Vanderstock v Victoria
Vanderstock v Victoria [2023] HCA 30
Victoria charged electric-vehicle owners a few cents for every kilometre driven on public roads. Is a State tax on how goods are used, rather than made or sold, a duty of excise that only the Commonwealth may impose?
What happened?
Victoria enacted the Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021, which came into operation on 1 July 2021. Section 7(1) provides that the registered operator of a zero or low emissions vehicle (ZLEV) must pay a charge for use of the ZLEV on specified roads ([2], [162], [167]). For the 2021-2022 financial year the rate was 2.5 cents for each kilometre travelled by an electric or hydrogen vehicle and 2.0 cents for a plug-in hybrid, a rate deliberately set at around half the per-kilometre equivalent that an average driver paid in fuel excise ([177]). “Specified roads” are in effect any area of land, public or private, inside or outside Victoria, over which the public has a right of way ([175]).
The plaintiffs, registered operators of ZLEVs, were issued with invoices for the charge and paid it (Jagot J [832]). The parties stated a single substantive question of law for the opinion of the Full Court of the High Court: whether s 7(1) was invalid on the basis that it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of s 90 of the Constitution ([3]). The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened in support of the plaintiffs, and the Attorneys-General of every other State and of the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory intervened in support of Victoria ([4]). Victoria also sought leave during the hearing to reopen two earlier decisions of the Court on the meaning of excise ([8]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered Question 1, whether s 7(1) is invalid on the basis that it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of s 90, “Yes”, and ordered the defendant to pay the costs (Orders; [199]). There were five sets of reasons, given on 18 October 2023: the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ ([1]-[199]); Gordon J ([200]-[440]); Edelman J ([441]-[707]); Steward J ([708]-[826]); and Jagot J ([827]-[951]). The Justices divided four to three.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The meaning of a duty of excise and the consumption stage ([5]-[10], [124]-[134], [439]-[440], [707], [824]-[826], [940]-[948]). The Court answered by four Justices to three that s 7(1) of the Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021 (Vic) imposed a duty of excise within the meaning of s 90 of the Constitution. In the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ, Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha had held, each by four to three, that duties of excise are inland taxes on goods, imposed at the stage of sale or distribution as well as manufacture or production, and had left undecided whether a tax on goods imposed at the stage of consumption answers that description ([5]-[6]).
Leave sought by Victoria during the hearing to reopen Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha, to argue that excise should be confined to taxes that discriminate against goods produced in Australia, was unanimously refused, because Victoria advanced nothing that had not been advanced and taken into account in those cases, and because the doctrine bears centrally on Commonwealth-State financial relations and had been acted on for more than 25 years, including in the GST settlement ([8]). The joint reasons then asked whether imposition at the stage of consumption takes a tax outside the scope of a duty of excise as a tax on goods (answered no) and whether the charge is properly characterised as a tax on goods (answered yes) ([9]-[10]).
To the extent that Dickenson’s Arcade stood in the way of the first answer it was to be reopened and overruled ([10], [133]): a tax on consumption can depress demand for goods no less surely than a tax on their production or distribution, and the limitation of excise to goods in the stream of production and distribution is irreconcilable with the purpose of s 90 ([124]-[126]); the modification to Dixon J’s description in Matthews that removed the reference to consumption, made in Parton, was never soundly based and should now be corrected ([127]-[128]).
A tax properly characterised as a tax on goods does not fall outside the constitutional conception of a duty of excise merely because it is imposed at the stage of consumption ([134]). Jagot J, in separate reasons, also held that Dickenson’s Arcade should be reopened and overruled ([940], [948]). Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ dissented. Gordon J would have refused leave to reopen Dickenson’s Arcade and, in any event, affirmed it, and answered the first question no ([439]-[440]); Edelman J would have answered the first question no ([707]); Steward J would have answered it no, holding that the premise of Dixon J’s reasons in Matthews was incorrect and that the minority views in Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha were correct, but accepting that governments had long relied on the majority decisions in those cases ([824]-[826]).
Identifying a tax on goods, and the ZLEV charge ([143]-[153], [184]-[198], [201]-[203], [943]-[949]). In the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ, whether a tax is a tax on goods, and so a duty of excise, turns on whether it meets the elements of Dixon J’s description in Matthews, having regard to its legal form and its substantive operation ([143], [146]). The first element is that the tax bears a close relation to the production or manufacture, sale, distribution or consumption of goods, which entails that it is on a step, an activity or relationship, involving goods ([147]).
The second is that the tax is of such a nature as to affect the goods as the subjects of manufacture or production or as articles of commerce, which is assessed by the nature and general tendency of the tax and is sufficiently shown if its tendency is to depress demand for the goods ([148]-[150]). The joint reasons rejected the submission that a court cannot conclude that a tax tends to depress demand absent expert economic evidence: the tendency to affect demand is a question of constitutional fact, and the court draws inferences from the legislation and the legislative record ([151]-[153]).
