Nelson v Nelson
Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538
A mother paid for a house and put it in her two adult children’s names so she could later claim a housing subsidy. When her daughter claimed half the proceeds, the mother had to explain why she never meant it as a gift.
What happened?
Mrs Nelson, a widow whose husband died on 4 November 1987, was an “eligible person” under the Defence Service Homes Act 1918 (Cth) (Deane and Gummow JJ). In August 1987 her adult son Peter and daughter Elizabeth contracted to buy a house at Bent Street, Petersham, as joint tenants for $145,000, and the purchase was completed on 4 November 1987 (Deane and Gummow JJ). The deposit and the balance came from a joint account of Mr and Mrs Nelson, and Mrs Nelson’s name did not appear on the title (Deane and Gummow JJ).
The reason for that arrangement was to keep Mrs Nelson’s name off the title so that she could obtain a subsidised advance under the Act if she later bought a home for herself, because the Act’s assistance was not available to a person who owned another dwelling (Dawson J; Toohey J). In 1989 she bought a property at Kidman Lane, Paddington. A subsidy application completed by Peter for his mother answered “No” to the question whether she owned another house, Mrs Nelson completed a statutory declaration verifying it, and she obtained a subsidised advance of $25,000 (Deane and Gummow JJ; Toohey J).
Bent Street was sold in 1990 for $400,000 and $232,509.83 was left in a trust account held by Elizabeth’s solicitors (Deane and Gummow JJ). The relationship between the family had broken down. Mrs Nelson and Peter claimed that the fund was held for Mrs Nelson, and Elizabeth claimed half of it (Deane and Gummow JJ). Master Macready found that Mrs Nelson had no intention of conferring any beneficial interest on her children, but held that she could not rebut the presumption of advancement because of the illegality, and gave Elizabeth declarations that she was entitled to half. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed Mrs Nelson’s appeal (Deane and Gummow JJ).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s orders and the Master’s declarations, and made declarations about who held the proceeds of Bent Street, with liberty to apply if the amount of a payment fixed by the order was not agreed by 30 November 1995. Elizabeth was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. There were four sets of reasons from five Justices: Deane and Gummow JJ jointly, and Dawson J, Toohey J and McHugh J separately.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
On the presumption, Dawson J, Toohey J and McHugh J each held that it applies to a mother as it does to a father. Dawson J said that “there is no longer any justification for maintaining the distinction between a father and a mother”, pointing to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which makes both parents responsible for a child’s maintenance. Toohey J said that “there is no compelling reason for making a distinction between mothers and fathers in relation to their children and every reason, in the present social context, for treating the situations alike”.
McHugh J said that “consistency of doctrine requires that the presumption should also apply to transfers of property by a mother to her child”, and that “it should apply whenever the parties stand in a relationship that has been held to give rise to the presumption”: the circumstances “may be used to rebut the presumption, but they cannot be used to prevent it from arising”. Deane and Gummow JJ described the presumptions as “interrelated and entrenched ‘land-marks’ in the law of property” and said “We prefer to approach this appeal on the footing that the existence of a presumption of advancement of her children by Mrs Nelson was properly accepted in the Supreme Court”.
They added that the presumption of advancement “is perhaps not strictly a presumption at all”: equity infers, from certain relationships, that a benefit was provided by way of advancement, so that the equitable estate stays with the legal title. It may be rebutted by evidence of the provider’s actual intention at the time of the purchase, and where it is, “the trust which then is enforced is a resulting trust, not an express trust”.
On illegality, Deane and Gummow JJ rejected both of the approaches urged for Elizabeth: the one that turns on whether the claimant must rebut a presumption of advancement, and the one that lets the loss lie where it falls. “Neither of these approaches is to be adopted in the present case.” Two matters were “of paramount importance”: “the question of illegality is bound up with the view taken of the underlying policy of the Act”, and “what is sought are equitable remedies in aid of an alleged trust and equity is equipped to attain a result which eschews harsh extremes”.
The Act’s scheme made a subsidy obtained on a false statement recoverable by the Commonwealth, and its purpose was served if that benefit was restored. So “as the price of obtaining the relief she seeks”, Mrs Nelson “must be prepared to do equity according to the requirements of good conscience”, which meant paying the Benefit Sum.
McHugh J agreed with those orders. His Honour said that courts should not refuse to enforce legal or equitable rights because they arose out of or were associated with an unlawful purpose unless the statute shows that the rights are to be unenforceable in all circumstances, or refusal is proportionate to the seriousness of the illegality, is necessary to protect the statute’s objects and policies, and is not displaced by an intention that the statute’s own sanctions are to be the only consequences. Equity “cannot condone Mrs Nelson’s unlawful purpose or encourage it”, and rights associated with unlawful conduct “should only be enforced on condition that the wrongdoer takes all lawful steps to overcome the consequences of that conduct”.
Dawson J and Toohey J would have granted the relief without a condition. Dawson J said that “the illegality involved was not a breach of the Defence Service Homes Act. It was the fraud involved in obtaining a subsidised advance upon a false basis”, and that “it is the absence of any intention to make a gift upon which reliance must be placed to rebut the presumption of advancement”, not the illegal purpose, so that “I see no reason to place conditions upon granting it”. Toohey J said that “there is no rule of public policy that demands that relief to Mrs Nelson must be refused”, that the remedy for any breach of the Act lay with the Commonwealth, and that to make payment of the subsidy a condition “is to require more than that a plaintiff do equity between the parties”.
Why does this case matter?
A problem question about a parent who pays for property in a child’s name asks two things at once: what the law assumes about the transfer, and whether the person asserting a beneficial interest has a problem of their own making. Students tend to answer the first by reciting the traditional categories and stopping, and the second with a slogan about wrongdoers. Nelson is the case that shows the Court taking the second question seriously and getting to relief by more than one road, which is why an answer that attributes a single rule to “the High Court” is easy to mark down.
Exam and application relevance
Take the facts in two steps. First, identify the relationship between the person who paid and the person who holds the title, and what evidence of intention at the time of the transfer is available. Secondly, identify any purpose that might be unlawful, the statute it touches, and what that statute provides for its own breach, then ask whether the claimant’s rights can be enforced and, if so, on what terms. When you use the reasons on illegality, name the Justices and say which route you are following, because the case does not give a single test.
The case was decided on its own facts: a Commonwealth housing subsidy statute and a resulting trust of the proceeds of land in New South Wales. When you use the Justices’ statements of principle on illegality, attend to what the statute in your problem provides about its own breach, and check the legislation of the relevant jurisdiction on resulting trusts and on the effect of illegality, which may differ from the provisions considered in the case.
Check your understanding
1. Why did Mrs Nelson put the Bent Street house in her children’s names, and what did she do later that gave rise to the claim of illegality?
2. Which Justices held that the presumption of advancement applies to a mother, and what did Deane and Gummow JJ say about the point?
3. What did Deane and Gummow JJ require Mrs Nelson to do as the price of relief, and why did they say equity could impose that term?
4. How did Dawson J and Toohey J differ from Deane and Gummow JJ about conditions, and what did McHugh J say about the order?