Perre v Apand Pty Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1999

TortsNegligence

Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; [1999] HCA 36

A potato grower’s crop was never touched by disease, yet a neighbour’s outbreak shut it out of the Western Australian market. Could the company that supplied the infected seed be sued in negligence?

Clarified by Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562

Kirby J’s three steps of foreseeability, proximity and policy ([282], [288]) are not the Australian test. In Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ said that the three-stage approach of Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman “does not represent the law in Australia”, citing Gleeson CJ ([9]), McHugh J ([77]-[82]) and Hayne J ([333]-[334]) in Perre; that proximity gives little practical guidance in cases not analogous to cases in which a duty has been established; and that different classes of case give rise to different problems, which become the focus of an evaluation of the factors for and against a duty ([48]-[50]). Present Kirby J’s reasoning as one Justice’s approach, not as a test.

Clarified by Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 25

In Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 25 growers sued the producer of contaminated seed for pure economic loss, and the appeal was dismissed because no duty was owed. The joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ said that, outside cases of assumed responsibility, whether a duty to avoid pure economic loss is owed has since Sullivan v Moody been understood in Australia to involve an evaluation of the “salient features” of the relationship, an approach that has attracted significant criticism and that no party argued should be departed from ([36]). They said it calls for an incremental and analogical approach and not an “instinctive synthesis” of competing considerations ([37]), and treated the defendant’s actual knowledge of the risk, citing McHugh J in Perre, and the plaintiff’s vulnerability as relevant to the evaluation ([38]-[39]). Edelman J, in separate reasons, agreed with that application of the approach, said that it has been strongly criticised and that until Caltex and its progeny are challenged or rationalised a duty based on salient features must be confined as narrowly as possible ([59]), and criticised vulnerability as a central feature, including as an explanation of the result in Perre ([96], [102]-[103]).

What happened?

Apand, the respondent, bought potatoes from growers for crisping and also researched new potato varieties (Hayne J at [309]-[310]). It supplied seed of a variety called Saturna to the Sparnons, a firm of commercial potato growers in the South Australian Riverland, to grow an experimental crop, and in April 1992 the Sparnons’ crop was found to have bacterial wilt ([307], [310], [315]). The trial judge found Apand liable to the Sparnons in contract and in negligence, and that was not challenged on this appeal ([318]-[319]).

Western Australia allowed potatoes to enter that State only if they had not been grown within 20 kilometres of a known outbreak of bacterial wilt in the previous five years, and had not been harvested, cleaned, washed, graded or packed with equipment or on premises that had handled such potatoes ([307]). The appellants grew and packed potatoes on properties between about two and three and a half kilometres from the Sparnons’ farm, and much of their business was selling into Western Australia ([308]). The disease did not spread to their land or crops, but they could no longer process potatoes for that market and said they had lost money as a result ([308], [327]). The trial judge held that Apand owed them no duty of care, and the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed their appeal ([308], [324]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the orders of the Full Court, allowed the appeal to that Court with costs, varied one of the trial judge’s orders and set aside two others, and remitted the matter to a single judge of the Federal Court for further hearing, with the costs of the first hearing to abide the outcome.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Each of the seven Justices gave separate reasons, and each held that Apand owed a duty of care to at least some of the appellants, whose loss was wholly economic: their land and crops were not infected, but a Western Australian regulation barred potatoes grown within 20 kilometres of a known outbreak of bacterial wilt, and the outbreak was on the Sparnons’ farm, to which Apand had supplied the seed (Gleeson CJ at [12]-[15]; Gaudron J at [42]; McHugh J at [136]; Gummow J at [217]; Kirby J at [302]; Hayne J at [351]; Callinan J at [406]).

The Justices did not frame the inquiry in the same terms. Gleeson CJ agreed with Gummow J’s reasons and emphasised “the combination of circumstances involving the use and ownership or enjoyment of land, the physical propinquity of such land to the Sparnons’ land, the known vulnerability of people in the position of the appellants, and the control exercised by the respondent over the relevant activity on the Sparnons’ land” ([15]). Gaudron J reasoned from cases in which a defendant is in a position to control another’s exercise of a legal right: where a person knows or ought to know that acts or omissions may cause the loss or impairment of legal rights possessed, enjoyed or exercised by another, whether as an individual or as a member of a class, and that other is in no position to protect their own interests, the law should impose a duty ([38], [41]-[42]).

McHugh J put five questions: whether the loss was reasonably foreseeable, whether a duty would impose indeterminate liability, whether it would impose an unreasonable burden on the defendant’s autonomy, whether the plaintiffs were vulnerable to loss from the defendant’s conduct, and whether the defendant knew its conduct could harm individuals such as them ([133]). Gummow J preferred the approach of identifying the “salient features” of the case, as Stephen J had in Caltex Oil, and found them in Apand’s knowledge of the risk, its control of the experiment, and the Perres’ lack of any means of protecting themselves ([198], [201], [213]-[217]).

Kirby J applied foreseeability, proximity and policy as three steps ([282], [289]-[302]). Hayne J asked whether liability was indeterminate and whether it was consistent with basic assumptions about the economy in which the conduct took place, testing the second by asking “what would have been the position if the respondent had deliberately (rather than negligently) engaged in the conduct of which complaint is now made” ([335]-[336], [346]). Callinan J found a duty on “the factors which in combination I think relevant in this case” ([406]).

