Orb Holdings Pty Ltd v WCL (Qld) Albert St Pty Ltd

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland · 2020

PropertyLand Registration

Orb Holdings Pty Ltd v WCL (Qld) Albert St Pty Ltd [2020] QCA 198

A laneway the public used as a road now sits in a private company’s name on the Torrens register, and the company has closed it. Does an indefeasible title settle whether the lane is a public road?

What happened?

Beatrice Lane is a narrow piece of land in central Brisbane between Albert and Margaret Streets, used until recently as a public laneway, and is a registered lot under the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) of which the respondent, WCL (Qld) Albert St Pty Ltd (WCL), is the registered owner (McMurdo JA at [12]). WCL wished to develop it in conjunction with adjoining lots ([12]). The appellant, Orb Holdings Pty Ltd (Orb), is the registered owner of nearby land fronting Margaret Street, to which the lane provided access; Orb said that the lane is by law a public road, dedicated in the late 19th century and, since the Land Act 1962 (Qld), vested in the Crown ([13]). When WCL began to develop the site it prevented access to the lane, and Orb applied in the Trial Division for a declaration that the lane is a public road ([14]).

In 1874 the trustees of Brisbane Grammar School bought land bounded by Margaret, Albert and Alice Streets ([18]). In September 1876 they lodged a plan of subdivision, registered as RP1073, dividing the land into nine lots; the remaining L-shaped piece, which became Beatrice Lane, was described as “Lot 11 (Balance)” with the words “Right of Way” written on its area ([20]-[21]). It remained owned by the trustees as an undescribed balance, with no separate description in the register and no certificate of title, until March 1994, when it was given its own description as lot 11 and a certificate of title was issued to the trustees free of any encumbrance ([22]-[23]).

The land was transferred to a developer in 2008, a further plan was registered in 2012, and WCL became the registered owner in 2014 ([24]-[25]). The lane is recorded in the Roads Register kept by the Brisbane City Council as a road controlled by the Council ([26]).

WCL applied for summary dismissal under r 658 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), arguing that Orb’s case could not succeed even on the facts Orb alleged ([15]). Orb’s case was that the trustees dedicated the land as a road under the common law ([27]), and WCL accepted that, for the purposes of its application, it was to be assumed that the trustees dedicated the land as a road or lane for public use ([29]). The primary judge accepted WCL’s case and dismissed the proceeding with costs, holding in essence that WCL’s claim to the land must prevail because of the indefeasibility provisions of the Land Title Act ([15]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal of Queensland (Sofronoff P, McMurdo JA and Boddice J) heard the appeal on 3 April 2020 and delivered its decision on 11 September 2020. It allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made on 29 October 2019, and ordered WCL to pay the costs of the application heard on 25 September 2019 and the costs of the appeal ([88]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

McMurdo JA, with whose reasons Sofronoff P ([1]) and Boddice J ([89]) agreed, said that the critical issue was the effect of the vesting that s 369 of the Land Act 1962 (Qld) produced if the lane had been dedicated as a public road ([36]). On the assumed facts the fee simple in the lane had been vested in the trustees of the Grammar School until s 369 was enacted, and there were co-existing public rights to use the land that were independent of the trustees’ ownership ([42]).

In 1962 the land became vested in the Crown, but “subject to the rights of the public to use [it] for passing and re-passing”, words he took from Brodie v Singleton Shire Council ([42]). He found that the reasoning in Brodie, in Attorney-General (Quebec) v Attorney-General (Canada) and in Buckle v Bayswater Road Board could not be distinguished ([39]-[42]), that his conclusion accorded with the opinion in Vickery v Municipality of Strathfield ([43]), that it could not be accepted that there was a conflict, actual or potential, between the Crown’s ownership and the public’s right of use ([44]), and that the Crown’s ownership “differed from the fee simple of a proprietor under the Real Property Act”, the public rights being removable only by the provisions of the Land Act allowing the closure of roads, so that “The Crown was not free to deal with the land as it wished” ([45]).

He then said that s 369 “thereby overrode the provisions of the Torrens statute” and described the case, in Street J’s words in Pratten v Warringah Shire Council, as one “where the fee simple has, by an overriding statute, been in effect removed from the registration system” ([46]). Section 369 unambiguously vested the land in the Crown if it had been dedicated as a public road, and made no provision for the vesting to be perfected by something being recorded on the Torrens register; and in Street J’s words the registered owners were thereafter incapable of calling back their fee simple and no act of the Registrar “could be recognised as effective to trench in any way upon the [Crown’s] fee simple” ([51]).

