State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator

Queensland Industrial Relations Commission · 2024

Employment And Industrial LawWork Health And Safety

State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 53

A regional manager develops a psychiatric injury after a disaster season in which her requests for extra staff went unanswered. Her department says reasonable management action explains it. Does that exclusion apply?

What happened?

Ms Alison Brunker was a permanent employee of the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, based in Mareeba. She held an AO8 position styled Regional Manager in the Department’s Rural Economic Development, North unit (RED North) and managed a team of four, and part of her role was managing the Department’s response to natural disasters and other emergencies affecting the agricultural industry in North Queensland ([1]). She reported to Mr West, the Regional Director in Townsville ([20]). On 5 April 2019 she applied for workers’ compensation for a psychiatric or psychological injury ([2]). The Workers’ Compensation Regulator’s review decision accepted the application, and the Department appealed to the Industrial Relations Commission ([3]).

It was not in dispute that she was a worker, that she had an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression, that the injury arose out of or in the course of her employment, and that her employment was the major significant contributing factor ([12]). The Department accepted a causal connection between the injury and her workload ([13]). The parties also accepted that an appeal of this kind is a hearing de novo of whether she suffered an injury within the Act, and that the onus was on the Department to prove on the balance of probabilities that she did not ([16]).

Three stressors were said to have contributed: her intense workload, the requirement that she perform disaster management duties as well as those of her Regional Manager role, and her perception of a lack of management support ([5]). One of her four direct reports, Mr Holden, took a temporary appointment elsewhere in the Department from 17 September 2018 and his position was not backfilled ([64], [73]). In the same period she proposed ways of restructuring RED North’s management, asked for an additional support person, asked to be relieved of some disaster response duties and twice asked that Mr Holden’s position be backfilled ([141]-[142], [148], [151], [164]).

The Department’s reasons for not acting included staffing caps and budget savings ([74], [150]). She performed disaster response duties during Tropical Cyclone Owen in December 2018 and again from January to 8 February 2019, and she went to hospital, with the symptoms that led to her claim, after returning to her substantive role ([157]-[159]).

The Department’s case under s 32(5) of the Act was that her injury was excluded because it arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way ([6]). The section as the judgment sets it out reads: “Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances” including reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker’s employment, and the worker’s expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker ([4]).

What did the Court decide?

Merrell DP delivered his reasons on 28 February 2024. Under s 558(1)(a) of the Act he confirmed the Regulator’s review decision, so that the appeal failed, and he directed the parties to file written submissions on costs by 13 March 2024, with costs to be decided on the papers unless otherwise ordered ([213]-[214]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Merrell DP, sitting alone on an employer’s appeal, held that the Department had not shown that Ms Brunker’s injury arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way under s 32(5)(a) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (the Act), and he began by asking whether there was any management action. He applied the meaning he had given in his earlier decision of the same name, [2020] QIRC 097, that the phrase “means action taken by a manager, in relation to a worker, in managing, handling, directing or controlling the worker” ([43], quoting [39] of the earlier decision).

He said that the exclusion was intended by Parliament to relate to specific management action directed to the worker’s employment itself, as opposed to action forming part of the everyday duties or tasks the worker performed in employment ([42]). On that approach he held that the matters the Department relied on for the first and second stressors, namely Mr West’s discussions, emails and expectations that Ms Brunker, an AO8 Regional Manager, would prioritise and delegate her work, would not work significant additional hours and could seek relief or take a break, were not management action.

They were a broadly expressed expectation about how she would exercise her own managerial discretion and judgment, not any specific action by Mr West managing, handling, directing or controlling her workload ([49]-[51], [119]-[129]). He held in the alternative that, if those matters were management action, s 32(5)(a) was still not engaged because it applies only to management action that has a causal connection with the injury and any such action was too remote from it ([53]-[55], [59]-[62], [130]-[133]), a conclusion for which he relied on the Industrial Court of Queensland’s decision in RACQ Operations Pty Ltd v Q-Comp ([56]-[58]).

By contrast he found that the decision not to backfill Mr Holden’s position, which Mr West described as vacancy managing, did involve management action and did have a causal connection with the injury ([91]-[92]).

Merrell DP restated the principles he had set out in his earlier decision: that the inquiry is not whether unreasonable management action was the dominant cause of the injury but whether there is a causal and temporal connection; that the task is to assess the management action that was taken and decide whether it was reasonable and taken in a reasonable way, an evaluative inquiry of fact determined objectively; that “Management action need only be reasonable; it does not need to be perfect”; and that reasonable means reasonable in all the circumstances, so that “It is the reality of the employer’s conduct that must be considered and not the employee’s perception of the employer’s conduct” ([171], quoting [23]-[27] of the earlier decision).

Applying them to the third stressor, he found that there was in fact a lack of support from Ms Brunker’s management, and that she was not under a flawed perception ([163], [169]). From September 2018 she had proposed a restructure of RED North management, requested an additional support person, asked to be relieved of some disaster response duties and twice asked that Mr Holden’s position be backfilled, and none of those suggestions or requests was acted on in full or in part ([164]-[165]).

