The presumption of advancement and illegality

How Nelson v Nelson dealt with a parent whose rebuttal of the presumption of advancement revealed an illegal purpose, and what the four sets of reasons share and where they differ.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
trusts-arising-by-operation-of-law

Learning outcomes

  • Explain where the burden lies under the presumptions of resulting trust and advancement, and how actual intention rebuts them.
  • Explain why an illegal purpose complicates rebuttal of the presumption of advancement.
  • State the different routes taken in Nelson v Nelson and the limits on what the case decides.

When a parent pays for property and puts it in a child’s name, equity presumes a gift. To rebut that presumption the parent must say why no gift was intended, and sometimes the honest answer is a purpose the law condemns. Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 5381 is the High Court’s answer to what happens then. This article builds on Resulting trusts, which states the presumptions. It states general equitable principle as the High Court described it in 1995, together with one New South Wales section of legislation. The Commonwealth statute in the case is described only as the Court described it, and the property and conveyancing legislation of the other States and Territories is not covered here.

The facts

Mrs Nelson paid the purchase price of a house at Bent Street, Petersham from a joint account with her husband, and the house was transferred into the names of her two adult children, Peter and Elizabeth, as joint tenants. The Master who first heard the case found that she had no intention of conferring a beneficial interest on the children. The purpose of putting the house in their names was to preserve her entitlement, as an “eligible person” under the Defence Service Homes Act 1918 (Cth), to a subsidised loan that she would not get if she owned another dwelling. Later she took a subsidised advance to buy another property, and a form completed for her answered “No” to the question whether she owned another house. When Bent Street was sold, the proceeds were held pending a dispute. Elizabeth claimed a share and Mrs Nelson claimed the whole.

The Master and the NSW Court of Appeal accepted that the presumption of advancement applied, and held that to rebut it she had to rely on her illegal purpose, which had by then been carried out, so that relief was refused. The High Court allowed her appeal.

The presumptions and where the burden lies

Deane and Gummow JJ explained that the presumptions “operate to place the burden of proof, if there be a paucity of evidence” bearing on the intention of the person who provided the money. They added that the presumption of advancement “is perhaps not strictly a presumption at all”: equity infers from certain relationships that a benefit was provided by way of advancement, so that the equitable estate stays with the legal title. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of the provider’s actual intention at the time of the purchase. That connects with the approach in Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation, discussed in Resulting trusts: intention comes first, and a presumption matters where the evidence leaves intention unresolved.

Their Honours also held that where the presumption of advancement is rebutted, “the trust which then is enforced is a resulting trust, not an express trust”. It is therefore outside the writing requirement in the Statute of Frauds and its modern Australian equivalents, and oral evidence is admissible. In New South Wales the provision is s 23C of the Conveyancing Act 1919,2 whose subsection (2) provides that the section “does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied, or constructive trusts” (current consolidated text). Deane and Gummow JJ cited counterparts in other jurisdictions in 1995; their current text is not set out here, so the equivalent provision of the jurisdiction in question should be checked.

Mothers and the presumption

The presumption had traditionally been associated with fathers, and Deane and Gummow JJ traced the English view that a mother stood differently to Bennet v Bennet. Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ each held that it applies to a mother’s provision for her children. Dawson J put it that “there is no longer any justification for maintaining the distinction between a father and a mother”. Dawson and Toohey JJ pointed to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as imposing on both parents the primary duty to maintain a child. Deane and Gummow JJ preferred to approach the appeal on the footing that the presumption had been properly accepted below. That is a statement about a parent and a child, not a ruling on the full list of relationships in which the presumption operates; its present scope is contested.

Why illegality mattered

Because the presumption favoured Elizabeth, Mrs Nelson had to explain why she did not intend a gift. Doing that revealed her plan. Two older ideas pointed to refusing relief. One was Lord Eldon’s rule that equity will not assist a party who has acted fraudulently on the law and will let the estate lie where it falls. The other was the English line of Tinsley v Milligan, discussed in the judgments, under which the result depends on whether the claimant must rebut a presumption of advancement (and so rely on the illegality) or can rely on a resulting trust arising from payment alone. Deane and Gummow JJ criticised that distinction because the outcome depends on the form in which the claim is cast, and held that “neither of these approaches is to be adopted in the present case”.

Four routes to one result

All four judgments allowed the appeal, so that Mrs Nelson was not left without relief. The reasoning differed, and the summaries below set the four sets of reasons side by side. That comparison is a way of reading them, not something the Court itself decided.

  • Deane and Gummow JJ. Illegality “is bound up with the view taken of the underlying policy of the Act”, and equity can impose terms instead of an all-or-nothing outcome. The Act itself provided for recovery of an improperly obtained subsidy. Relief was granted on the footing that Mrs Nelson pay the Commonwealth a sum representing the value of the subsidy, with that sum held for Elizabeth if she did not.
  • McHugh J. The presumption could be rebutted even where the purpose was illegal unless public policy required otherwise, and relief could be conditioned on the claimant restoring the benefit obtained. His Honour agreed with the orders Deane and Gummow JJ proposed.
  • Dawson J. Mrs Nelson did not rely on the illegality, because “[i]ntention is something different from a reason or motive”, and he saw “no reason to place conditions” on the relief.
  • Toohey J. Public policy had to be weighed, the Commonwealth could pursue the subsidy, and imposing a condition went beyond requiring that “a plaintiff do equity between the parties”.

Limits to state

  1. The orders made follow Deane and Gummow JJ’s terms with McHugh J’s agreement. It would overstate to say the High Court as a whole required relief to be conditional.
  2. The reasoning leaned on the scheme of the Defence Service Homes Act, which had its own recovery provisions. McHugh J observed that where a court cannot evaluate the benefit the claimant gained, the sound exercise of discretion may sometimes require refusing relief. A different statute could produce a different result.
  3. The case is from 1995, and later Australian and English developments on illegality and trusts are not covered here, so check for them before relying on it.
  4. The case concerned a parent and adult children. It does not settle the scope of the presumption in other relationships.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Establish who paid and in whose name the property was put, then ask whether the relationship attracts the presumption of advancement. For a parent and child, Nelson v Nelson supports the presumption for mothers as well as fathers, with the qualification above.
  2. Look for evidence of actual intention at the time of the transaction before relying on a presumption.
  3. If the claimant’s explanation involves an unlawful purpose, ask whether it was carried out, and identify the statute concerned.
  4. State the competing routes by judge, say the orders followed Deane and Gummow JJ’s terms with McHugh J agreeing, and reason from the statute’s own remedies about whether to impose conditions.
  5. Remember that Mrs Nelson’s beneficial interest arose under a resulting trust. In New South Wales, s 23C(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 exempts the creation or operation of that trust from the section’s writing requirements.

Where the authority sits

The authority is Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, read in its four sets of reasons, together with s 23C of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) for the writing point.

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