Lang v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 2023

EvidenceOpinion

Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29

A woman died of a stab wound with one other person in the flat, who was charged with her murder. A pathologist testified that the wound was more likely inflicted by another than self-inflicted. Was that expert evidence?

What happened?

Mrs Maureen Boyce, aged 68, died in her bed in her 20th-floor apartment in Brisbane on 22 October 2015, from blood loss from a stab wound to her abdomen ([27]). Only two people were in the apartment at the time of her death, Mrs Boyce and the appellant, Mr Lang, and he accepted at trial and in the High Court that either she had killed herself or he had killed her ([27]). He was convicted of her murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland ([1], [244]).

A forensic pathologist, Dr Ong, gave evidence that the wound was more likely to have been inflicted by another person than to have been self-inflicted ([3]). He said his opinion rested on his experience of roughly 25 years as a forensic pathologist and on the literature on incised injuries ([21]). Two features of the wound were significant to his opinion: multiple tracks through a single incision, and what he considered must have happened between the early and the later movements of the blade, a partial withdrawal and a rotation of about 180 degrees ([22]).

The appellant objected to the opinion in a pre-trial hearing under s 590AA of the Criminal Code (Qld), the trial judge ruled that Dr Ong had laid a sufficient foundation, and the opinion was given at the trial ([421], [423]). The Court of Appeal of Queensland dismissed his appeal, and he appealed to the High Court on two grounds: that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the opinion was wrongly admitted ([1], [245]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal ([472]). The Court divided three to two. Jagot J gave reasons dismissing the appeal on both grounds, and Kiefel CJ and Gageler J agreed with her Honour’s reasons and wrote separately to elaborate on the common law principles ([1], [4]). Gordon and Edelman JJ gave joint reasons and would have allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial ([243]).

On the admissibility of Dr Ong’s opinion, Jagot J held that the Court of Appeal did not err in holding it admissible ([427], [471]), and Kiefel CJ and Gageler J agreed with her Honour’s reasons ([1]). Gordon and Edelman JJ would have held it inadmissible ([242]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The traditional approach. Kiefel CJ and Gageler J described the traditional approach of the common law as accepting that the opinion of a witness with peculiar skill is admissible “whenever the subject-matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without such assistance”, and denying it where the subject-matter does not require peculiar habits or study ([8]).

Under strain. They said: “The traditional approach has come under strain as developments in specialised knowledge, especially in fields of behavioural science and forensic science, have narrowed the subject-matters in respect of which it might continue to be asserted categorically and with confidence that common knowledge and experience provide so firm a foundation upon which to engage in fact-finding that the opinion of an expert could be of no assistance” ([9]). Nor does it follow that expert opinion is unavailable merely because the tribunal of fact could be expected to work out its own explanation for events and behaviour from common knowledge and experience ([9]).

What remains. Their Honours continued: “it remains a condition of the admissibility of evidence of the opinion of an expert at common law that the opinion be demonstrated to be based on specialised knowledge or experience of the expert that is beyond the common knowledge and experience attributable to the tribunal of fact” ([10]). The principles stated in Makita and applied in Dasreef under the uniform evidence legislation apply equally at common law: the inference drawn by the expert must be supported by reasoning sufficient to demonstrate that the opinion is the product of the application of the expert’s specialised knowledge to facts that the expert has observed or assumed ([11]). It is enough that the opinion be based substantially on that knowledge ([12]), and “Speculation, however, is not reasoning. Nor is intuition” ([13]).

The other Justices. Jagot J set out the formulation of Dixon CJ in Clark v Ryan, the questions identified by King CJ in R v Bonython and the criteria stated in Makita ([428]-[431]). Gordon and Edelman JJ identified three requirements for admissibility, the first being an accepted field of expertise, which concerns knowledge “not possessed by ordinary people” ([223]-[224]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Obiter · Kiefel CJ and Gageler J

Read judgment: [9] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab)

The observation that the traditional approach has come under strain, and that a jury might form its own explanation without excluding expert assistance, goes beyond the ground requiring decision. The challenge concerned whether this opinion was based on the pathologist’s expertise. Their Honours resolved that challenge by finding that it drew substantially on specialised knowledge; they did not need to decide the wider limits of subjects on which expert assistance is permissible. This observation is that of two Justices.

Ratio · Kiefel CJ and Gageler J

Read judgment: [10] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [11]–[13] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [26] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)

The requirement to demonstrate a reasoned connection between specialised knowledge and the opinion, with a substantial basis in that knowledge being sufficient, supplies the test these two Justices applied to reject the admissibility ground. Their conclusion was that Dr Ong drew substantially on his specialised knowledge. This classification concerns that necessary reasoning in their reasons; it does not turn every observation in their elaboration into a holding of the majority.

Ratio · Jagot J; Kiefel CJ and Gageler J agreeing with her reasons

Read judgment: [430]–[432] (PDF p 120) (opens in a new tab), [469] (PDF p 131) (opens in a new tab), [470]–[471] (PDF p 132) (opens in a new tab)

Jagot J used the principles drawn from Makita and the criteria collected in Cross on Evidence to identify the disputed connection between expertise and opinion. Her conclusion that the opinion had a rational foundation in Dr Ong’s specialist knowledge was necessary to dismiss the admissibility ground. Kiefel CJ and Gageler J expressly agreed with her reasons. This applied ground does not establish that Jagot J adopted their separate observation about the traditional approach coming under strain.

Separate reasoning · Gordon and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [242]–[243] (PDF p 69) (opens in a new tab)

Their Honours dissented in the result: they would have allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial because Dr Ong had not shown how his expertise substantially connected the facts with his opinion. Their different assessment of that connection explains the division on admissibility and must not be presented as the majority’s conclusion.

Why does this case matter?

Lang is where a student meets the High Court’s recent discussion of the oldest limb of the common law rule on expert opinion, and a problem set at common law may invite it. What earns the marks is saying which Justices said what, and how far their statements go.

The case also shows what a common law challenge to an expert’s opinion looks like on real facts: not a dispute about whether forensic pathology is a field of expertise, which the appellant accepted ([422]), but a dispute about whether this opinion was the product of that expertise.

Exam and application relevance

Treat the passage on the traditional approach as the reasoning of two Justices, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J, and say so.

Where the question is whether an expert’s opinion is admissible at common law, ask what the opinion is based on and whether that has been demonstrated, and consider whether an argument that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect was available and was raised ([17]-[18], [25]). The case was decided at common law on an appeal from Queensland. Queensland legislation now provides that, in a criminal proceeding relating wholly or partly to a sexual offence, an expert’s opinion given under s 103ZZGB of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), about the nature of sexual offences and factors that may affect the behaviour of a victim, is not inadmissible only because it is about a matter of common knowledge (s 103ZZGD).

That provision is confined to such evidence and proceedings, and Lang concerned a murder trial. For the uniform Evidence Acts the relevant authority is Dasreef, which Kiefel CJ and Gageler J describe as having acknowledged and applied the Makita principles under that legislation ([11]).

Check your understanding

1. At [9]-[10] Kiefel CJ and Gageler J make two statements about the traditional approach to expert opinion. What is the first, what is the second, and which of the five Justices made them?

2. How did Kiefel CJ and Gageler J say that the question whether the expert’s reasoning is sufficient to show the opinion is the product of specialised knowledge differs from the question of its cogency ([15]-[17])?

3. What did Jagot J set out at [428]-[431], and what did Gordon and Edelman JJ conclude about Dr Ong’s evidence at [242]?