He held that the decision not to implement her restructuring proposal known as Option A for the 2018-2019 season was reasonable management action despite the late notice of it ([179]). He held that the failure, in any meaningful or practical way, to implement her other requests to reduce or relieve her workload was unreasonable management action ([201]). He said that failing to deal meaningfully with such requests “may, in ordinary circumstances, amount to reasonable management action”, but that here it was not, because Mr West knew that Ms Brunker was prone to take on duties, knew of her health issues and knew that she was overwhelmed, had a full agenda and was struggling with her workload ([202]).

He rejected the Department’s submissions that she had been told to prioritise and to let things drop off and that she had support available ([181]-[196]), and on Dr Bayley’s evidence found a causal connection between that management action and the injury ([203]). He concluded that the lack of support was not reasonable management action and that, taking all three stressors together, the injury did not arise out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way ([204]-[205]).

On s 32(5)(b), Merrell DP stated that it operates when a psychiatric or psychological disorder arises out of, or in the course of, the worker’s expectation or perception of reasonable management action where the management action is being taken against the worker, and in respect of the worker’s perception of action actually taken against the worker, citing Wyllie v Q-COMP and Misevski v Q-COMP ([206]-[207]). The Department’s alternative submission was that the workload Mr West expected of Ms Brunker was imposed on her and so was taken against her, and that her injury arose from her misperception of what was expected ([208]). The Regulator submitted that no management action was taken against her. Merrell DP accepted that submission and held that there was no evidence of any management action being taken against Ms Brunker, so that s 32(5)(b) was not enlivened ([209]-[211]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Merrell DP

Read judgment: [42]–[43] (opens in a new tab), [49]–[51] (opens in a new tab), [119]–[129] (opens in a new tab)

Merrell DP’s statement of what management action means and his finding that Mr West’s expectations about prioritising and delegating were not management action were the ground on which he held that s 32(5)(a) was not enlivened for the first and second stressors.

Ratio · Merrell DP

Read judgment: [53]–[62] (opens in a new tab), [130]–[133] (opens in a new tab)

The conclusion that any such management action was too remote from the injury was an alternative ground, stated as applying if the primary conclusion was wrong, and was independently sufficient to reach the same result on those stressors.

Ratio · Merrell DP

Read judgment: [91]–[92] (opens in a new tab)

The finding that the decision not to backfill Mr Holden’s position was management action with a causal connection to the injury was necessary to the analysis of the third stressor, where he went on to find that management action unreasonable.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Merrell DP

Read judgment: [171] (opens in a new tab), [197] (opens in a new tab), [201]–[205] (opens in a new tab)

The principles on reasonableness that Merrell DP adopted from his earlier decision, and his finding that the failure to implement Ms Brunker’s requests was unreasonable management action given what Mr West knew, were the ground of decision on the third stressor and the conclusion on s 32(5)(a).

Proposition 3

Ratio · Merrell DP

Read judgment: [206]–[211] (opens in a new tab)

Merrell DP’s finding that there was no evidence of any management action taken against Ms Brunker was the ground on which the Department’s alternative reliance on s 32(5)(b) failed, and his statement of the section’s two operations was the principle he applied to reach it.

Why does this case matter?

A psychological-injury claim can be won or lost on what the employer is shown to have actually done, and a weak answer jumps straight to whether the employer behaved reasonably. What must be identified about the employer’s conduct before its reasonableness can be assessed, and what must be shown about its connection with the injury?

Exam and application relevance

Take the stressors one at a time, as Merrell DP did ([9]). For each, identify what the employer says the management action was, and the evidence for it, and keep that separate from the later question whether it was reasonable and taken in a reasonable way.

Separate the findings that depend on this evidence, such as what Mr West said, did and knew, from the statements of principle, and give the paragraph for each. Where Merrell DP quotes his own earlier reasons, say so.

This is a decision of a single Deputy President of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission on an appeal under the Act, applying Industrial Court of Queensland authority; the judgment does not say whether it binds other members of the Commission. For a later Commission decision that refers to this one, compare Van Blanken v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 283 at [40]-[45], where Dwyer IC referred to Merrell DP’s reasons. The statute is stated as the judgment sets it out at [4]; check the current Act, and check for any later treatment or appeal, before relying on the decision.

Check your understanding

1. Who was the worker, what was her role, and what injury did she have ([1], [12])?

2. What were the three stressors ([5])?

3. What did the parties accept about the nature of the appeal and about the onus ([16])?

4. What meaning of management action did Merrell DP apply, and what did he say about everyday duties and tasks ([42]-[43])?

5. How did he characterise Mr West’s discussions and expectations about prioritising and delegating work ([49]-[51])?

6. What alternative reason did he give for the first and second stressors, and which authority did he use ([53]-[62])?

7. What did he find about the decision not to backfill Mr Holden’s position ([91]-[92])?

8. What did he say about the decision on Option A and about Ms Brunker’s other requests ([179], [201]-[202])?

9. Why did s 32(5)(b) not apply ([206]-[211])?