Owen v Menzies

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland · 2012

Constitutional LawChapter Iii And State Courts

Owen v Menzies [2012] QCA 170

A man accused of vilifying gay people says the law is invalid. The body hearing the complaint is named a tribunal, and most of its members are not judges. What would you weigh to decide whether it is a court of a State?

What happened?

Rhonda Bruce and Richelle Menzies complained under s 124A of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) that Ronald Owen had vilified people on the ground of sexuality ([22]). The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, which has since been replaced by QCAT, found that Mr Owen had vilified Ms Menzies by a sticker on a vehicle, a report to a shire council, a television interview and a letter published on a website, ordered him to pay her $5,000 and to publish an apology, and dismissed Ms Bruce’s complaint on the ground that as a bisexual person she had no standing ([23], [24]). Mr Owen had contended that s 124A was unconstitutional, and the former tribunal had determined that it was not permitted to decide that issue ([23]).

On appeals to the Trial Division, Douglas J set aside the former tribunal’s decision and sent the matter to QCAT for referral to the Court of Appeal division to determine the constitutional arguments, so that QCAT would apply the result ([29]). On 4 March 2011 a senior member of QCAT stated a case to the Supreme Court under s 216 of the Anti-Discrimination Act, and the case stated was transferred to the Court of Appeal ([30], [31]). Mr Owen argued that QCAT is not a court of a State within s 77(iii) of the Constitution and so could not be vested with federal judicial power; the respondents and the Attorney-General for Queensland, who intervened, argued the contrary ([9], [32], [42]).

The Court also had applications by Ms Bruce to remove her appeal into the Court of Appeal and by Ms Menzies for an extension of time to appeal against Douglas J’s orders ([38], [39]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal refused the application for leave to amend the case stated, and answered the five questions in the case stated as follows: questions 1 and 2, which asked about the former Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, “Unnecessary to decide”; question 3, whether s 124A is invalid for inconsistency with the implied freedom of political communication, “No”; question 4, that it is unnecessary to read down s 124A; and question 5, that depending on the circumstances a bisexual person may have standing under s 134(1)(a) to complain about vilification on the ground of homosexuality. It refused Ms Bruce’s application to remove her appeal and Ms Menzies’s application for an extension of time, and said it would receive submissions on the costs of the appeal hearing ([33]-[34], [37], [81], [96]-[99], [158]-[159], and the orders).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

De Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Muir JA each gave separate reasons and each concurred in the orders. All three said that QCAT is a court of a State for the purposes of Chapter III of the Constitution: de Jersey CJ at [20], McMurdo P at [52] and [61], and Muir JA at [101] and [103]. De Jersey CJ said “In a sense this is a non-issue”, because on Muir JA’s analysis QCAT could exercise State jurisdiction even if it is not a court, but gave the issue extended treatment because it featured so prominently in the submissions ([7], [8]).

De Jersey CJ began with the QCAT Act’s description of QCAT as a “court of record” (s 164(1)), which, he said, citing Kirby J in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court, though not conclusive may be a “very strong consideration” in determining the true nature of the body ([10]). He said that QCAT decides controversies between the parties by binding and authoritative decisions ([11]) and that the legislature had provided that it “must act independently” and “is not subject to direction or control by any entity, including any Minister”, which he called “pivotal features of a judicial process” ([14]).

He then considered the ten features that counsel for Mr Owen said combined to “sap” QCAT of the independence necessary for a court, among them that only two members may exercise the contempt power, that senior and ordinary members may be removed by the executive for inefficiency or conduct warranting dismissal from the public service, that members serve relatively short terms, and that only the President and Deputy President, of more than 160 members, hold tenure linked to judicial office ([15]).

On the last he said that the qualification in Forge (“or at least the Supreme Court”) is significant and that lack of Act of Settlement tenure “does not weigh substantially against their constituting a court” ([15], item 7). He asked for “an appropriately broad, overall assessment” ([17]), returned to the court of record designation and the mandatory independence and impartiality that he called “hallmarks of the judicial process” ([18], [19]), and concluded that “none of the additional features tabulated for the applicant, nor their combination, excludes that conclusion” ([20]).

McMurdo P said that Chapter III permits the investing of federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) on a body that is a court in the constitutional sense, while the organisation of State courts is otherwise a matter for State legislatures ([46]). The New South Wales Court of Appeal had held in Skiwing, 2UE Sydney and Sunol (No 1) that the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal is not a court of a State; she distinguished them because QCAT is a court of record, which she called “a compelling factor” ([47], [48], [56]).

In combination with other factors, she said, that makes QCAT “a Queensland court, albeit an inferior court of summary jurisdiction”: it is an independent tribunal resolving disputes between parties, its decisions bind the parties and are enforceable, its hearings are ordinarily in public and it must give reasons, and its decisions are subject to appeal and to the Supreme Court’s supervisory and appellate jurisdiction ([49]). On composition she called Spigelman CJ’s statement in Skiwing that a court of law is comprised predominantly of judges a “chicken and egg” argument, because it raises the question of what a judge is, and noted that Magistrates Courts are courts of a State although presided over by magistrates and, at federation, commonly constituted by justices of the peace ([50]).

