non-contractual aspects of the relationship, principally the roster system, only to establish a firm advance commitment as to hours; as to the duration of his employment, he relied solely on the terms of each contract ([117]). Those terms contained nothing to oblige WorkPac to continue a contract beyond the completion of its assignment, which was enough in the circumstances to negative any firm advance commitment on WorkPac’s part to the indefinite continuation of the employment ([118]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [49]–[53] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [57]–[67] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs read the Act’s provisions on casual employment, state that the commitment must be found in enforceable terms and reject the Full Court in Skene’s wider characterisation exercise. They are the reasoning by which the joint reasons decided that the written contracts determined Mr Rossato’s status.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [88]–[99] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs apply the enforceable-terms approach to the General Conditions, the rosters and the casual loading, and conclude that the contracts contained no firm advance commitment beyond each assignment. They are the ground of the declarations.
Proposition 3
Separate reasoning · Gageler J
Read judgment: [111]–[118] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)
Gageler J concurs in the orders but expressly declines to decide whether the firm advance commitment must be an enforceable contractual obligation, and rests his conclusion on the terms of each contract about the duration of the employment. His reasons are not the joint reasons’ and do not adopt their holding at [57].
Why does this case matter?
Casual employment questions invite a quick answer from the label on the contract or from the pattern of work. A problem built on this case asks what the facts show about the arrangement between employer and employee, which of those facts you are relying on and why, and whether the date of the events matters. It also tests whether you attribute reasoning to the right Justices, because the two sets of reasons are not the same.
Exam and application relevance
Begin with the period in which the facts occurred and whether the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) already contained its definition of “casual employee”; Rossato was decided on the Act as it stood before that definition ([10], [111]). Then identify every source of the employment terms in the problem: the written contract or contracts, any enterprise agreement, and anything the parties said or did afterwards. Ask what each says about the duration of the employment and about work after each engagement ends. Consider the roster, the label and any casual loading, and say what weight each should bear and why. When you cite the case, name the joint reasons ([1]-[108]) or Gageler J ([109]-[119]) according to which reasoning you rely on.
Check your understanding
1. What formulation of casualness did the parties accept, and where did the joint reasons say a firm advance commitment must be found ([32], [57])?
2. Which clauses of the General Conditions did the joint reasons treat as critical, and what did each provide ([88]-[92])?
3. What significance did the joint reasons give to the rosters, the label “casual” and the casual loading ([93]-[97])?
4. What question did Gageler J decline to resolve, and on what basis did he agree with the orders ([113]-[118])?