Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21
A chemist estimated the silica dust a stonemason breathed at “a thousand or more times” the permitted level, and the judge used the figure in a calculation. Was the estimate expert evidence?
What happened?
Nawaf Hawchar worked for Dasreef as a labourer and then as a stonemason for a little over five and a half years from 1999, and was exposed to silica dust ([1]). In 2006 he was diagnosed with early stage silicosis, and in 2007 he began proceedings against Dasreef in the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales claiming damages ([2]). His central allegation was that he had been exposed to unsafe levels of silica dust while working for Dasreef ([2]).
His evidence at the trial included the opinion of Dr Basden, a chartered chemist, chartered professional engineer and retired senior lecturer in chemical engineering ([2]). Dr Basden had written that the dust concentrations in Mr Hawchar’s breathing zone while he used a cutting wheel would have been “of the order of a thousand or more times” the permitted figures ([16]). On the voir dire he said that his numbers were “only a ballpark” to justify the protective equipment he was recommending ([22]). Counsel for Dasreef objected to the report, but the primary judge did not rule on the objection until judgment ([18]-[20]). The primary judge used the estimate in a calculation of Mr Hawchar’s time weighted average exposure to respirable silica, which he found exceeded the permitted level ([23]). The Court of Appeal of New South Wales rejected Dasreef’s complaints about the admissibility of the evidence ([8]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave joint reasons, and Heydon J gave separate reasons ([49], [50]).
The joint reasons held that Dr Basden’s evidence was not admissible to found the primary judge’s calculation of the level of respirable dust to which Mr Hawchar was exposed ([43]), and that the primary judge erred in using his own experience as a member of a specialist tribunal to determine what caused the silicosis ([47]). The appeal was nonetheless dismissed, because there was uncontested expert evidence that Mr Hawchar suffered from silicosis, that the short latency of the disease suggested intense exposure over about six years, and that readily available means of avoiding injury existed ([10], [49]). Heydon J agreed that the evidence was inadmissible ([137]) but would have remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal ([147]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The two criteria. The joint reasons say that, to be admissible under s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), “the evidence that is tendered must satisfy two criteria”. The first is that the witness “has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience”, and the second is that the opinion expressed in evidence “is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge” ([32]).
Identifying the opinion. Section 79(1) must be read with the opinion rule in s 76(1), which directs attention to why the party tendering the evidence says it is relevant and to the finding that party will ask the tribunal of fact to make, so that it is necessary to identify the fact in issue that the opinion is said to prove or assist in proving ([31]).
Demonstrating them. To proffer an admissible opinion about the numerical or quantitative level of Mr Hawchar’s exposure, the party tendering the evidence would have had to demonstrate first that Dr Basden had specialised knowledge that permitted him to measure or estimate the amount of respirable silica to which a worker doing the relevant work would be exposed, and second that the opinion he expressed about Mr Hawchar’s exposure was wholly or substantially based on that knowledge ([35]). Demonstration of those matters “could come only from evidence given by Dr Basden” ([36]).
The joint reasons added that the admissibility of opinion evidence is determined by applying the requirements of the Act and not by parsing statements in decided cases ([37]), and that the requirements can be met “very quickly and easily” in many, perhaps most, cases, as where “a specialist medical practitioner expressing a diagnostic opinion in his or her relevant field of specialisation” describes qualifications and experience and identifies the subject matter of the opinion ([37]).
Admissibility, not weight. “A failure to demonstrate that an opinion expressed by a witness is based on the witness’s specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience is a matter that goes to the admissibility of the evidence, not its weight” ([42]). That analysis did not introduce what has been called the basis rule, which concerns proof of the facts on which an opinion rests ([41]).
Applying it. Dr Basden gave evidence of his training, study and experience, but not that they permitted him to provide anything more than a “ballpark” figure, and he gave no evidence that he had ever measured or calculated the amount of respirable dust to which such an operator would be exposed ([39]). There was therefore no footing on which the primary judge could conclude that a numerical or quantitative opinion was wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge ([40]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
Read judgment: [32] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [35]–[36] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [42]–[43] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [48]–[49] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)
The two criteria and the tendering party’s obligation to demonstrate them were necessary to the joint reasons’ resolution of the admissibility ground: Dr Basden’s numerical estimate lacked the demonstrated connection to specialised knowledge required for its use in the trial judge’s calculation. The defect therefore concerned admissibility, rather than merely weight. This classification concerns that ruling on the evidence. It does not mean that the error required the appeal to succeed: the joint reasons dismissed the appeal because other, uncontested evidence supported liability.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [137] (PDF p 63) (opens in a new tab), [147] (PDF p 66) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J separately concluded that the estimate was inadmissible because the witness had not explained the specialised knowledge or reasoning supporting it. His agreement on inadmissibility did not extend to the result: he dissented on the orders and would have remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal, considering the evidence before the High Court insufficient to sustain dismissal on the alternative footing.
Why does this case matter?
Students asked whether an expert’s opinion is admissible often begin and end with the witness’s credentials. Dasreef is the case to cite for the structure of the inquiry rather than for any particular field of expertise.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the fact in issue and the opinion offered on it, and ask what the party tendering the evidence has shown, by the witness’s own evidence, about the opinion actually expressed as distinct from the witness in general.
Keep the limits in view. Dasreef was decided under s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), in a civil proceeding in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. Heydon J, in separate reasons, went further than the joint reasons on what s 79 requires ([61], [98]-[101], [130]-[134]), so the statement in the joint reasons should be attributed to those six Justices.
Check your understanding
1. What are the two criteria stated at [32], and why did the joint reasons say that Dr Basden’s evidence did not satisfy the second as to the numerical level of exposure ([39]-[40])?
2. Why does the opinion rule in s 76(1) direct attention to the finding that the party tendering the evidence will ask the tribunal of fact to make ([31])?
3. What did the joint reasons say about a failure to demonstrate that an opinion is based on specialised knowledge, and what did they say about the basis rule ([41]-[42])?