E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd
E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 15; (2010) 241 CLR 144
Californian wine bearing an Australian-registered mark reached Australia through Germany without its owner’s knowledge. Had the owner used the mark in Australia, so as to defeat an application to remove it for non-use?
What happened?
E & J Gallo Winery (Gallo), a Californian company, was the registered owner of the trade mark BAREFOOT, which had been registered in Australia since 9 March 1999 in class 33 for wines ([2], [4]). From 9 March 1999 to 17 January 2005 the registered owner was Michael Houlihan, who licensed the mark to Grape Links Inc, trading as Barefoot Cellars, of which he was President. Gallo bought Grape Links under an agreement dated 10 November 2004, and the mark was transferred to Gallo on 17 January 2005 ([5]).
On 14 February 2001 Barefoot Cellars shipped 60 cases of wine bearing the mark to a German distributor, Einig-Zenzen. Some of that wine was sold to a Victorian wholesaler, Beach Avenue Wholesalers Pty Ltd, which imported it into Australia in July 2002 ([6]). During the three-year period from 7 May 2004 to 8 May 2007 Beach Avenue imported and offered 144 bottles for sale in Australia, 41 of which were sold, and gave 18 away ([3], [7]). Gallo conceded that there was no evidence that it, Barefoot Cellars or Mr Houlihan knew that wine was being offered or sold in Australia under the mark ([8]).
Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd began selling beer in Australia under the name BAREFOOT RADLER in January 2008 ([12]). Gallo sued for infringement of its registered mark, and Lion Nathan cross-claimed for removal of the mark from the Register on the ground of non-use during the three-year period ([15]-[16]). The primary judge, Flick J, found against Gallo on infringement and ordered removal ([18]). A Full Court of the Federal Court found for Gallo on infringement, but upheld the removal order ([18]). Gallo appealed to the High Court on the findings about non-use ([19]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs and set aside orders 4, 6 and 7 of the Full Court, making fresh orders in the terms set out at [73]. It also refused special leave to cross-appeal ([72]-[73]). The Court gave reasons in two judgments ([1]-[73] and [74]-[88]). The question for decision was whether, during the three years, the registered owner had used the mark in Australia, or used it in good faith, within ss 92(4)(b) and 100(3)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ([28]-[29]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The plurality said that use of a trade mark under ss 92(4)(b), 100(1)(c) and 100(3)(a) must be understood in the context of s 17. Distinguishing the registered owner’s goods from the goods of others, and indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods and the registered owner, are essential characteristics of a trade mark ([41]-[42]). The Court approved the statement that use “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods ([43]), and a mark is used only if it is used in the course of trade ([44]).
The capacity of a trade mark to distinguish the registered owner’s goods “does not depend on whether the owner knowingly projects the goods into the Australian market”; it depends on the goods being in the course of trade in Australia, and each occasion of trade in Australia, while the goods remain in the course of trade, is a use for the purposes of the Act ([51]).
An overseas manufacturer who has registered a mark in Australia, and who himself or through an authorised user places the mark on goods sold to a trader overseas, can be said to be a user of the mark when those goods are offered for sale and sold in Australia. The mark remains the mark of the registered owner, through an authorised user if there is one, while the goods are in the course of trade before they are bought for consumption ([52]).
Estex Clothing Manufacturers v Ellis and Goldstein was not authority that a knowing projection of the goods is necessary; there was no suggestion in it that what was sufficient there was necessary in every case ([49]). Provided Barefoot Cellars was an authorised user, the facts were sufficient to constitute use by the registered owner, and it was unnecessary to decide whether Beach Avenue also used the mark ([53]). Heydon J agreed with the substance of the plurality reasoning on these issues ([87]).
On authorised use, the plurality held that Gallo had established, on the evidence it relied on, that Barefoot Cellars used the mark under the control of Mr Houlihan while he was the registered owner, so that the use was authorised use under s 8(1) and (3) ([59]). Section 8(3) allows control to take the form of quality control ([21]). Gallo relied on affidavit evidence that Mr Houlihan and Ms Harvey were retained as consultants to continue monitoring the quality of the wine, and on cl 5(e) of the Consulting Agreement ([55]-[56]).
