Yanner v Eaton

High Court of Australia · 1999

PropertyProperty Concepts

Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53; (1999) 201 CLR 351

A State Act says wild fauna is the property of the Crown, and a man harpoons two crocodiles without a licence. Does the bare word ‘property’ decide whether his clan’s right to hunt survived?

Qualified by legislation: Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), from 30 September 1998

Section 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) is set out in the judgment as it stood when the crocodiles were taken in 1994. The Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), which commenced on 30 September 1998, inserted s 211(1)(ba), so that s 211(2) applies only if the law does not provide that a licence, permit or other instrument is only to be granted or issued for research, environmental protection, public health or public safety purposes, and added a note to s 211(2) that native title holders carrying on the activity, or gaining the access, are subject to laws of general application. Both changes are in the current section. The step in the reasoning that applied s 211 ([39]-[40]) therefore has to be re-checked against the current text of s 211(1) when the same question arises today.

What happened?

Murrandoo Yanner, a member of the Gunnamulla clan of the Gangalidda tribe, used a traditional form of harpoon between 31 October and 1 December 1994 to catch two juvenile estuarine crocodiles in Cliffdale Creek in the Gulf of Carpentaria area of Queensland. He and other members of his clan ate some of the meat, and he froze the rest of the meat and the skins at his home ([1]). He held no licence, permit, certificate or other authority under the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Q), s 54(1)(a) of which provided that a person shall not take, keep or attempt to take or keep fauna of any kind unless he is the holder of one ([2]-[3]). He was charged in the Magistrates Court with taking fauna contrary to the Act ([3]).

The Magistrate accepted his contention that s 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) applied, found that his clan had a connection with the area from which the crocodiles were taken and that hunting juvenile crocodiles for food was a traditional custom, and dismissed the charge ([3]-[4]). A police officer applied for review. The Court of Appeal of Queensland, by majority, made the order nisi absolute, set aside the Magistrate’s order and remitted the proceedings, and Mr Yanner appealed by special leave ([6]).

Before the High Court, Mr Yanner argued that he had been exercising native title rights and interests preserved by the Native Title Act, so that the Fauna Act, to the extent that it prohibited the taking of crocodiles in the exercise of those rights, was invalid under s 109 of the Constitution ([7]). The respondent argued that any native title right to hunt crocodiles had been extinguished before the Native Title Act began, by s 7(1) of the Fauna Act, which provided that all fauna, save fauna taken or kept otherwise than in contravention of the Act during an open season, “is the property of the Crown and under the control of the Fauna Authority” ([8]). The Fauna Act was repealed and replaced on 19 December 1994, but it was common ground that the proceedings fell to be decided under it ([2]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed, the orders of the Court of Appeal were set aside, and the order nisi was discharged ([42]). The Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory, who had intervened, were ordered to pay the additional costs of the appellant caused by their intervention, and the other costs questions were reserved (Orders; [126]-[129]). Four sets of reasons were given: the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ ([1]-[42]), and the separate reasons of McHugh J ([43]-[58]), Gummow J ([59]-[129]) and Callinan J ([130]-[159]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The meaning of property and of the vesting in s 7(1) ([17]-[30]). In the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ, “property” in the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Q), “as elsewhere in the law”, “does not refer to a thing; it is a description of a legal relationship with a thing”, a degree of power recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the thing ([17]). It is applied to many kinds of relationship and is not “a monolithic notion of standard content and invariable intensity” ([19]); to say that A has property in B invites the question what interest A has in B ([20]); and because the word is so comprehensive it “presents the problem, not the answer”, so that its use in an Act “does not, without more, signify what form of interest is created” ([21]).

Applying that to s 7(1), which provided that fauna (other than fauna taken or kept otherwise than in contravention of the Act during an open season) was the property of the Crown and under the control of the Fauna Authority, the joint judgment rejected the submission that the Crown had “full beneficial, or absolute, ownership” of fauna, for four reasons: the difficulty of identifying what fauna the Crown owned ([22]); the limited property in wild animals at common law and the connotation of ownership as a right to have and dispose of possession, when the subject matter of the Act was intended to remain outside human possession ([23]-[25]); aspects of the Act (the open-season exception, the forfeiture provisions and s 7(2), under which liability at law did not attach to the Crown by reason only of the vesting) that suggest an unusual kind of property ([26]); and the purpose of the vesting, tied to the royalty system and to the need to differentiate the levy from an excise ([27]).

They described the statutory vesting as nothing more than a fiction “expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource” (quoting Toomer v Witsell) ([28]), and held that the property vested was “no more than the aggregate of the various rights of control by the Executive that the legislation created”, which are less than the rights of full beneficial or absolute ownership ([30]). Gummow J, who also would have allowed the appeal, read s 7(1) differently: the Crown’s property arose only upon a taking or keeping of fauna ([93], [114]), and the Crown’s interests were limited to royalties and penalty sums ([101]).

McHugh J and Callinan J dissented. McHugh J held that in its natural and ordinary meaning s 7 vested in the Crown, and took from everyone else, the right to deal with fauna as defined by the Act ([46]-[47], [52]); Callinan J held that the whole scheme of the Act was consistent with no intention other than an intention to have absolute property in all fauna in the State ([146]).

