Trobridge v Hardy
Trobridge v Hardy [1955] HCA 68; (1955) 94 CLR 147
A constable arrested a taxi driver who had handed him a card with his name and address, for refusing to give his name and address. The trial judge would have found for the driver, but a statute stood in the way. Did it?
What happened?
At about 9.15 pm on 24 July 1954 Mr Trobridge, a taxi-cab proprietor, was driving slowly along William Street, Perth, when two intending passengers hailed him from the kerb. He stopped and backed towards the kerb. The defendant, a constable in plain clothes, approached, told him he had no right to be there, and demanded his name and address. Mr Trobridge handed over a card bearing his name, address and telephone numbers and said he would tell the constable anything else he wanted once he had taken the passengers’ names and addresses as potential witnesses. While he was writing down the first name, the constable said “You are under arrest”, and when asked the reason said “For refusing to give your name and address” (Fullagar J at 151-152).
He was taken to the police station, placed in a cell with three other men for the best part of two hours, and then released after his fingerprints were taken, with five pounds retained for bail. He was charged before a magistrate with refusing to give his name and address and was acquitted (Fullagar J at 151-152). He sued the constable for trespass to the person and false imprisonment (Fullagar J at 152).
Virtue J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia accepted Mr Trobridge’s evidence and found that there was no reasonable or probable cause for the arrest or the charge (Fullagar J at 151; Taylor J at 170). He would have given judgment for Mr Trobridge, but considered himself barred by a statutory provision protecting police officers, because in his view there was no “direct proof” of malice (Kitto J at 161).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs, discharged the Supreme Court’s order and entered judgment for the plaintiff for 527 pounds 17s with costs. Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ each gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Fullagar J, in a passage of his reasons commenting on the pleadings, said that the plaintiff “did not sue, as he might also have done, for malicious prosecution, but for trespass to the person and false imprisonment”. He continued: “The mere interference with the plaintiff’s person and liberty constituted prima facie a grave infringement of the most elementary and important of all common law rights. It was for the defendant to justify, if he could, by reference to his office or otherwise.” Nor was it “necessary to allege in the first place either absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice” (at 152-153). He introduced the passage with the remark that “Nothing in the argument before us turned on the pleadings in the action” (at 152).
The appeal was allowed because the statutory protection on which the constable relied did not defeat the claim, but the three Justices reached that conclusion by different routes. The protection was in par H of the Second Schedule to the Interpretation Act 1918-1948 (WA), incorporated into the Police Act 1892-1953 (WA): no action lay against a police officer for an act done “in carrying the provisions of this Act into effect” against a person offending or suspected of offending against it, “unless there is direct proof of corruption or malice” (Fullagar J at 154).
Fullagar J preferred to decide the case on the ground that “the defendant’s acts fall outside the scope of what is protected by the provision” (at 156): an act is not done in carrying an Act into effect unless the officer honestly believes it authorised and “the purpose of the act done should be to vindicate and give effect to the law” (at 157-158), and the only inference open from the trial judge’s findings was that the acts were done “with the intention of punishing the plaintiff for some fancied slight or affront” (at 158).
Kitto J said that the facts found were “inconsistent with the existence in the defendant’s mind of an honest intention to enforce the law”, so that par H was inapplicable (at 161-162), and also dealt with the question the trial judge had decided: agreeing with the trial judge’s construction that malice must be proved by evidence “shewing what the motive was and that it was wrong” (at 164-166), he held that the facts showed “a vindictive desire for the satisfaction of settling a score” and that this was “malice proved directly” (at 166).
Taylor J held that the protection was not available because the constable, who knew that the plaintiff had not refused to give his name and address, could not have believed or suspected that the offence had been committed (at 171-173), and also held that “direct proof” does not exclude proof of malice by inference from collateral facts, on which a finding of malice was “not only possible but inevitable” (at 173-176).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Obiter · Fullagar J
Read judgment: pp 152–153 (opens in a new tab)
Fullagar J expressly said that nothing in the argument turned on the pleadings before giving this account of the plaintiff’s prima facie right and the defendant’s onus to justify the interference. The passage explains the common-law starting point, but was unnecessary to the ground on which his Honour allowed the appeal under the statutory protection.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Fullagar J
Read judgment: p 156 (opens in a new tab), pp 157–158 (opens in a new tab), p 160 (opens in a new tab)
Fullagar J preferred to decide the appeal on the ground that the constable’s acts fell outside the statutory protection because they were not performed with an honest purpose of vindicating the law. Applying that construction to the trial findings was necessary to his Honour’s order allowing the appeal.
Separate reasoning · Kitto J
Read judgment: pp 161–162 (opens in a new tab)
Kitto J concurred in allowing the appeal on the independently sufficient ground that the facts were inconsistent with an honest intention to enforce the law, making the protection inapplicable. His Honour’s route supports the result without adopting every step in Fullagar J’s analysis.
Obiter · Kitto J
Read judgment: pp 162–166 (opens in a new tab)
Having said that the question of direct proof of malice did not need to be decided, Kitto J nevertheless addressed it because it was the issue decided below and argued on appeal. His Honour’s construction and conclusion that the vindictive motive was directly proved were therefore unnecessary to his dispositive ground.
Separate reasoning · Taylor J
Read judgment: pp 171–173 (opens in a new tab)
Taylor J concurred in allowing the appeal because the constable knew there had been no refusal and therefore could not honestly have suspected that the offence had been committed. His Honour expressly treated that conclusion as sufficient to dispose of the appeal.
Obiter · Taylor J
Read judgment: pp 173–176 (opens in a new tab)
Taylor J turned to direct proof of malice only after stating that his earlier conclusion was sufficient to dispose of the appeal. The construction of that expression and the finding that malice was inevitably inferable were additional observations rather than necessary steps in his Honour’s ground of decision.
Why does this case matter?
Trobridge is often cited for a single sentence. A student who has only that sentence will be asked what the appeal actually turned on, and the sentence does not say.
Exam and application relevance
Cite Fullagar J by name and by page for the statement about justification, and say what the case was decided on before relying on it for anything else.
If your facts involve a statute that protects an officer from suit, read the statute’s own conditions first and attribute each step of the reasoning to the Justice who took it. The Justices did not all take the same route.
The decision applies a Western Australian provision in the form it had in 1955. Western Australia has since replaced that protection for police officers by statute: ss 137 and 138 of the Police Act 1892 (WA), inserted by the Acts Amendment (Police Immunity) Act 1999 (WA), apply to things done after its commencement. Whether any statute protects an officer in your jurisdiction, and on what conditions, depends on the statute in force there.
Check your understanding
1. What did Virtue J find would have been the result for Mr Trobridge but for the statutory protection, and why did he consider the protection applied (Kitto J at 161)?
2. What did Fullagar J say it was for the defendant to do, and what did he say the plaintiff did not need to allege (at 152-153)?
3. According to Fullagar J, what must the purpose of an act be if it is to count as done in carrying an Act into effect (at 157-158)?
4. How did Taylor J’s reasons for holding the statutory protection unavailable differ from Fullagar J’s (at 171-173)?
5. What orders did the Court make?