Qantas Airways Limited v Transport Workers Union of Australia
Qantas Airways Limited v Transport Workers Union of Australia [2023] HCA 27
Qantas outsourced ground handling when its employees could not yet lawfully take protected industrial action. Can a ban on adverse action reach a workplace right that the workers did not yet have when Qantas acted?
What happened?
On 30 November 2020, while its operations were severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, Qantas announced a decision to outsource its ground handling operations at ten Australian airports. Work then done by employees of Qantas and of Qantas Ground Services Pty Ltd (QGS), many of them members of the Transport Workers Union of Australia (TWU), would instead be done by staff of third-party suppliers ([1]). The decision was adverse action under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) because it altered the position of the affected employees to their prejudice ([2]). Qantas had sound commercial reasons for it, including savings of around $100 million a year ([3], [17]).
At the time of the decision the affected Qantas employees were prohibited by s 417 of the Act from organising or engaging in protected industrial action because their enterprise agreement had not passed its nominal expiry date, which was 31 December 2020. The QGS employees’ agreement had passed its nominal expiry date, but the steps needed for protected industrial action, including a protected action ballot, had not been taken ([8], [15]). The TWU alleged that Qantas had contravened s 340(1)(b), which prohibits adverse action “to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person”.
The primary judge, Lee J, found that Qantas had not shown that preventing the affected employees from exercising workplace rights to organise and engage in protected industrial action and to participate in enterprise bargaining was not among the substantial and operative reasons for its decision ([3], [18]). A Full Court of the Federal Court (Bromberg, Rangiah and Bromwich JJ), on Qantas’s appeal, also concluded that Qantas had contravened s 340(1)(b) ([4]).
Before the High Court, Qantas did not challenge the finding that it had failed to rebut the presumption in s 361 ([64]). It argued that s 340(1)(b) bites only where a workplace right is in existence when the adverse action is taken and, alternatively, that taking advantage of a window of opportunity in which the Act stopped employees from acting did not “prevent” the exercise of a right ([5], [27]-[29]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal ([58], [127]). There were three sets of reasons: the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ ([1]-[58]), the reasons of Gordon and Edelman JJ ([59]-[88]) and the reasons of Steward J ([89]-[127]). The Court did not need to consider the TWU’s notice of contention or proposed cross-appeal ([59], [127]). The question for decision was whether s 340(1)(b) applies where the workplace right has not come into existence when the adverse action is taken.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
All seven Justices held that s 340(1)(b) is not confined to a workplace right held when the adverse action is taken. The joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ held that its readily ascertainable meaning is to proscribe adverse action if a substantial and operative reason for it is “to prevent the other person exercising a presently held or future workplace right” ([57]). Its focus is the future exercise of a workplace right, not the present existence of one ([45]). Section 341(1) is a substantive statement of when a person has a workplace right, not a definition that confines s 340(1)(b) to rights held at the time of the action ([32], [47]). Qantas’s arguments from the relationship between s 340(1)(a) and (b), the provisions on prospective employees and the unfair dismissal and industrial action provisions were rejected ([48]-[56]).
Gordon and Edelman JJ reached the same conclusion by their own route. Section 341 is not a definition section to be read into s 340; it identifies what is a workplace right, and s 340 provides the bases on which the protection operates, which are temporal in nature ([79]-[81]). Section 340(1)(b) is directed to what they described as a “pre-emptive strike” to deny a person the opportunity to exercise a workplace right in the future ([84]). Steward J held that the temporal frame is governed by s 340(1), the operative provision, and that s 340(1)(b), which addresses the future, is concerned with the “pre-emptive strike” and has no words limiting it to rights in existence when the action is taken ([121]-[124]).
The Justices differed in their reasoning on whether the affected employees had a workplace right when the decision was made. The joint reasons said that a person can have a workplace right comprising an entitlement to the benefit of a workplace law even though the capacity to exercise it depends on accrual over time or a future contingency ([34]-[35]), but that where exercise of the purported right is prohibited the person cannot be said to have the right at all ([38]), and proceeded on the basis that the affected employees did not have the relevant rights ([39]).
Gordon and Edelman JJ distinguished contingent entitlements that accrue, such as annual leave, from “a thing, action or activity which is unlawful or positively prohibited under pain of civil penalty”, saying that “There is no power or entitlement to do something that is positively prohibited or unlawful”, and held that the affected employees had no presently existing workplace right to engage in protected industrial action ([71]-[76]). Steward J held that to assert a present right to take protected industrial action under s 341(1)(b), exercisable only on future contingent events, is “to assert no more than the retention of an expectancy, given content by mere hope”; he noted that the Explanatory Memorandum treats benefits under s 341(1)(a) as including contingent or accruing benefits ([117]).
On the reason inquiry, the joint reasons said that adverse action “will not offend s 340(1) if taken with mere awareness of an effect on another person’s workplace rights”; it offends only if taken for a proscribed reason, which must be a substantial and operative reason ([41]). The provision leaves scope for lawful adverse action provided the action is not “substantively actuated by a purpose or reason inimical to a person holding or exercising workplace rights” ([41]). “To prevent” means “in order to prevent” or “with a view to preventing” ([45]), and what is required to be proved is “the state of mind of the alleged contravener” ([49]). Under s 361 it is presumed that the action was taken for the reason alleged unless the person proves otherwise ([26]).