The first certificate of title, issued to the trustees in March 1994, could not have affected the Crown’s ownership ([52]). He disagreed with the primary judge’s reasoning that, because the road was delineated on a plan lodged under the Real Property Act 1861 (Qld), the delineation became part of the register and so vested a registered title in the Crown ([54]), and he held that the New South Wales decision in City of Canada Bay Council v F & D Bonaccorso Pty Ltd, on which the primary judge relied, concerned land the council had acquired and become the registered owner of and gave no support for the primary judge’s view ([55]-[56]).

As to the Land Act 1994 (Qld), s 454 continued roads dedicated under the repealed Act and s 95 provided that the land in all roads dedicated and opened for public use under the repealed Act “vests in, or remains vested in, the State” ([57]-[58]). He rejected the primary judge’s reading of s 95 as confined to roads dedicated under a statute, because on that reading, for no apparent reason, only Crown land dedicated as a road under s 362 of the 1962 Act, and not land vested by s 369, would remain in the State’s ownership, and the 1994 Act made no other provision for land that had vested by s 369 ([59]-[61]).

As to the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), he said that an indefeasible title for a lot is created on the recording of the particulars of the lot in the freehold land register (ss 37, 38) and that, by s 184, a registered proprietor of an interest in a lot holds it subject to registered interests but free from all other interests ([65]-[66], [77]). Sections 51, 52 and 54 provide for the opening of new roads without providing that the particulars of the lot be entered in the register or that the Crown be recorded as its registered owner, so that the Crown’s ownership of such land “does not derive from the freehold land register under this Act” but from s 95 of the Land Act 1994; in this way, he said, the Land Title Act maintains the distinction between “the ownership of freehold land under the Torrens statute, and the ownership of roads according to a different and overriding statute, by which the land is effectively removed from the registration system” ([78]).

No provision of the Land Title Act, including ss 48 and 201, brought within its operation the ownership of land that derived from s 369 of the Land Act 1962 and had been outside the operation of its predecessors ([79]-[80]), and the registration of plan SP142332 in 2012 could not have divested the Crown of its ownership of the lot ([81]). He concluded that the primary judge erred in holding, “on the facts that had to be assumed in Orb’s favour”, that the lot had ceased to be land vested in the Crown for use as a public road because of the indefeasibility provisions of the Land Title Act ([82]).

Sofronoff P added observations of his own about the text of the Land Act 1962 ([1]). He said that the “absolute indefeasibility of registered title lies at the very heart of the system of registration of land” ([2]), identified the problem as the apparent inconsistency between ss 37 and 184 of the Land Title Act 1994 and s 369 of the Land Act 1962, which provides that dedicated land is vested in the Crown ([3]), and asked what the word “vested” can mean in that context ([4]).

Referring to Hohfeld’s discussion of the ambiguity of the word “property”, to Gummow J’s reasons in Yanner v Eaton and to the Privy Council’s description of “vest” as “of elastic import” in Attorney-General (Quebec) v Attorney-General (Canada), he said that a statutory declaration that lands are vested in a public body for public purposes may pass only such powers of control and management and such proprietary interest as may be necessary to enable that body to discharge its public functions effectively ([5]-[8]).

He reasoned that no person holds a legal or equitable estate in land vested under s 369 and no single person holds a right, power or privilege in relation to the land; that the public at large has a right of use, but “certainly it is not a right of a registrable kind held by a person”; and that “It is also certain that the Crown does not, by such vesting, acquire a fee simple in the land” ([9]-[10]). He quoted Rich AJ’s statement in Vickery v Municipality of Strathfield that the Torrens statute “makes no provision, express or implied, for the destruction of public rights, nor does it provide any machinery for the recognition of the existence or the creation of such rights” ([10]). He agreed that the appeal should be allowed for these reasons as well as McMurdo JA’s ([11]).

