Westpac Securities Administration Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Westpac Securities Administration Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] HCA 3
Westpac’s callers opened each call by saying everything discussed was general in nature. Then they asked what the member wanted from their super. Can a disclaimer keep a sales call on the general side of the advice line?
What happened?
Westpac Securities Administration Ltd and BT Funds Management Ltd (together, Westpac) were the trustees of two superannuation funds, and each held an Australian financial services licence ([23]-[24]). Under those licences neither was authorised to give personal advice about superannuation products ([26]).
To increase its funds under management, Westpac ran a campaign encouraging existing members to roll over superannuation held in other funds into their BT accounts; between 1 January 2013 and 16 September 2016 its funds under management rose by almost $650 million ([42]). Members were sent letters offering to search for and roll over their external accounts ([44]), and then received telephone calls from Westpac’s Super Activation Team ([43], [45]). The appeal concerned calls to 14 members ([43]).
Each call began with a warning that everything discussed would be general in nature and would not take into account the member’s personal financial needs. The caller then asked what the member saw as the main benefits of consolidating, affirmed those reasons with “social proofing”, telling the member that such reasons were commonly held, and offered to carry out the consolidation ([45]). One caller told member 1 that saving on fees and manageability were the “two main reasons our clients do like to bring their supers together” ([8]).
The primary judge held that Westpac had not given personal advice, having been dissuaded by the disclaimer, the absence of a charge and the callers’ limited knowledge of the members’ finances ([7]). The Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously held that it had ([27]). In the High Court, Westpac accepted for the first time that the calls gave “financial product advice”: an implied recommendation that each member should roll over external accounts into the BT account ([46]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed Westpac’s appeal with costs. The decision was unanimous: Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ gave joint reasons agreeing with the orders proposed by Gordon J ([1], [22]), and Gordon J gave separate reasons ([23], [83]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Financial product advice is personal advice under s 766B(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) if it is given in circumstances where a reasonable person might expect the provider to have considered one or more of the person’s objectives, financial situation and needs. The parties agreed that the question is whether a reasonable member might expect that Westpac had in fact considered those matters, not whether it should have ([3]). Gordon J described an objective test, assessed when the advice is given, from the position of “a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the person receiving the advice” ([57]), and said that “The standard is one of reasonable possibility, not reasonable probability” ([58]).
Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ held that “considered” means “took account of” ([15]), the counterpart of the warning in s 949A(2)(a) that general advice has been prepared “without taking account of” the client’s circumstances ([15]-[16]), and that it imports no requirement of “an active and comprehensive process of evaluation” ([17]). The words “one or more of” are satisfied by consideration of “at least one aspect of the client’s objectives, financial situation or needs” ([20]); the provision “does not provide that the provider must have considered all of those matters” ([10]). And objectives “do not cease to be personal objectives merely because those objectives are such as to be generally applicable to all or most persons in the position of the client” ([11]). Gordon J construed the provision to the same effect ([59]-[61], [67]).
Applying the test, the joint reasons held that the opening disclaimer “was not apt to alter either the character of the recommendation” or the expectation the call engendered, because the callers went straight on to elicit each member’s objectives ([8]); that the service being free of charge was “at best neutral” ([9]); that the callers’ incomplete knowledge of members’ affairs was not inconsistent with an expectation that the members’ objectives were taken into account ([10]); and that the social proofing confirmed that consolidation suited each member’s stated objectives ([12]-[13]). Gordon J reached the same conclusion by weighing the subject matter, the pre-existing relationship of trustee and beneficiary, the tenor of the calls, the eliciting of objectives, the single warning at the start of each call, the absence of a charge and the urging of a particular course of action ([72]-[81], [83]).
Westpac argued that the Full Court had asked what Westpac should have considered, a “normative” approach ([51]). The joint reasons accepted that parts of the Full Court’s reasoning suggested such an approach, but held that, the appeal failing on the undisputed facts, it was “neither necessary nor appropriate to express a concluded opinion as to the correctness of the approach taken by the members of the Full Court” ([4]-[5]). Gordon J held that the Full Court had not added a normative element to the inquiry ([70]-[71]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [15]–[17] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [20] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)
These constructions answer Westpac’s grounds of appeal: considered means took account of, without requiring an active and comprehensive evaluation, and consideration of at least one aspect of a client’s objectives, financial situation or needs suffices. They are necessary to rejecting Westpac’s narrower reading and classifying the calls as personal advice.
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [5] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab), [8]–[13] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab)
The appeal failed because a reasonable member might expect Westpac to have taken the elicited personal objectives into account in recommending consolidation. The explanation of why the disclaimer, absence of a charge and incomplete financial knowledge did not defeat that expectation supplies the factual ground of decision. The conclusion concerns these calls in their context, rather than a rule that disclaimers can never matter.
Separate reasoning · Gordon J
Read judgment: [57] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [58] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [70]–[72] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [78]–[81] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
Gordon J concurred in dismissing the appeal, applying an objective test from the recipient’s position and a standard of reasonable possibility. Her assessment weighed the circumstances together, including the warning and fee arrangements. Her separate route also rejected the claim that the Full Court introduced a normative element; the four joint judges did not adopt a concluded view on that claim merely by agreeing in the orders.
Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [4] (PDF p 5) (opens in a new tab), [5] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab)
The joint judges acknowledged suggestions of a normative approach in the Full Court but expressly declined to decide whether that approach was correct, because the undisputed facts independently defeated the appeal. These passages record a limit on what their reasons decide; they do not establish that the Full Court’s approach was either correct or erroneous.
Why does this case matter?
The classification decides which obligations apply. A licensee authorised only for general advice that in fact gives personal advice is outside its licence, and the duty to act in the client’s best interests in Pt 7.7A attaches to personal advice to retail clients ([26], [40]-[41]).
Students tend to classify advice by what the adviser said about its own advice, or by how much the adviser knew about the client. An examiner rewards an answer that works through the circumstances of the whole interaction.
Exam and application relevance
Be precise about what was decided. Because of Westpac’s concession ([46], [49]), the case is not High Court authority on the definition of financial product advice, or on when a person provides a financial service. Gordon J identified the single issue as whether the advice was personal advice within s 766B(3)(b) ([27]); the best-interests contravention that followed below from that classification was not contested ([41]).
The facts were a superannuation roll-over campaign by a trustee calling its own members. Gordon J observed that advice about other products, such as securities traded on a licensed market, is subject to specific provisions, and that superannuation products are treated as a distinct kind of product ([82]). Apply the test to the circumstances of the advice in your problem rather than to a script.
Check your understanding
1. What did Westpac accept for the first time in the High Court, and what question did that leave for the Court?
2. What did the joint reasons say “considered” means in s 766B(3), and which provision did they use to confirm that meaning?
3. Why did the general advice warning at the start of each call not change the result?
4. Why did the joint reasons not decide whether the Full Court had taken a normative approach, and what did Gordon J say about it?