General protections: the reason for adverse action
How the High Court in Barclay and Qantas v TWU approaches the reason for adverse action under the Fair Work Act general protections, including ss 351, 360 and 361.
Learning outcomes
- Explain how ss 360 and 361 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) determine the reason for adverse action and who bears the onus.
- State what Barclay decided about the decision-maker’s evidence, the burden under s 361 and unconscious reasons.
- Apply Barclay and Qantas v TWU to a general protections problem and identify what the employer must prove.
A general protections claim under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) turns largely on one question of fact: why did the employer act? The sibling article on workplace discrimination explains the two avenues and the reverse onus. This article looks at what a court actually does with that question, using the two High Court decisions that govern it. It is Commonwealth law only and concerns the national system under Part 3-1 of the Act.
The statutory frame
Section 342 defines adverse action. For an employer acting against an employee it includes dismissing the employee, injuring the employee in his or her employment, altering the employee’s position to their prejudice, and discriminating between the employee and other employees. Section 340(1) prohibits adverse action because a person has, or has exercised or not exercised, a workplace right, or to prevent the exercise of a workplace right. Section 351(1) prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee or prospective employee “because of” a listed attribute: race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, breastfeeding, gender identity, intersex status, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, subjection to family and domestic violence, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin.3 Section 351(2) excludes action that is not unlawful under an anti-discrimination law in force where it is taken, action taken because of the inherent requirements of the particular position, and certain good faith action by religious institutions.
Two provisions in Division 7 decide how the reason is proved. Section 360 says a person takes action for a particular reason “if the reasons for the action include that reason”. Section 361(1) presumes, where it is alleged that action was taken for a particular reason and that reason would contravene Part 3-1, that the action was taken for that reason, “unless the person proves otherwise”.4 Section 361(2) disapplies the presumption for interim injunctions.
Barclay: the reason is the decision-maker’s
In Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay [2012] HCA 321, the chief executive of a TAFE institute suspended an employee and asked him to show cause why he should not be disciplined, after he emailed union members that some staff had been asked to produce false audit documents. He was also the president of the union’s sub-branch at the institute. The case was decided under s 346, which protects officers of industrial associations and industrial activity, not under s 351. Gummow and Hayne JJ observed, however, that “because” also appears in ss 340 and 351 ([100]), and ss 360 and 361 apply to Part 3-1 as a whole.
The trial judge accepted the chief executive’s evidence of her reasons and held there was no contravention. The Full Federal Court reversed that decision, reasoning that the real reason might be one the decision-maker did not appreciate, and that the suspension was founded on conduct in the employee’s union capacity. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge’s decision. French CJ and Crennan J gave joint reasons, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons, and Heydon J gave separate reasons.
The principles that emerge are these.
- The question is “why was the adverse action taken?”, a question of fact decided on all the evidence. French CJ and Crennan J rejected the argument that the inquiry is purely objective ([44]-[45]).
- Direct evidence from the decision-maker is central. It is generally “extremely difficult” to displace the presumption without it. It can be unreliable if the decision-maker is contradicted by other evidence or by proven facts, but if it is accepted as reliable it can discharge the employer’s onus even though the employee was a union officer engaged in industrial activity ([45]).
- The onus is not made heavier because the employee holds a protected status or is engaged in protected activity. The employer need not show that the reason was entirely dissociated from that status or activity. The onus is discharged on the balance of probabilities on all the evidence ([60], [62]).
- It is appropriate for the decision-maker to give positive evidence comparing the employee with one who lacks the protected status ([63]). The chief executive had said she would have taken the same action against someone who was not an officer of the union and who sent a similar email, and that evidence was accepted ([65]).
- Gummow and Hayne JJ applied the statement of Mason J in General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling that the protected status or activity must have been a “substantial and operative” reason, or one of the reasons, for the action. They said the focus was the decision-maker’s reasons when the action was taken ([104], [127]). The presumption in s 361 does not create an irrebuttable presumption in the employee’s favour ([128]).
- On unconscious reasons, Gummow and Hayne JJ held there was no scope for the Full Court to make findings about the employer’s “unconscious” state of mind ([134]). Heydon J said that the search for a reason is a search for the reasoning actually employed by the person who acted ([146]).
Qantas: the same approach applied
Qantas Airways Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2023] HCA 272 shows the same inquiry producing the opposite result. Qantas outsourced its ground handling work during the pandemic. The trial judge found that, as well as sound commercial reasons, a substantial and operative reason was to prevent the affected employees from exercising workplace rights to bargain and take protected industrial action in 2021. The High Court unanimously dismissed Qantas’s appeal. Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ gave joint reasons, Gordon and Edelman JJ gave joint reasons, and Steward J gave separate reasons.
Three points matter for a student. First, the joint reasons said adverse action does not offend s 340(1) if taken with “mere awareness” of an effect on another person’s workplace rights; the proscribed reason must be a substantial and operative reason ([41]). Second, they treated what must be proved as the state of mind of the alleged contravener ([49]). Third, Gordon and Edelman JJ explained that s 361 recognises that the decision-maker is uniquely placed to know the reasons for their action, and held that Qantas failed to rebut the presumption because its witness evidence on the point was not accepted ([63]-[64]). Steward J added that the task is to identify the actual, immediate or operative reason or reasons, and that factors which contributed only causally to the decision are not reasons ([104], [108]), and that the real decision-maker must be identified ([107]).
Putting the cases together
The following draws the two cases together and is not a holding in either of them. Where an employee alleges that dismissal followed a protected attribute, the statute makes the employer’s reasons the contest, and Barclay and Qantas show how a court conducts it: the employee alleges the reason and s 361 presumes it, and the employer cannot succeed by showing only that it also had a good reason, because s 360 asks whether the prohibited reason was among the reasons. The employer succeeds if the court accepts that the prohibited matter was not a substantial and operative reason at all. Applied to s 351, the same words and the same Division 7 operate, but neither case decided a s 351 claim.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the adverse action under s 342 and the reason alleged: an attribute under s 351(1) or a workplace right under s 340(1).
- State the presumption in s 361 and that s 360 makes it enough that the alleged reason was among the reasons.
- Identify the real decision-maker and the evidence they can give about why they acted.
- Test that evidence against the documents, the timing and any comparator, because accepted direct evidence can rebut the presumption (Barclay) and unaccepted evidence will not (Qantas).
- Ask whether any s 351(2) exception applies.
- Conclude on whether the employer proved that no prohibited reason was a substantial and operative reason for its action.