Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

High Court of Australia · 1996

Constitutional LawChapter Iii And State Courts

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51

An Act of Parliament aimed at one named man, directing a court to imprison him for what he might do. Could a state court be asked to do that?

Qualified by Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46

Preventive detention is not itself incompatible with a state court’s institutional integrity. Fardon upheld a Queensland scheme for the continuing detention of serious sex offenders, distinguishing it by its general application, the ordinary judicial safeguards it preserved and the court’s genuine discretion. Kable remains the principle; Fardon shows how demanding the incompatibility test is in practice.

What happened?

Gregory Wayne Kable was serving a sentence for the manslaughter of his wife, and had written threatening letters from prison — he was in custody awaiting seventeen charges arising from them when the application was made. As his release approached, New South Wales passed the Community Protection Act, which empowered the Supreme Court to order his continued detention — naming him — where satisfied on reasonable grounds that he was more likely than not to commit a serious act of violence and that detention was appropriate for the community’s protection. The detention order did not depend on conviction for any further offence.

What did the Court decide?

The Act was invalid and the detention order could not stand. A majority held that requiring the Supreme Court of New South Wales to make an order of that kind, against a named individual, on the balance of probabilities, was not something a state parliament could ask of that court.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

A state legislature cannot confer on a state court a function that is incompatible with that court’s institutional integrity as a potential repository of federal jurisdiction under Chapter III.

Why does this case matter?

The bar is higher than it first looks, and Fardon is the reason. A materially similar-sounding preventive detention scheme was upheld eight years later, so the lesson is not that such schemes are forbidden — a state court may still be given unusual and even non-judicial functions. Students who take this case as a general prohibition get the next question wrong.

What the cases turn on is whether defining characteristics of a court survive: an independent decision on evidence the court can test, a genuine discretion, and reasons. Later cases such as Wainohu have added to that list rather than settled it.

Exam and application relevance

Point to the specific feature that damages a defining characteristic of the court: legislation directed at a named person, an outcome effectively dictated, a decision required on material the court cannot test, reasons dispensed with, or ordinary safeguards removed. Then compare it against a scheme that survived, and say what distinguishes them. Listing a statute’s oddities is not an argument that its function is incompatible.

Check your understanding

Chapter III is about federal courts. Why does it constrain what a state parliament may ask a state court to do?