Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd

House of Lords · 1897

Corporations And Commercial LawCorporate Personality

Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22

A boot manufacturer sold his business to a company in which he held all but six shares, and the company later failed. Could its liquidator make him personally answer for the company’s debts?

What happened?

Aron Salomon had traded for over thirty years as a boot and shoe manufacturer in Whitechapel under the name A Salomon and Co, on his own account (Lord Macnaghten). In 1892 he turned the business into a limited company, A Salomon and Company Limited, incorporated on 28 July 1892 with a capital of 40,000 pounds in 40,000 shares of one pound each (Lord Herschell). The memorandum of association was subscribed by Salomon, his wife, his daughter and his four sons, each for one share (Lord Herschell). The company bought the business under an agreement; the price on paper was over 39,000 pounds, paid in cash, in debentures for 10,000 pounds, and in fully paid shares, and Salomon came to own all the shares except six (Lord Macnaghten; Lord Herschell).

The company failed and went into liquidation. Mr Broderip, to whom Salomon’s debentures had been reissued for an advance of 5,000 pounds, took proceedings; the liquidator met his claim with a counterclaim against Salomon, which was amended at the suggestion of the trial judge, Vaughan Williams J, to claim that the company was entitled to be indemnified by Salomon against its debts to its other creditors (Lord Macnaghten; Lord Herschell). Vaughan Williams J held that the company was an alias for Salomon and was his agent, and he made an order for the indemnity of 7,733 pounds 8s 3d (Lord Herschell).

The Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes and Kay LJJ) affirmed that order on a different footing: that the company stood as trustee for Salomon as beneficiary, on the ground that the formation of the company, the agreement and the issue of debentures were a mere scheme to enable him to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act 1862 (Lord Watson; Lord Herschell). Salomon appealed to the House of Lords and the company cross-appealed on its original claim to rescind the agreement for fraud (Lord Watson).

What did the Court decide?

The House of Lords allowed Salomon’s appeal. Lord Halsbury LC, Lord Watson, Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris and Lord Davey each delivered an opinion, and all agreed in the result. The order of the Court of Appeal was reversed and the cross-appeal was dismissed with costs here and below. Salomon’s costs in the House were to be taxed in the manner usual when a pauper appellant sues, and the cause was remitted to the Chancery Division (order at the end of the report).

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Lord Halsbury LC began by saying that “the important question in this case, I am not certain it is not the only question, is whether the respondent company was a company at all”, and that “the sole guide must be the statute itself”. He pointed out that seven living persons held shares, that the statute enacts nothing about the extent or degree of the interest each holds (“One share is enough”), and that “if they are shareholders, they are shareholders for all purposes”.

His conclusion was that “once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and liabilities are”. He added a reservation: he did not mean to suggest that, if the statutory condition of seven shareholders had not been complied with, a fraud on the officer entrusted with giving the certificate could not be shown by a proceeding in the nature of scire facias.

He rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach of reading into the Act words such as Lopes LJ’s “seven independent bonâ fide members, who had a mind and a will of their own”, and he said that “either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not. If it was, the business belonged to it and not to Mr. Salomon.”

Lord Herschell said that both courts below had treated the company as “a legal entity distinct from Salomon and the then members who composed it, and therefore as a validly constituted corporation”, so that it was not “another name for the same person; the company is ex hypothesi a distinct legal persona”. A company might be said in a popular sense to carry on business for its shareholders, but “this certainly does not in point of law constitute the relation of principal and agent between them”.

He observed that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning would equally catch the many private companies formed by former partners, and that the statute sanctions a scheme under which all the shares except six are owned by one person. He held that it made no difference that the six were Salomon’s nominees: the statute forbids the entry of a trust on the register, and “whether they are beneficial owners or bare trustees is a matter with which neither the company nor creditors have anything to do”.

He added that “we have to interpret the law, not to make it”, and that the creditors had notice they were dealing with a limited company and could see from the register how the shares were held.

Lord Macnaghten said that nothing in the Act requires the subscribers to be independent or unconnected, or to take a substantial interest. On registration the subscribers are a body corporate, “capable forthwith” of exercising all the functions of an incorporated company, so that “the company attains maturity on its birth” and “the company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum”, and, even if the business and its managers are unchanged, “the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them”.

Of the nickname “one man companies”, he said that if it is meant to convey that a company under the absolute control of one person is not a company legally incorporated although the requirements of the Act have been complied with, it is “inaccurate and misleading”; if it means only a predominant member entitled practically to the whole profits, there is nothing in that contrary to the true intention of the Act.

Lord Watson said that what the legislature intended “can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication”, and that the Act of 1862 imposed no limit on the number of shares one member may take. He held that the statute casts on creditors the duty of making inquiry, and that a creditor who does not use the means the statute provides “must bear the consequences of his own negligence”. He and Lord Herschell both noted that, taken in its proper legal sense, the Court of Appeal’s finding that the company was formed contrary to the Act would imply that it had not been validly constituted, not that it was Salomon’s trustee.

Lord Davey said that it was possible, and probable, that the conclusion he felt constrained to reach had not been contemplated by the legislature and might be due to some defect in the machinery of the Act, but that the intention of the legislature must be collected from the language of its enactments. He added that, since no member need hold more than one share and the Act prescribes no minimum amount, it is not legitimate to inquire whether the interest of any member is substantial. He observed that it was not argued that the company was a sham to be disregarded; he did not say that such an argument would prevail, but remarked that it was not certain that the section making the registrar’s certificate conclusive evidence of compliance would be an answer to it. Lord Morris concurred in the judgment and the reasons given.

Why does this case matter?

Problems about a business run through a family or one-person company usually invite two arguments: that the business is really the controller’s, and that the controller should answer for what the company owes. Both were put to the House of Lords in this case. The case also shows how the House dealt with an argument from the purpose of a statute, which is worth following in the opinions themselves.

Exam and application relevance

Set out the facts that made the company look like Salomon’s own business, then follow each point to the Law Lord who answered it. Cite each point to the Law Lord who made it. Keep the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, which the Lords reversed, separate from the House of Lords’ own, and name the Lord Justice where the Lords quote one.

The House was construing the Companies Act 1862, an English statute. In an Australian answer, check the current statutory provisions on the creation and capacity of a company before applying the point to a modern company. Ask also what each Law Lord said about fraud, and whether anyone argued that the company was a sham.

Check your understanding

1. Which three Lords Justices sat in the Court of Appeal, and on what ground did their order say the company’s formation was objectionable (Lord Watson)?

2. What did Vaughan Williams J say the company was in relation to Mr Salomon, and what relief followed (Lord Herschell)?

3. Which Law Lord said only that he concurred, and which Law Lord remarked that the conclusion might not have been contemplated by the legislature (Lord Morris; Lord Davey)?

4. What did Lord Halsbury LC say about the possibility of showing a fraud on the officer who gave the certificate of incorporation?

5. What did Lord Davey say had not been argued in the case, and what did he say about the registrar’s certificate?