Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay
Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 32
A union officer emailed members a warning about fraudulent audit documents and was then suspended. How does a court decide why an employer acted when the employer gives one reason and the employee’s union role suggests another?
What happened?
Mr Barclay was a team leader at the Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (BRIT) and president of the BRIT sub-branch of the Australian Education Union (AEU) ([2], [8]). On 29 January 2010 he emailed AEU members employed at BRIT. The email reported that several members had witnessed or been asked to be part of producing false and fraudulent documents for a re-accreditation audit, and told them not to agree to take part ([11]).
BRIT’s chief executive, Dr Harvey, formed the view that he had contravened certain clauses of the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees ([12]). On 2 February 2010 she gave him a letter asking him to show cause why he should not be disciplined and suspended him on full pay, denied him internet access and barred him from the premises ([13]-[14]).
Mr Barclay and the AEU applied to the Federal Court for a declaration that BRIT had contravened s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by taking adverse action against him because he was an officer of the AEU and had engaged in industrial activity ([3]). Dr Harvey gave sworn evidence that she acted because he had not reported the allegation to management, because of the way he had circulated it, and out of concern for the reputation of BRIT and its staff, and not because of his union role. She said she would have taken the same action against a person who was neither a member nor an officer of the AEU ([24]-[28]).
The primary judge, Tracey J, accepted her evidence and dismissed the application ([4], [32]-[33]). A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Gray and Bromberg JJ; Lander J dissenting) upheld the appeal. The majority reasoned that the real reason for action might be one the decision-maker did not appreciate, and that Dr Harvey’s reasons were founded on the sending of the email, which they treated as industrial activity ([34]-[37]).
What did the Court decide?
By special leave, BRIT appealed to the High Court ([4]). The Court allowed the appeal, set aside orders 1, 2 and 3 of the Full Court made on 9 February 2011 and ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed, so that the primary judge’s dismissal of the application stood ([66]). Costs were left to a consent order or to the Court on the papers ([66], [136]-[139]).
French CJ and Crennan J gave joint reasons ([1]-[66]). Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons, in addition to those and in general agreement with them ([67]-[139], [71]). Heydon J gave separate reasons and agreed that the orders proposed by the other members of the Court should be made ([140]-[150]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
French CJ and Crennan J held that the question why an employer took adverse action is a question of fact, answered in the light of all the facts established in the proceeding ([41], [45]). The text of s 346 and the s 361 presumption did not require an inquiry that was only objective, “including any unconscious reason” ([44]). Because the onus is on the employer, the decision-maker’s direct evidence of state of mind, intent or purpose naturally bears on the question, and it is generally extremely difficult to displace the presumption if the decision-maker gives no direct testimony. That evidence may be unreliable because of contradictory evidence or proven facts, but direct testimony accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the employer’s burden even though the employee is a union officer engaged in industrial activity ([44]-[45]).
On the onus, French CJ and Crennan J held that it is erroneous to treat it as heavier because the employee is an officer of an industrial association, and that the history of the provisions gives no reason why it should differ when the adverse action is taken while the employee is engaged in industrial activity ([60]). They also held it erroneous to require that the reason for adverse action be “entirely dissociated” from the employee’s union position or activities, which would be indistinguishable from the approach of Isaacs J in Pearce that Bowling rejected.
The onus is discharged on the balance of probabilities in the light of all the established evidence ([62]). Positive evidence from the decision-maker comparing the employee with one who has no union involvement is appropriate ([63]). Dr Harvey’s accepted evidence, including that she would have taken the same action against a non-officer who circulated a similar email, discharged the burden ([65]).
Gummow and Hayne JJ applied the reasoning of Mason J in General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling: an employer contravenes s 346 if engagement in industrial activity comprised “a substantial and operative” reason, or reasons including that reason, for the action ([104]). In assessing the evidence offered to discharge the onus, its reliability and weight are balanced against the employee’s evidence and the overall facts and circumstances, but the focus of the inquiry is the decision-maker’s reasons at the time the action was taken ([127]).