McMurdo JA also dealt with WCL’s argument that Orb’s case was bound to fail because the trustees of the Grammar School did not have the sanction of the Governor and the Executive Council to dedicate the land as a public road, which s 6 of the Grammar Schools Act 1860 (Qld) required before the trustees could alien, mortgage, charge or demise land, other than by a lease of not more than 21 years ([83]-[84]). It was unnecessary to consider the correctness of the primary judge’s opinion that a common law dedication of a road did not involve the alienation of land, though he agreed that it did not involve the creation of a proprietary interest in the land ([86]).

He held that the argument should not be accepted “at least at this stage”: the evidence was silent on whether the sanction was given, Orb’s case had the advantage of the presumption of regularity, by which the trustees should be presumed to have acted with the requisite authority until the contrary is shown, and, because the application was for summary judgment, the prospect that preparation for a full hearing would disclose relevant evidence could not be excluded ([87]). McMurdo JA concluded that the primary judge should not have been persuaded that the case should be dismissed without a trial ([88]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · McMurdo JA (Sofronoff P and Boddice J agreeing)

Read judgment: [36]–[82] (opens in a new tab)

McMurdo JA concluded that the primary judge erred in holding, on the facts assumed in Orb’s favour, that the lot had ceased to be land vested in the Crown for use as a public road because of the indefeasibility provisions of the Land Title Act ([82]); that is the ground on which the summary dismissal was set aside, together with the rejection of the trustees’ authority argument ([87]-[88]).

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · Sofronoff P

Read judgment: [1]–[11] (opens in a new tab)

Sofronoff P concurs in the result and in McMurdo JA’s reasons and conclusions, and adds observations of his own about the text of the Land Act 1962 and the meaning of vesting ([1], [11]). Agreement in the orders and in McMurdo JA’s reasons does not adopt every statement in the separate observations, and McMurdo JA does not repeat them.

Proposition 3

Ratio · McMurdo JA (Sofronoff P and Boddice J agreeing)

Read judgment: [83]–[88] (opens in a new tab), [29]–[30] (opens in a new tab)

WCL relied on the trustees’ lack of sanction as a further reason why Orb’s case was bound to fail; rejecting it, at least at the stage of an application for summary judgment, was necessary to the conclusion that the primary judge should not have dismissed the case without a trial ([87]-[88]).

Why does this case matter?

A Torrens title problem can be framed as a question about what the register says, or as a question about the statute under which someone else claims the land. This decision is useful for seeing how an appeal court worked between those framings, and for seeing what a court does on an appeal against a summary dismissal when the facts have not been found.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where a registered proprietor’s title is met by a claim that the land is a public road or is held under another statute, identify the statute under which the claimant says the land is held, what it says about the land, and what the registration statute says about the register. Say which Justice’s reasons you are applying, because Sofronoff P wrote separately ([2]-[10]), and attribute statements about the nature of the Crown’s interest to the Justice who made them. Keep apart what the Court decided on the facts assumed for the application from findings of fact: the dedication of the lane as a road was assumed ([29], [82], [88]).

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. It concerns Queensland legislation, stated as the judgment set it out in 2020: the Land Act 1962 (Qld), which has been repealed, the Land Act 1994 (Qld) and the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). Check the current text of the legislation, and later decisions, before relying on these statements in a modern problem. In particular, the same dispute returned to the Court of Appeal in WCL (Qld) Albert St Pty Ltd v Orb Holdings Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 263, which is reported to have read s 369 as vesting the fee simple in the Crown and so sits uneasily with Sofronoff P’s remark at [10]; check that later decision before relying on [10].

Check your understanding

1. Where is Beatrice Lane, who is its registered owner, and what did Orb say about its status ([12]-[13])?

2. What was assumed, for the purposes of WCL’s application, about the dedication of the lane, and what date did WCL accept the dedication, if it occurred, predated ([29]-[30])?

3. What happened to the land in March 1994, and what did McMurdo JA say about the effect of that event on the Crown’s ownership ([23], [52])?

4. What did s 369 of the Land Act 1962 provide, as the judgment sets it out ([31])?

5. How did McMurdo JA say the primary judge had read s 95 of the Land Act 1994, and why did he not accept that reading ([59]-[61])?

6. Which Justices sat, whose reasons were Sofronoff P and Boddice J agreeing with, and what orders were made ([1], [88]-[89])?

7. Why did McMurdo JA not accept WCL’s argument about the trustees’ authority to dedicate the land ([83], [87])?