The presumption of advancement and illegality

The facts

Mrs Nelson bought a house using a joint account with her husband. The house was put in the names of her two adult children, Peter and Elizabeth, as joint tenants.

The original judge (the Master) found she did not intend to give the children any real ownership. She wanted the house in their names so she could still qualify as an “eligible person” under the Defence Service Homes Act 1918 (Cth) for a subsidised loan.

She later got a subsidised loan for another property. A form for that loan wrongly said she owned no other house.

When Bent Street was later sold, a dispute arose over the proceeds. Elizabeth claimed a share; Mrs Nelson claimed all of it.

The presumption of advancement applied here. This is a legal assumption that a parent transferring property to a child means to gift it to them.

Mrs Nelson needed to rebut (disprove) that presumption. But doing so meant relying on her own illegal purpose, which she had already carried out.

The Master and the NSW Court of Appeal refused her relief on this basis. The High Court later allowed her appeal.

The presumptions and where the burden lies

Deane and Gummow JJ said these presumptions only matter when there isn’t much evidence about what the person who paid actually intended. They said the presumptions fill the gap, placing the burden of proof on whoever argues against the presumed outcome.

They also said the presumption of advancement (where equity assumes a payment was a gift, due to the relationship between the parties) is “perhaps not strictly a presumption at all”. It can be rebutted by evidence of what the payer actually intended at the time. This fits with Bosanac: actual intention comes first, and the presumption only fills gaps.

Where the presumption of advancement is rebutted, the resulting trust that is then enforced is not an express trust. This matters because express trusts over land usually need to be in writing, under the Statute of Frauds and its Australian equivalents. Resulting trusts are exempt from that writing requirement, so oral evidence can prove them.

In New South Wales, the relevant provision is s 23C of the Conveyancing Act 1919. Subsection (2) says the section does not affect resulting, implied or constructive trusts. Deane and Gummow JJ referred to equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions as they stood in 1995, but those are not restated here. Students should check the current equivalent provision for their own jurisdiction.

Mothers and the presumption

The presumption of advancement assumes a gift when a parent provides for a child. Courts used to apply it only to fathers, treating mothers differently.

In this case, three judges (Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) held it also applies to mothers. Dawson J said there was no longer any reason to treat mothers differently from fathers.

Dawson and Toohey JJ also noted the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) gives both parents a primary duty to maintain their children.

Two other judges (Deane and Gummow JJ) did not decide this point. They simply accepted that the presumption had been correctly applied in the lower court.

This means the case confirms the presumption can apply to a mother and child. It does not settle how far the presumption extends to other relationships.

Why illegality mattered

The presumption of advancement favoured Elizabeth. This meant Mrs Nelson had to show she did not intend a gift. But explaining this exposed her illegal plan.

Two older approaches suggested she should get no help from the court. Lord Eldon’s rule said equity will not help someone who acted fraudulently on the law. Under this rule, property simply stays where it has landed.

The other approach came from English case law discussed in the judgments. It asked whether the claimant must rely on the illegal purpose to rebut the presumption of advancement, or can instead rely on a resulting trust based on payment alone. The outcome depended on which path applied.

Deane and Gummow JJ criticised this English approach. They said it made the result depend on how the claim happened to be framed. They held that neither of these older approaches should be used in this case.

Four routes to one result

All four judges agreed Mrs Nelson should get relief, but for different reasons. This comparison is just a way of reading the case, not something the Court itself ruled on.

Deane and Gummow JJ said illegality depends on the policy behind the Act. Equity could impose conditions rather than refuse relief entirely. Mrs Nelson had to repay the Commonwealth the subsidy’s value, held for Elizabeth if she did not.

McHugh J said the presumption of advancement (the assumption a gift was intended) could still be rebutted despite the illegal purpose, unless public policy said otherwise. He agreed with the same conditional orders.

Dawson J said Mrs Nelson did not rely on the illegality at all. He distinguished intention from motive, and saw no reason to impose any conditions on relief.

Toohey J said public policy mattered and the Commonwealth could still pursue the subsidy separately. But imposing a condition went further than merely requiring the plaintiff to “do equity.”

Limits to state

Quick Read: Limits to this case

The judges who decided the case agreed with Deane and Gummow JJ’s approach. It’s too strong to say the High Court as a whole made relief conditional.

The reasoning relied heavily on the Defence Service Homes Act’s own recovery rules. McHugh J noted that if a court can’t work out the benefit someone gained, it may be right to refuse relief. A different Act might lead to a different outcome.

This case is from 1995. Later developments in Australian and English law on illegality and trusts aren’t covered here. Check for newer cases before relying on this one.

The case involved a parent and adult children. It doesn’t decide how far the presumption of advancement applies in other relationships.

Applying this in a problem question

First, identify who paid for the property and whose name it is in. Then ask whether the relationship attracts the presumption of advancement (an assumption that a transfer was a gift, not a loan). For a parent and child, Nelson v Nelson supports this presumption for mothers as well as fathers, subject to the earlier qualification.

Before relying on that presumption, check for evidence of the parties’ actual intention at the time of the transaction.

If the claimant’s explanation involves an unlawful purpose, ask whether that purpose was actually carried out. Identify the statute involved.

Different judges may reach the same result by different reasoning. In Nelson, the orders followed Deane and Gummow JJ’s approach, with McHugh J agreeing. Reason from the statute’s own remedies when deciding whether to impose conditions on relief.

Finally, remember Mrs Nelson’s beneficial interest arose under a resulting trust (a trust implied by law, not express agreement). In New South Wales, s 23C(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 exempts the creation or operation of such a trust from that section’s writing requirements.

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