To contrast “objective” and “subjective” reasons is “an illusory frame of reference” ([121]); the answer is that the test is whether adverse action was taken because of a proscribed reason ([129]). Where the primary judge’s findings and reasons are unchallenged, the decision that the employer did not act for a proscribed reason must stand, and to hold otherwise would treat the s 361 onus as creating an irrebuttable presumption in the employee’s favour ([128], [131]). They said that Lord Nicholls’ reference in Khan to a reason held “consciously or unconsciously” presented a paradox, apparent also in the Full Court majority’s passage, and was “apt to confuse and mislead the finder of fact” ([124]).
The Full Court erred in reassessing the reliability and weight of the evidence ([133]), and there was no scope for it to make findings about BRIT’s “unconscious” state of mind ([134]).
Heydon J reasoned separately. To search for the reason for a voluntary action is to search for the reasoning actually employed by the person who acted; nothing in the Act expressly suggests that courts are to search for unconscious elements, and no such requirement can be implied ([146]). In the alternative, the respondents had shown no unconscious element in Dr Harvey’s reasoning ([147]).
The case arose under s 346. Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that “because” also appears in ss 340 and 351 ([100]), but the contravention alleged and decided was of s 346 ([3], [116]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ and Crennan J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [44]–[45] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [60]–[63] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the approach that decided the appeal: why the employer acted is a question of fact; the text of ss 346 and 361 does not make the inquiry only objective; accepted direct evidence from the decision-maker can discharge the onus; and, following Bowling, the onus is not heavier because the employee holds union office or engages in industrial activity, and the reason need not be entirely dissociated from it ([60]-[62]). The Full Court’s contrary approach is what the High Court set aside, so the passages are necessary to the ground of decision. Paragraph [60] begins on one PDF page and [62]-[63] on the next.
Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [104] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab), [120]–[121] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab), [127]–[129] (PDF p 49) (opens in a new tab), [131]–[134] (PDF p 51) (opens in a new tab)
Gummow and Hayne JJ apply Mason J’s reasoning in Bowling to s 346 ([104]), reject the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ contrast as an illusory frame of reference ([121]), state that the focus is the decision-maker’s reasons at the time of the action and that otherwise s 361 would create an irrebuttable presumption ([127]-[128]), answer the first question ‘Neither’ ([129]), and hold that, absent challenge to the primary judge’s findings, the decision had to stand and the Full Court could not reassess the reliability and weight of the evidence or make findings about unconscious state of mind ([131]-[134]). They reach the same orders as the joint reasons of French CJ and Crennan J, and are written as additional to those reasons ([71]). The finding at [134] depends on their answers to the earlier questions, so it is tied to a case in which the findings of fact were unchallenged. Paragraph [127] continues onto the next PDF page.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [146]–[147] (PDF p 55) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J, who concurs in the orders ([150]), says that the search for a reason is a search for the reasoning actually employed, that nothing in the Act requires a search for unconscious elements and that none can be implied, and in the alternative that the respondents showed no unconscious element in any event ([146]-[147]). This is his own route. It is not stated in those terms in the joint reasons of French CJ and Crennan J, so it should not be attributed to them.
Why does this case matter?
Students often treat three things, a protected status or activity, adverse action and the s 361 presumption, as the end of the analysis in the employee’s favour, or treat an employer’s denial as the end of it in the employer’s favour. Barclay is the authority an examiner expects when the conduct the employer complains of is bound up with the employee’s union role, as the respondents argued the email was here ([23]), because it shows that neither shortcut finishes the answer.
Exam and application relevance
Identify who made the decision, what that person says the reasons were, and what other evidence tests the account: documents, timing, how comparable employees were treated. Say whether the employer’s account is likely to be accepted, and why, before you conclude on the presumption.
For a claim under a section other than s 346, say which section’s wording the reasoning is being applied to.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Full Court majority say about reasons the decision-maker did not appreciate, and how did Gummow and Hayne JJ respond ([34], [124], [134])?
2. What did French CJ and Crennan J say about the effect of an employee’s union office on the s 361 onus, and about whether the reason must be dissociated from the employee’s union position or activities ([60]-[62])?
3. Why, according to Gummow and Hayne JJ, was the Full Court not entitled to reassess Dr Harvey’s evidence ([131]-[133])?