She read the observations in Forge about permanent judges as confined to the Supreme Court of a State, so that the fact that most QCAT members are part-time with limited tenure “does not preclude QCAT from being a court of a State under s 77(iii)” ([51]). She added that QCAT, as a court of a State, is subject to the Kable principle but does not offend it, so that it can determine whether s 124A is constitutional in exercising federal judicial power ([53]-[55]).

Muir JA agreed with de Jersey CJ’s reasons on the first issue and said that QCAT is a Ch III court “for the reasons given by the Chief Justice” ([101], [103]). He then gave an alternative route, with which de Jersey CJ agreed ([6], [7]), that “proceeds on the premise that QCAT is not a Ch III court” ([121]): QCAT’s jurisdiction would remain wholly a State jurisdiction, and the stating of the case was merely the mechanism that enlivened the Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction over the constitutional question, on which QCAT attempted no adjudication ([129], [133]-[137]). He found it unnecessary to determine the Attorney-General’s contentions about State tribunals that are not courts ([151]-[155]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Classification unresolved · de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Muir JA

Read judgment: [7]–[8] (opens in a new tab), [10]–[20] (opens in a new tab), [48]–[55] (opens in a new tab), [61] (opens in a new tab), [101] (opens in a new tab), [103] (opens in a new tab)

All three Justices state the conclusion that QCAT is a court of a State and de Jersey CJ and McMurdo P give reasons for it. It is a step in McMurdo P’s answer on the first issue ([55], [61]), but de Jersey CJ calls the issue in a sense a non-issue because QCAT could exercise State jurisdiction in any event ([7]), Muir JA’s alternative route proceeds on the premise that QCAT is not a court ([121]), and the case stated’s questions 1 and 2 were answered Unnecessary to decide ([159]). A single ratio or obiter label would hide that the orders do not turn on the conclusion alone, so it is left unresolved.

Classification unresolved · Muir JA, with de Jersey CJ agreeing

Read judgment: [6]–[7] (opens in a new tab), [104]–[155] (opens in a new tab)

Muir JA reasons that even if QCAT were not a Ch III court its State jurisdiction would not be displaced by the constitutional question being raised, and that the case stated was a mechanism for the Supreme Court to decide it; de Jersey CJ agrees with his reasons ([6]) and explains the route at [7]. It is an independent route to the same result as the court-of-a-State conclusion, introduced as a hypothesis ([121]), and McMurdo P’s reasons proceed on QCAT being a court. Muir JA found it unnecessary to determine the Attorney-General’s contentions about State tribunals that are not courts ([155]). Because the route stands beside a primary conclusion and is hypothetical by its terms, a single ratio or obiter label would misdescribe it.

Why does this case matter?

A student asked whether a State body may decide a constitutional question can misclassify the decision-maker, and then the jurisdictional analysis goes astray before the constitutional argument starts. Examiners reward the answer that sets the classification as a question to be worked through, uses authority from the right court, and says how firmly each Justice held the point.

Exam and application relevance

Owen is a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal about QCAT as the QCAT Act stood in 2012, so it does not bind the High Court or courts outside Queensland; the QCAT Act provisions it discusses are stated here as the judgment describes them and their current text should be checked before they are relied on. The QCAT Appeal Tribunal has since applied Owen as the law in Queensland, and in Twitter Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Muslim Advocacy Network Ltd [2026] QCATA 27 it dealt with a submission that the conclusion was obiter by saying that, obiter or not, it is not for QCAT to second-guess the Court of Appeal ([146], [147] of that decision).

For a problem about a different tribunal, start from the Act that constitutes it and compare the features the Justices examined, as the Victorian Court of Appeal did in Meringnage. When stating Owen, attribute each point to the Justice whose reasons it is in and say whether the orders depended on it. Muir JA’s alternative route was given six years before Burns v Corbett (2018) and ten years before Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022), High Court decisions on what a State tribunal that is not a court may adjudicate, so state that route as one those decisions bear on and state the conclusion that QCAT is a court of a State separately.

Check your understanding

1. What did the case stated ask in its questions 1 and 2, and how did the Court answer them ([30], [159])?

2. Whose remark about a “very strong consideration” does de Jersey CJ quote, and what did he say it was a consideration in determining ([10])?

3. Which of the ten features put by counsel for Mr Owen concerned the number of members whose tenure is linked to judicial office, and what did de Jersey CJ say about the qualification in Forge ([15], item 7)?

4. What did McMurdo P mean by calling an argument “chicken and egg”, and whose statement was she answering ([50])?

5. What did Muir JA say about de Jersey CJ’s reasons on the first issue, and on what premise does his later discussion proceed ([101], [103], [121])?

6. What did the Victorian Court of Appeal in Meringnage say it did not agree with in Owen ([86])?