Extinguishment and s 211 of the Native Title Act ([31]-[41]). In the joint judgment, the respondent expressly disclaimed a contention that legislation forbidding the taking or keeping of fauna except pursuant to licence would be sufficient to extinguish the appellant’s native title rights and interests, and that concession was rightly made ([31]). Native title is extinguished by the creation of rights inconsistent with the native title holders continuing to hold their rights and interests ([35]). The joint judgment found it unnecessary to examine the debate about partial extinguishment ([34]) and unnecessary to decide whether the creation of property rights of the kind the respondent contended for would be inconsistent with native title: it was sufficient to say that “regulating the way in which rights and interests may be exercised is not inconsistent with their continued existence”, although regulation may shade into prohibition ([37]).

Native title rights reflect connection with the land, and saying to a group of Aboriginal peoples “You may not hunt or fish without a permit” does not sever that connection or deny the continued exercise of the rights ([38]); s 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) assumes that a conditional prohibition of that kind does not affect the existence of the rights ([39]). The Fauna Act therefore did not extinguish the rights and interests relied on, so that by s 211(2) of the Native Title Act and s 109 of the Constitution it did not prohibit or restrict the appellant, as a native title holder, from hunting or fishing for the crocodiles he took for personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs, and the Magistrate was right to dismiss the information ([40]).

The joint judgment added that it was neither necessary nor desirable to express a view on submissions touching questions broader than those that had to be decided ([41]). Gummow J reached the same result by his own route: the legislative regulation, by requiring a permit under the Fauna Act, did not abrogate the native title right to hunt, and the right was not extinguished before a taking ([115]-[117]); s 211(2) then applied and s 109 of the Constitution operated ([124]).

McHugh J held that the Act proclaimed that no one, including an Aboriginal person, had any right to take fauna and so the appellant had no right which the Native Title Act protected ([57]); Callinan J held that the Native Title Act is not retrospective and that the Fauna Act was wholly valid and effective in relation to any native title right to take fauna ([158]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [17]–[21] (opens in a new tab), [22]–[30] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state what ‘property’ means in the Fauna Act and reject the respondent’s submission that s 7(1) gave the Crown full beneficial or absolute ownership; that rejection is the premise of the conclusion at [31] and [40] that the Act did not extinguish the appellant’s rights.

Separate reasoning · Gummow J (agreeing that the appeal be allowed)

Read judgment: [93] (opens in a new tab), [101] (opens in a new tab), [114] (opens in a new tab)

Gummow J read the vesting of property as arising only upon a taking or keeping and limited to royalty and penalty interests; this is his own route to allowing the appeal and is not the joint judgment’s reasoning.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J and Callinan J (each dissenting)

Read judgment: [46]–[52] (opens in a new tab), [137] (opens in a new tab), [146] (opens in a new tab)

Each of these Justices read s 7 as vesting full ownership of fauna in the Crown and would have dismissed the appeal; they are the contrary view and not the Court’s holding.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [31]–[40] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs apply the construction of s 7(1) to the extinguishment question and conclude that the Act did not extinguish the rights relied on, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed ([42]). The joint judgment reserved two matters (partial extinguishment at [34], and whether property rights of the kind contended for would be inconsistent at [37]), so those are not decided.

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [41] (opens in a new tab)

The remarks that Walden v Hensler concerned radically different issues and that it was neither necessary nor desirable to express a view on broader submissions are observations about the limits of the decision and are not needed for the result.

Separate reasoning · Gummow J (agreeing that the appeal be allowed)

Read judgment: [115]–[117] (opens in a new tab), [124] (opens in a new tab)

Gummow J held that the permit requirement regulated and did not abrogate the native title right, and applied s 211(2) with s 109 of the Constitution; the same result by a different route.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J and Callinan J (each dissenting)

Read judgment: [57]–[58] (opens in a new tab), [158]–[159] (opens in a new tab)

These Justices held that the Fauna Act had taken away or extinguished the right to take fauna and would have dismissed the appeal.

Why does this case matter?

A statutory declaration that something is the property of someone sounds decisive, and a problem built on this case rewards an answer that shows which Justices’ reasoning it relies on, and for which step.

Exam and application relevance

Name the Act and the date. The Court construed the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Q) as it stood in 1994 in a prosecution for taking crocodiles; the decision is not a ruling on the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), which replaced it, or on any other statute that uses the word. Section 83(1) of the later Act provides that, subject to exceptions, all protected animals are the property of the State (AustLII consolidation as at 16 June 2026).

Attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is, and say which Justice’s route you are describing.

Check your understanding

1. Which provision of the Fauna Act did the respondent say had extinguished the appellant’s native title right to hunt, and what did that provision say ([8])?

2. What reasons did the joint judgment give for not treating the Crown’s property in fauna as full beneficial or absolute ownership ([22]-[27])?

3. How did Gummow J’s reading of s 7(1) differ from the reading of McHugh J ([46]-[47], [93], [114])?

4. What did the joint judgment say it was unnecessary to decide about the creation of property rights of the kind the respondent contended for, and what did it say about regulation of the way native title rights are exercised ([37])?

5. What change has been made to s 211(1) of the Native Title Act since the offence in 1994, and why does it matter to the step that applied s 211 ([39]-[40])?