Casual employment and the firm advance commitment

How the High Court in WorkPac v Rossato tied casual employment to the terms of the contract, how section 15A of the Fair Work Act now defines a casual employee, and how conversion and loading offsets work.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth
Subjects
employment-and-industrial-law
Topics
contract-of-employment

Learning outcomes

  • Explain what the High Court decided in WorkPac v Rossato about the firm advance commitment that distinguishes casual from other employment.
  • State the two limbs of the casual employee definition in section 15A of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and explain how section 15A(2) and (3) changed the way the first limb is assessed.
  • Apply the Division 4A conversion process and section 545A loading offset to a worker who was described as casual.

Whether a worker is a “casual employee” bears on whether a worker can claim paid annual leave, personal/carer’s leave, compassionate leave and public holiday pay, or is instead paid a loading in the hourly rate. The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) now defines the term, but the definition was built on a High Court decision about the contract of employment, and that decision still explains what the words “firm advance commitment” are doing. This article is Commonwealth law only. It deals with national system employment under the Fair Work Act and does not state any State or Territory industrial law.

What the High Court decided in Rossato

Mr Rossato worked for a labour-hire company, WorkPac, at coal mines under six successive written contracts. Each was an “assignment”, of varying length. His shifts were fixed by rosters issued up to a year ahead, and for almost four years he worked them without being asked whether he would attend. He was paid a flat rate that included a casual loading. After the Full Federal Court held in another case that a similar worker was not casual, he claimed paid leave and public holiday pay. In WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 231 the High Court held that he was a casual employee throughout.

Six Justices gave joint reasons (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). Gageler J agreed in the orders, with separate reasons, and left open whether the commitment must be an enforceable contractual obligation ([114]-[115]). The parties agreed that the hallmark of casual employment is the absence of a firm advance commitment ([88]; Gageler J at [112] puts it as a commitment as to the duration of the employment or the days or hours to be worked). The joint reasons then hold that a “firm advance commitment” must be found in enforceable terms of the contract, not in “unenforceable expectations or understandings” about how the parties in fact performed it ([57]). A reasonable expectation of continuing, regular work is not a commitment. The Act itself treated a “long term casual employee” with a reasonable expectation of regular and systematic work as still a casual ([51]).

The contract was the decisive material. Its terms put the employment on an “assignment-by-assignment basis”, let Mr Rossato accept or reject each offer, and left WorkPac under no obligation to offer another. On their ordinary meaning those terms deliberately avoided a firm commitment beyond each assignment ([88]). The roster gave his work regularity within an assignment, but a regular pattern was “entirely compatible” with casual employment ([96]). The Court also treated the label “casual” as relevant but not decisive. The more telling fact was that the contract paid a loading in place of leave entitlements, whose rationale presupposes an ongoing working relationship ([97]). Finally, the joint reasons rejected an inquiry into the “real substance, practical reality and true nature” of the relationship. They said such an approach would leave parties unable to know their obligations at the outset ([98]-[99]).

That is a decision about the contract. The joint reasons also said that the analysis in Hollis v Vabu, a case about employee versus independent contractor status, gives no assistance in characterising an admitted employment relationship as casual or not where the terms are comprehensively committed to writing ([101]). The sibling article on the contract of employment deals with the employee and contractor question.

What Parliament did next

The Court noted that the Act had since been amended to insert a definition of “casual employee” and a rule offsetting casual loadings against entitlements ([10]). Gageler J added that the new definition had stripped the Full Court decisions of precedential effect ([111]). That definition was repealed and replaced with effect from 26 August 2024. Section 15A2 now provides, in the version in force at the date of this article, that an employee is a casual employee of an employer only if both of these are true:

  • the employment relationship is characterised by an absence of a firm advance commitment to continuing and indefinite work; and
  • the employee would be entitled to a casual loading or specific casual rate under a fair work instrument, or is entitled to one under the contract of employment.

The first limb is Rossato’s concept, but section 15A(2) changes how it is found. Absence of commitment is assessed on “the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the employment relationship”, which is the language the joint reasons declined to adopt. A firm advance commitment can lie in the contract or in a “mutual understanding or expectation” that does not rise to a contractual term, and section 15A(3)(a) says such an understanding may be inferred from conduct after the contract was made or from how it is performed. So the High Court’s reasoning that only enforceable terms count has been displaced for Fair Work Act purposes, as has its refusal to look at performance.

Section 15A(2)(c) lists considerations that may indicate a commitment: whether either side can choose to offer or accept work (and whether this happens in practice), whether continuing work is reasonably likely to be available, whether full-time or part-time employees do the same work, and whether there is a regular pattern of work. Section 15A(3)(b) says all must be considered and none is determinative. The Note to section 15A(2)(c)(iv) says a regular pattern does not of itself show a firm advance commitment. That Note is consistent with Rossato’s point about the roster, although the statute does not adopt the case’s reasoning.

Two further rules matter. Under section 15A(5), a person who starts as a casual employee remains one until a specified event, such as conversion under Division 4A of Part 2-2, an order of the Fair Work Commission, a change under a fair work instrument, or acceptance of an alternative offer of non-casual employment and commencing work on that basis. Section 15A(4) removes certain fixed-term higher education academic and teaching staff from the definition.

Converting, and recovering when the label was wrong

Division 4A of Part 2-23 gives a casual employee a path to full-time or part-time status. An employee who believes they no longer meet section 15A(1) to (4) may give written notification under section 66AAB. The employee must, among other conditions, have been employed for 6 months, or 12 months if the employer is a small business employer. The employer must consult the employee and give a written response within 21 days after the notification is given (section 66AAC). The employer may decline only on the grounds the section lists: the employee still meets the definition, there are fair and reasonable operational grounds, or acceptance would breach a legally required recruitment process. If the employer accepts, the employee is taken to be full-time or part-time from the day specified (section 66AAD).

If a worker described as casual was not in fact casual, they can claim the leave and other entitlements an employee of that kind would have had. Section 545A4 then requires a court to reduce the amount payable by an identifiable casual loading the employer paid to compensate for not having those entitlements. The court must reduce the claim by the loading amount, though it may reduce by a different proportion (including nil) having regard only to the matters the section lists. This is the statutory answer to the set-off question that the High Court found it unnecessary to decide in Rossato ([9]).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Decide whether the Fair Work Act applies. If it does, section 15A governs and Rossato is background.
  2. Ask whether the contract, or any mutual understanding or expectation, amounts to a firm advance commitment to continuing and indefinite work. Take the contract’s terms first, then conduct and the section 15A(2)(c) considerations.
  3. Check the second limb: is there a casual loading or casual rate under the contract or fair work instrument?
  4. Remember that Rossato’s contract-only reasoning no longer controls the Fair Work Act question.
  5. If the worker was mislabelled, apply section 545A to the money claim. If they are genuinely casual, consider Division 4A conversion.

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