Gordon and Edelman JJ said that the presumption recognises that the decision-maker is “uniquely placed to know the reasons for their action”, that an employer can discharge the onus by proving that none of its substantial and operative reasons was to prevent the exercise of workplace rights, and that Qantas failed to rebut it “because its witness evidence on this point was not accepted” ([63]-[64]). They added that an employer may take account of the existence and terms of enterprise agreements, and that what s 340(1)(b) does not permit is adverse action to prevent the exercise of a workplace right, whether presently existing or not ([88]).
Steward J said that the task is “the identification of the actual, immediate or operative reason or reasons for taking adverse action”, distinguishing the operative reason from factors that contributed only causally ([102]-[109]). He said that genuine redundancy is not a defence under Pt 3-1, but that an employer who shows that all the employees of a division were made redundant because of changes in the operational requirements of the enterprise “should thereby be capable of displacing the presumption” ([101]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [45]–[57] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the joint reasons’ construction of s 340(1)(b) and answer each of Qantas’s arguments against it. They are the ground of the order dismissing the appeal, since Qantas’s case depended on confining s 340(1)(b) to workplace rights held at the time of the adverse action.
Separate reasoning · Gordon and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [77]–[87] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
Gordon and Edelman JJ wrote separately and agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. They reach the same construction of s 340(1)(b) by a route that treats s 341 as substantive law that identifies what is a workplace right and s 340 as providing the temporal bases on which the protection operates ([79]-[81]). They concur in the result and in the construction, but the reasoning is their own.
Separate reasoning · Steward J
Read judgment: [120]–[126] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab)
Steward J wrote separately and agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. His reasons for rejecting the temporal limit on s 340(1)(b) are that the temporal frame is governed by s 340(1), that s 340(1)(b) addresses the future and is not limited by the present tense of s 341(1), and that Burnie Port Corporation is distinguishable ([121]-[126]). He concurs in the result and the construction, and the reasoning is his own.
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [37]–[39] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons distinguish contingent entitlements from a purported right that is prohibited, and then proceed on the basis that the affected employees lacked the relevant workplace rights. That basis is adopted for the purposes of the appeal and is not itself a ground of the decision, which depends on the construction of s 340(1)(b), so a binary label would conceal that the joint reasons did not hold the point.
Separate reasoning · Gordon and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [70]–[76] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
Gordon and Edelman JJ accepted Qantas’s first contention and held that neither group of affected employees had a presently existing workplace right to engage in protected industrial action. They agreed in the result, but the finding is their own and the Court’s other reasons do not adopt it.
Separate reasoning · Steward J
Read judgment: [116]–[117] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab)
Steward J rejected the TWU’s and the Minister’s submission that contingent rights to take protected industrial action satisfied s 341(1)(b). He agreed in the result, and the reasoning is his own.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [40]–[41] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [49]–[50] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the character of the reason inquiry that s 340(1) requires and answer Qantas’s arguments about uncertainty and unfairness. [49]-[50] also form part of the answer to the arguments against the construction adopted, and to that extent belong with the ratio on construction (first proposition). As statements of the reason inquiry itself, they are not a ground necessary to the decision: the appeal was decided on the construction of s 340(1)(b), and Qantas did not challenge the finding that it had not rebutted the presumption.
Obiter · Gordon and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [63]–[64] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [88] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs describe the presumption and the way Qantas failed to rebut it, and note what employers remain free to consider. The failure to rebut was not challenged in the High Court ([64]), so the paragraphs record the position below and state the settled onus rather than decide a contested question.
Obiter · Steward J
Read judgment: [99]–[114] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)
Steward J’s discussion of the operative reason, the decision-maker and genuine redundancy explains how the reason inquiry works and why the primary judge’s finding was reached on narrow grounds. It is not necessary to the construction question on which he agreed the appeal should be dismissed ([98], [115]), and the observation about redundancy is expressed as a general and practical one.
Why does this case matter?
The usual fact pattern pairs a commercial restructure, redundancy or outsourcing decision with an approaching bargaining round, an enterprise agreement near its expiry, or a union campaign. An adverse action problem then turns on a small number of linked questions, and the facts are written so that each can be answered separately. An examiner looks for each to be identified and answered in turn from the facts given.
Exam and application relevance
Identify which limb of s 340(1) is relied on, the right the person is said to have been stopped from exercising, and when the person has that right or may come to have it. Ask who the decision-maker was, what that person’s reasons were, and who must prove what about them under s 361.
Name the Justices responsible when stating a point that only some of them made.
Check your understanding
1. What two contentions about s 340(1)(b) did Qantas advance, and how did the joint reasons dispose of them ([27]-[29], [45]-[57])?
2. How did Gordon and Edelman JJ describe the relationship between s 340 and s 341, and why did that matter to the construction of s 340(1)(b) ([79]-[84])?
3. What did the joint reasons say about adverse action taken with mere awareness of an effect on workplace rights, and what must instead be shown ([41])?
4. Which Justices said that the affected employees had no presently existing workplace right, and which Justices proceeded on that basis only ([39], [76], [117])?