The plurality recorded Lion Nathan’s contention that the clause was only a covenant about the future, and Gallo’s answer that the agreement was tendered for a plain purpose without objection, that no application was made to limit its use under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and that it was in evidence for all purposes under s 60 ([57]-[58]). Heydon J gave separate reasons ([74]-[86]). He treated the first sentence of cl 5(e) as a recital of past fact from which it could be inferred that Mr Houlihan had engaged in quality control ([79]), said that it was hearsay but admissible under s 69 ([81]), and said of the evidence that it was “vague and indirect” and “not perfect. But it is sufficient” ([86]).
On use in good faith, the plurality recorded Lion Nathan’s contentions that the use must be substantial and that an owner unaware of the use could not have used the mark in good faith ([60]). It referred to authority that bona fide use must be “ordinary and genuine” use judged by commercial standards, and that a court may be influenced by the quantum of sales in deciding that a use is not genuine ([62]). It said that a single act of sale may not be sufficient to prevent removal, that in the case of genuine use a relatively small amount of use may be sufficient, and that on the facts it was not necessary to decide whether a single use in good faith would have been sufficient ([64]).
The 144 bottles offered and 41 sales proved were a commercial quantity, there was no suggestion of any purpose other than profit and establishing goodwill, and the use was not contended to be fictitious or colourable, so the use was genuine and sufficient to establish use in good faith ([65], [70]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [41]–[44] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [49]–[53] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state what use of a trade mark by the registered owner requires and apply it to the facts. They are necessary to the conclusion that the registered owner used the mark in the statutory period, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed. Heydon J agreed with the substance of these paragraphs ([87] and footnote 57), except for the last sentence of [42].
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [55]–[59] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
The plurality’s use finding at [53] was expressed to depend on Barefoot Cellars being an authorised user, so the finding at [59] that it was is necessary to the ground on which the appeal was allowed. It is a conclusion on the evidence in this case.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [74]–[86] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J wrote separately on whether Mr Houlihan exercised quality control and on the admissibility and use of the Consulting Agreement and the affidavit evidence under the Evidence Act. He concurs in the result and in the finding that the control was established, and the reasoning on the evidence is his own; the plurality’s reasons on the same issue are at [55]-[59].
Proposition 3
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [60]–[65] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs address Lion Nathan’s contentions on good faith and conclude that the use proved was genuine and sufficient. They are necessary to the conclusion at [70] that the registered trade mark was used in good faith in the statutory period. The statement that a single act of sale may not be sufficient is tentative and the Court expressly left open whether a single use in good faith would have sufficed ([64]).
Why does this case matter?
Non-use problems hand the student a mark, a gap in the owner’s own activity in Australia and some goods that turn up in the market. An examiner rewards an answer that sets out each requirement for use by the registered owner and for good faith and ties each requirement to a fact in the problem, rather than a short conclusion about whether the owner did anything in Australia.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the three-year period, the goods to which the application relates, who applied the mark to the goods, how the goods came to be offered for sale in Australia, and what the owner’s relationship was to the person who applied the mark. Ask whether the mark was used in the course of trade in Australia, by whom, and whether the owner or an authorised user under the owner’s control stands behind that use. Then ask separately whether the use was in good faith, and what the quantity, purpose and genuineness of the use show.
Gallo applied ss 7, 8, 17, 92 and 100 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) to a statutory period that ended in 2007, so check the text in force for the period in question.
Check your understanding
1. How did the plurality describe use “as a trade mark”, and whose statement did it approve ([43])?
2. What did the plurality say about Lion Nathan’s reliance on Estex, and what did it say the capacity of a trade mark to distinguish depends on ([49]-[51])?
3. On what evidence did the plurality find that Barefoot Cellars was an authorised user, and how did Heydon J’s reasons on that issue differ from the plurality’s ([55]-[59], [74]-[86])?
4. What did the plurality say about the amount of use needed for use in good faith, and what did it leave undecided ([62]-[65])?