What counts as “property”: the concept of property in Yanner v Eaton
What ‘property’ means in a statute or instrument: the High Court’s statement in Yanner v Eaton that property describes a legal relationship with a thing, and how the Court read a Queensland Act vesting ‘property’ in wild fauna in the Crown as an aggregate of rights of control, not full ownership.
Learning outcomes
- State the High Court’s statement in Yanner v Eaton that ‘property’ describes a legal relationship with a thing, not the thing, and explain why it is not a notion of standard content.
- Explain why the joint judgment held that the statutory vesting of ‘property’ in fauna in the Crown was not full beneficial or absolute ownership, and identify the four reasons given.
- Attribute the propositions in Yanner v Eaton correctly to the joint judgment, Gummow J’s separate reasons and the dissents, and apply the approach to a statute or instrument that says something is ‘the property of’ a person.
When a statute or a document says that something “is the property of” a person, a student of property law must ask a prior question: what interest does that give? The word is used for many different relationships with many different things, so its presence settles little by itself. The leading statement of this point in Australian law is in the High Court’s decision in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, which concerned a Queensland Act vesting “property” in wild fauna in the Crown. This article states what the Court said about the concept of property and about how a vesting of “property” is read, and builds on the classification of real and personal property and of rights in rem and in personam in Real property and personal property. It states High Court authority on one Queensland statute and does not state the property legislation of any jurisdiction.
The case
The appellant, a member of the Gunnamulla clan of the Gangalidda tribe, used a traditional form of harpoon in 1994 to catch two juvenile estuarine crocodiles, and he and other members of his clan ate some of the meat (joint judgment at [1]).1 He held no licence, permit, certificate or other authority under the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Q), and was charged with taking fauna contrary to that Act (at [3]); the Magistrate dismissed the charge on the footing that s 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) applied (at [3]-[4]), and the Court of Appeal of Queensland, by majority, set that dismissal aside and remitted the matter (at [6]). Section 7 of the Fauna Act, as enacted, provided that all fauna, save fauna taken or kept during an open season, “is the property of the Crown and under the control of the Fauna Authority” (set out by McHugh J at [44]). The respondent submitted, with the Commonwealth’s support, that s 7(1) gave the Crown full beneficial, or absolute, ownership of the fauna (joint judgment at [21]). The High Court allowed the appeal from the Court of Appeal: the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ held that the vesting of “property” in the Crown was not full ownership, and Gummow J agreed in the result with separate reasons. McHugh J and Callinan J dissented.
“Property” describes a relationship, not a thing
The joint judgment began from the meaning of the word. “Property” in the Fauna Act, “as elsewhere in the law”, does not refer to a thing; it is “a description of a legal relationship with a thing”, and it “refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the thing” (at [17]). It is usually treated as a “bundle of rights”, but the Court noted that even that may have its limits as an analytical tool (at [17]). The term can be, and is, applied to many different kinds of relationship with a subject matter; it is not “a monolithic notion of standard content and invariable intensity” (at [19]).
The practical consequence for a student is stated at [20]. To say that A has property in B invites the question what interest A has in B. It will usually provoke further questions of classification: whether the interest is real or personal, the item tangible or intangible, and the interest legal or equitable. The comprehensiveness of the word, the Court said, “presents the problem, not the answer to it”, because “property” comprehends a wide variety of interests and its use in an Act does not, without more, signify what form of interest is created (at [21]).
Reading a statutory vesting of “property”
The joint judgment gave several reasons for holding that the Crown’s “property” in fauna was not full beneficial or absolute ownership (at [22]-[30]):
- It is difficult to identify what fauna is owned: migratory fauna, and fauna that has at any time been within the State (at [22]).
- At common law wild animals were the subject of only the most limited property rights, and “ownership” connotes a legal right to have and dispose of possession and enjoyment, whereas the Act intends fauna ordinarily to remain beyond possession and disposition by humans (at [24]-[25]).
- Aspects of the Act suggest an unusual kind of property: the Crown’s property ceased as fauna was lawfully taken in open seasons, the Act provided for forfeiture of fauna to the Crown, and s 7(2) provided that no liability attached to the Crown by reason only of the vesting (at [26]).
- Property was vested in the Crown at the time that a royalty on fauna was introduced, so the vesting may have been seen as a step in creating a royalty system and in distinguishing the levy from an excise (at [27]).
The Court concluded that the vesting was “nothing more than” a fiction “expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource” (at [28]), and that the “property” vested was “no more than the aggregate of the various rights of control by the Executive that the legislation created”: rights to limit what fauna might be taken and how, rights to possession of fauna reduced to possession, and rights to receive royalty on fauna taken (at [30]). Those rights are less than full beneficial or absolute ownership (at [30]).
The same word, in other words, can denote a very full relationship in one context and a regulatory aggregate of powers in another, and the content is found in the rights the statute actually confers.
Separate and dissenting reasons
The decision is not unanimous and the reasoning of the Justices differs. Gummow J, agreeing in the result, treated the Crown’s interests under the Act as limited ones, arising from the royalty and penalty provisions, and held that the Crown’s “property” in fauna arises only upon a “taking” or “keeping” (at [101], [114]). McHugh J, dissenting, read s 7 in its natural and ordinary meaning as vesting in the Crown, and taking away from everyone else, the right to deal with the fauna defined by the Act (at [46]), and would have dismissed the appeal (at [58]). Callinan J, also dissenting, considered that the scheme of the Act was consistent with no intention other than an intention to have absolute property in all fauna (at [146]) and would have dismissed the appeal (at [159]). A student citing the passages on the concept of property should cite the joint judgment and say that two Justices read the same section differently.
The native title consequence, and its limits
The Court went on to hold that the Fauna Act did not extinguish the native title right and interest in hunting (at [40]). That holding rests on the construction and effect of the Fauna Act. Because the right survived, s 211(2) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and s 109 of the Constitution meant that the Fauna Act did not prohibit or restrict the appellant’s hunting for personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs (at [40]); this article does not state those provisions, and the extinguishment rules are in Extinguishment of native title by grants of interests in land. Section 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), as applied in the case, has since been amended (the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) inserted s 211(1)(ba) and a note to s 211(2) from 30 September 1998), so that step in the reasoning has to be re-checked against the current section.2 The decision construed one Queensland Act as it stood in 1994; the joint judgment records that the Fauna Act was repealed and replaced by the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Q) from 19 December 1994, and that the proceedings were nonetheless decided under the Fauna Act (at [2]). It is authority for how the word “property” is approached, and is not authority that a statutory vesting of “property” never confers ownership.
Applying this in a problem question
- When a statute, will, contract or instrument says something is “the property of” a person, do not treat the word as the answer. Ask what interest it is intended to give.
- Classify the interest: real or personal, tangible or intangible, legal or equitable, and whether it is a right in rem or in personam.
- Read the whole instrument for the rights actually conferred, the way the joint judgment read the Fauna Act: the rights of control, of possession, of disposition and to receive payments, and their limits.
- Ask why the vesting was made, and whether the context shows a regulatory, fiscal or ownership purpose.
- State the authority accurately: the concept of property is from the joint judgment of four Justices; Gummow J agreed in the result on different reasoning; two Justices dissented.
Self-check
- Have I asked what interest “property” confers, rather than treating the word as decisive?
- Have I attributed the “relationship, not a thing” passage to the joint judgment (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ)?
- Have I said that Gummow J gave separate reasons and that McHugh J and Callinan J dissented?
- Have I limited the case to the Queensland Act it construed?