Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2016

ContractDischarge And Remedies

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28

A bank charges a fixed fee when a customer pays late, and the fee is far larger than the bank’s actual cost of the delay. Does the size of the gap decide whether the fee is a penalty?

What happened?

Mr Paciocco held two credit card accounts with the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (“ANZ”). The standard terms charged a Late Payment Fee if the monthly minimum, and any amount due immediately shown on the statement, was not paid by the due date. The fee was $35 and later $20 for each late payment. (Kiefel J, at [11]; Nettle J, at [370].)

Mr Paciocco and a company he controlled sued as applicants in a representative proceeding in the Federal Court. The primary judge, Gordon J, held that the late payment fees were penalties (French CJ, at [2]). The bank’s actual losses from a late payment were put at about $3 (Kiefel J, at [67]).

The Full Court of the Federal Court (Allsop CJ, Besanko and Middleton JJ) held that the late payment fees were not penalties (Nettle J, at [306]).

The bank called expert evidence that identified categories of cost it said it incurred when a payment was late, including collection costs, loss-provisioning costs and regulatory-capital costs (Kiefel J, at [63], [68]). The appeals came to the High Court by special leave. They were concerned only with the late payment fees (French CJ, at [2]).

What did the Court decide?

Both appeals were dismissed with costs. The appeal on the penalty question was dismissed, and the statutory claims under the ASIC Act, the National Credit Code and the Fair Trading Act were also dismissed. The Justices gave separate reasons, and the reasons are not one joint judgment.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

A stipulated late payment fee is penal only if it is out of all proportion to the bank’s legitimate interests in timely payment, and those interests are not limited to the damages recoverable for the breach. Kiefel J, with French CJ agreeing, held that the estimate is made when the fee is agreed, and that the bank’s provisioning and regulatory-capital costs were interests that the fee could protect. Gageler J and Keane J also dismissed the penalty claim. Gageler J reached that result by asking whether the stipulation had a purpose other than punishment. Nettle J dissented and measured the fee against the greatest recoverable damages, which he found grossly disproportionate.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Kiefel J, with French CJ agreeing

Read judgment: [52] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [62]–[63] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [67]–[69] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

The test is that the fee is penal only if it is out of all proportion to the interest the stipulation protects (at [52] and [69]). Kiefel J held at [62] that the estimate is made when the fee is agreed, so the primary judge erred in limiting the bank’s costs to the actual loss of about $3 found at [67]. At [68] the evidence of provisioning and regulatory-capital costs was not answered, so the fee was not shown to be out of all proportion. That reasoning, applied to the penalty question, supports the order.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [160]–[161] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [176]–[177] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurs in dismissing the penalty appeal but frames the question as whether the stipulation has a purpose other than punishment. He says a comparison with unliquidated damages will often be probative and might sometimes be decisive, but not always ([160]), and that interests beyond the protection of damages can justify the stipulation ([161]). He concludes that the fee was not merely in terrorem ([176]) and that the customers failed to show it was a penalty ([177]). This is a distinct route to the same result, not a joint ground with Kiefel J.

Separate reasoning · Nettle J (dissenting on the penalty question)

Read judgment: [370]–[371] (PDF p 120) (opens in a new tab)

Nettle J put the maximum additional cost recoverable as damages at $6.90 per late payment, which made the fee grossly disproportionate to the greatest recoverable amount ([370]). He treated penalty status as a question of degree that depends on the disproportion and on the consumer relationship, and he would have allowed the penalty appeal ([371], [376]). His reasons are the minority view on the penalty question.

Why does this case matter?

A student who has learned that a penalty is extravagant or unconscionable in amount may treat the question as a comparison between the fee and the loss the bank could prove. An examiner will ask what the comparison is made against, and at what date. An answer that stops at the loss proved in the particular case, and an answer that treats the dissent as the law, both miss what the question tests.

Exam and application relevance

Use Paciocco for a question about a fixed fee charged on default, whether by a bank, a lender or a supplier. Identify the test the majority applied and apply it to the facts the question gives, rather than the rule the student expects. The majority Justices reached the same dismissal by different reasoning, so name each majority Justice’s route separately and do not merge them. A dissent is the minority view and must not be presented as the law the Court applied. Andrews is the earlier authority on the scope of the penalty rule; this case applies it to a late payment fee and does not extend it to the statutory claims.

Check your understanding

1. What did Kiefel J say the estimate of the bank’s interest is measured against, and when is it made?

2. Gageler J and Nettle J both mention the comparison with damages. How does each use it, and where do they part?

3. Gageler J and Kiefel J both dismissed the penalty appeal. In what sense is Gageler J’s reasoning a separate route to the same result?