Whether a tax is a tax on goods is a determination of law ([145]). Applying those elements, the ZLEV charge bore a close relation to the use of ZLEVs and affected ZLEVs as articles of commerce ([185]). Victoria’s argument that it taxed only the activity of driving on specified roads failed because the definition of “specified road” extends to any way over which the public may pass and repass, nearly all uses of nearly all ZLEVs will involve their use on such roads, the charge is levied on the registered operator, who is the owner or manager, and it runs with the vehicle for as long as it is used ([175], [186]-[191]).
Its natural tendency was to dampen demand for ZLEVs, which the second reading speech implicitly acknowledged ([192]-[194]). The charge was a tax on ZLEVs and for that reason a duty of excise ([195]). The joint reasons added that any tax on ZLEVs or any other goods, whether imposed at importation, production or manufacture or at any later stage in their distribution, sale, ownership, control, use, resale, reuse or destruction, can be imposed only by uniform national legislation ([197]). Jagot J agreed with that statement ([949]) and held that the charge was a tax on the use of ZLEVs that affected them as articles of commerce ([949]).
She also said that it is not the case that every tax involving a burden on the passing of a good to the consumer is a tax on the good and an excise: many taxes may burden a good without being a tax on it, because the relationship between the person liable and the good is insufficiently close, and the tendency of a tax to distort supply, price or demand is a principal factor in the overall evaluation ([943]-[944]). Gordon J, in dissent, disagreed with the new two-question approach, which she described as a departure from long-established principle and as resting on assertions and assumptions that are not established ([201]-[203]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [8] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [10] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [124]–[128] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [133]–[134] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs refuse leave to reopen Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha, and hold that Dickenson’s Arcade is reopened and overruled so that a tax on goods imposed at the stage of consumption can be a duty of excise; they are necessary to the answer given to Question 1.
Separate reasoning · Jagot J (agreeing in the result and on overruling Dickenson’s Arcade)
Read judgment: [940] (PDF p 390) (opens in a new tab), [948] (PDF p 391) (opens in a new tab)
Jagot J gave separate reasons and also concluded that Dickenson’s Arcade should be reopened and overruled, which makes up the four-Justice majority.
Separate reasoning · Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ (each dissenting)
Read judgment: [439]–[440] (PDF p 193) (opens in a new tab), [707] (PDF p 298) (opens in a new tab), [824]–[826] (PDF p 343) (opens in a new tab)
Each of these Justices would have answered Question 1 no, on different reasoning; these are the dissenting conclusions and not the Court’s holding.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [143]–[153] (PDF p 58) (opens in a new tab), [184]–[195] (PDF p 74) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the two elements by which a tax on goods is identified and apply them to the ZLEV charge, which is the ground for the answer to Question 1.
Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [197]–[198] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab)
The statement that any tax on goods at any stage can be imposed only by uniform national legislation states the general consequence of s 90 rather than a step needed to answer the question about the ZLEV charge, though Jagot J expressly agrees with it.
Separate reasoning · Jagot J (agreeing in the result)
Read judgment: [943]–[945] (PDF p 390) (opens in a new tab), [949] (PDF p 391) (opens in a new tab)
Jagot J agreed with the statement at [197] and added that many taxes may burden a good without being a tax on it, so that characterisation depends on the closeness of the relationship and the tendency to affect the good as an article of commerce.
Separate reasoning · Gordon J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [201]–[203] (PDF p 79) (opens in a new tab)
Gordon J rejected the new approach as a departure from long-established principle; this is a contrary view and not the Court’s holding.
Why does this case matter?
State and Territory revenue measures are routinely tested against s 90, and the usual error is to treat the label of the tax, or the stage at which it is collected, as the answer. A problem set after this decision, whether on a road charge, a levy on a class of equipment or a licence fee, rewards an answer that identifies the goods concerned, the step in their life that the tax is tied to, and the evidence from which its effect on them is to be inferred.
Exam and application relevance
Name the court, the date and the division of the Justices, and keep the joint reasons, the separate reasons of Jagot J and each dissent distinct.
State the limit of what was applied. The joint reasons applied their two elements to the ZLEV charge; they quote earlier statements about the reach of excise to payroll tax and land tax ([139]) without applying the elements to such taxes. Check for later legislative or judicial development before applying the decision to a present problem.
Check your understanding
1. What did the joint reasons say Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha had held about duties of excise, and what had they left undecided ([5]-[6])?
2. What happened to Victoria’s application to reopen Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha, and what reasons did the joint reasons give ([8])?
3. What are the two elements by which the joint reasons identify a tax on goods, and how did they answer the argument that expert economic evidence was necessary ([147]-[153])?
4. How did Jagot J’s reasons differ in form from the joint reasons, and on which two matters did she expressly agree with them ([947], [949])?
5. On what ground did Steward J dissent, and what did he say about the earlier majority decisions ([824]-[826])?