The Justices did not all extend the duty to every appellant. McHugh J held that it was owed to growers and landowners within an ascertainable class, but not to processors in that capacity, and would have dismissed the appeal of Perre’s Vineyards Pty Ltd ([143]-[145], [153]). Hayne J held that it was owed only to Warruga Farms Pty Ltd, and would have dismissed the other appeals ([352], [356]). Kirby J recorded that the other members of the Court made no such differentiation ([303]), and the orders proposed by Gaudron J, which Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Kirby J adopted, allowed the appeal for all the appellants ([16], [46], [228], [306]). Whether and how much each appellant had lost was not decided: liability had been tried separately from quantum ([323]), and the further hearing was to deal with damage ([44]-[46], [220]-[221], [354], [434]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gummow J; Gleeson CJ expressly agreeing

Read judgment: [12]–[15] (opens in a new tab), [201] (opens in a new tab), [213]–[220] (opens in a new tab)

The combination of Apand’s knowledge, control of the experiment and the Perres’ inability to protect themselves supplied the necessary basis for Gummow J’s duty finding. He extended that duty to all components of the Perre business, subject to proof of damage. Gleeson CJ expressly adopted his duty reasoning and emphasised the combination that answered the concern about indeterminate liability. This identifies the reasoning necessary to those judgments; it does not make every Justice’s approach a single test adopted by the Court.

Separate reasoning · Gaudron J

Read judgment: [38]–[42] (opens in a new tab), [44]–[46] (opens in a new tab)

Gaudron J concurred in allowing all appellants’ appeals through an analogy with control over another’s legal rights. Knowledge of the threatened impairment and the appellants’ inability to protect their interests were necessary to her duty conclusion. She expressly recognised that the analogy was not exact. Her distinct route supports the result without establishing that the other Justices adopted her formulation; damage remained to be established.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [133]–[136] (opens in a new tab), [143]–[145] (opens in a new tab), [153] (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J used five questions to reach his duty conclusion, but limited the protected class to relevant growers and landowners and excluded processing losses. He concurred in allowing most appeals and dissented in part by proposing dismissal of Perre’s Vineyards’ appeal. His class limitation was necessary to his proposed orders, rather than an incidental observation, and was not the Court’s disposition for all appellants.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [282] (opens in a new tab), [289]–[302] (opens in a new tab), [303]–[306] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J concurred in allowing all appeals, applying foreseeability, proximity and policy as his distinct methodology. His application of those considerations and his rejection of differentiation within the integrated Perre enterprise supported his proposed orders. Agreement in the result did not mean that the other Justices adopted his three-stage approach; the subsequent treatment by Sullivan v Moody recorded above is therefore material.

Separate reasoning · Hayne J

Read judgment: [335]–[336] (opens in a new tab), [346]–[352] (opens in a new tab), [356] (opens in a new tab)

Hayne J found a duty by addressing determinacy and whether liability would inhibit otherwise lawful commercial activity. Those were grounds for his conclusion, not merely abstract observations. He concurred in allowing Warruga Farms’ appeal but dissented as to the other appellants, limiting the duty to persons directly affected by the regulation. His deliberate-conduct inquiry and narrower class should therefore be attributed to his judgment.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [406]–[426] (opens in a new tab), [428]–[430] (opens in a new tab), [434]–[435] (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J concurred in allowing all appeals on the cumulative effect of the listed circumstances, including control, a determinate class, knowledge, vulnerability and the experimental activity. That combination was his stated basis for the duty. He expressly declined to rely on the South Australian import prohibition because it had not been argued, so his agreement in the result does not adopt Hayne J’s reliance on illegality. Proof and assessment of each appellant’s damage remained for trial.

Obiter · Callinan J

Read judgment: [436]–[437] (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J’s general caution against separate trials in tort actions unless compensable damage is accepted was unnecessary to deciding Apand’s duty or allowing this appeal. His order remitted the matter for trial of damages. The caution is procedural guidance prompted by the litigation, rather than a ground establishing the duty to avoid the appellants’ economic loss.

Why does this case matter?

Perre is a source for the features the High Court has weighed in deciding whether to recognise a duty to avoid wholly financial loss where the plaintiff and the defendant had no dealings with each other. Citing it for the result alone tells an examiner little about the problem in hand.

Exam and application relevance

Perre does not supply one test, so identify whose reasoning you are using, cite the paragraph, and compare the problem’s facts with the facts that Justice relied on. Then check the result against the later authorities on the approach the Court now takes, Sullivan v Moody and Mallonland v Advanta Seeds.

Gleeson CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J and Heydon J, in a joint judgment in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16 at [23]-[24], described vulnerability as having emerged as an important requirement in cases of this kind, naming Perre as the most notable example, and said it was not necessary to state the breadth of any general proposition about its importance. That is the later Court’s account of Perre, not a statement in Perre.

Check your understanding

1. What kind of loss did the appellants claim, and why was it described as pure economic loss ([3], [24], [327])?

2. Which two circumstances, other than known vulnerability and control, did Gleeson CJ list in the combination he emphasised ([15])?

3. In what way did Gaudron J say the appellants’ position was analogous to, but not the same as, the cases in which a defendant controls another’s exercise of a legal right ([39]-[42])?

4. Which Justices would have limited the duty to some of the appellants, and which appellants would each have excluded ([143]-[145], [153], [352], [356])?

5. Why had the amount of the appellants’ loss not been decided ([323], [220]-[221])?