Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
A tribunal reviews a deportation order and largely agrees with the Minister’s published policy. Is it enough for a reviewing tribunal to ask whether the Minister applied that policy sensibly?
What happened?
Daniel Drake, a United States citizen born in 1937, entered Australia in 1968 and was granted permanent resident status on 23 September 1974. On 3 January 1978 he was convicted in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin of possessing cannabis, in circumstances involving the attempted production of cannabis on a substantial scale that was clearly intended for sale. He was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for 12 months, with a direction that he be released after three months on entering a recognizance, and was released on 1 April 1978. On 21 April 1978 the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ordered his deportation under s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal, constituted by Davies J as a Deputy President, affirmed the Minister’s decision. Mr Drake appealed to the Federal Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which limits such an appeal to a question of law. He put four grounds: that Davies J could not constitute the Tribunal; that he was not an alien; that he had not been sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer within s 12; and that the Tribunal had attached such importance to a policy statement of the Minister about deterring others that its Deputy President failed to exercise his own independent judgment.
What did the Court decide?
The Federal Court (Bowen CJ, Smithers J and Deane J) allowed the appeal with costs and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a rehearing. Bowen CJ and Deane J gave joint reasons, and Smithers J gave separate reasons. Bowen CJ and Deane J added that they expressed no view about whether the Tribunal should affirm the Minister’s decision on the rehearing. The three Justices agreed in rejecting the argument that Davies J could not constitute the Tribunal and the argument that Mr Drake was not an alien.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Bowen CJ and Deane J said that the function of the Tribunal is administrative: it reviews the administrative decision under attack, and it is not restricted to the questions relevant to a judicial determination of whether a statutory discretion has been validly exercised. In their words, the question for the Tribunal “is not whether the decision which the decision-maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him” but “whether that decision was the correct or preferable one on the material before the Tribunal” (at 589).
The Tribunal is not at large. It is obliged to act judicially, and it is subject to the general constraints on the officer whose decision it reviews: the power is not to be used for a purpose other than the one for which it exists, regard is to be had to relevant considerations, and matters absolutely apart from those that ought to be considered are to be left out.
Where the Minister could properly take government policy into account and the Tribunal is under no statutory duty to treat itself as bound by it, Bowen CJ and Deane J held that the Tribunal may treat the policy as a relevant factor. It is not entitled, without specific statutory provision, to abdicate its function of determining whether the decision was the correct or preferable one on the material before it in favour of merely determining whether the decision conformed with the policy.
The Tribunal may conclude that the correct or preferable decision is the one that results from applying the policy, but then it is desirable that it make clear that it has considered the propriety of the policy and state the considerations that led it to that conclusion, particularly where personal liberty is involved. On balance, they concluded that the Tribunal’s published reasons showed that it had not made that independent assessment and determination.
Smithers J agreed that the fourth ground was established. He said (at 599) that the Tribunal is authorised and required to review the actual decision and not the reasons for it, that its duty is to satisfy itself whether the decision was objectively the right one to be made, and that a Tribunal which merely asks whether the administrator acted reasonably under the policy takes a supervisory role. He was persuaded that the Tribunal had done that and had treated the Minister’s application of his policy as paramount.
The Justices divided on the third ground. Bowen CJ and Deane J held that a sentence of 12 months with a direction for release after three months on a recognizance was a sentence of imprisonment for one year within s 12. Smithers J held the opposite and would have ordered the appeal allowed on that ground as well.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Only selected propositions are annotated. An unmarked proposition has not been classified.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Bowen CJ and Deane J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: p 589 (opens in a new tab)
The statement of what the Tribunal must decide is the premise of the joint reasons’ conclusion that the Tribunal failed to perform its function of reviewing the Minister’s decision, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the matter remitted. The page is the one High Court footnotes give for this passage.
Separate reasoning · Smithers J
Read judgment: p 599 (opens in a new tab)
Smithers J reached the same conclusion on the fourth ground by his own route, rejecting a supervisory role for the Tribunal and describing its task as deciding whether the decision was objectively the right one. He concurred in allowing the appeal on that ground and also upheld the third ground, which Bowen CJ and Deane J rejected. The page is the one a High Court footnote gives for the statement that the Tribunal reviews the actual decision and not the reasons.
Why does this case matter?
The formula students remember comes from a deportation appeal that raised four grounds. A student who can recite it without knowing how it was applied to the Tribunal’s reasons has a slogan and little else, and an examiner can test that with a problem about a tribunal that reviews a decision made under an agency’s published policy.
Exam and application relevance
Say which Justices wrote the passage you are relying on, and attribute each statement about the Tribunal’s reasoning to the Justice who made it. Keep two questions apart: what the Tribunal is deciding, and what part a Minister’s policy may play in that decision.
The Tribunal in Drake was the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). That Tribunal has been replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal under the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), so check the current Act’s provisions on the Tribunal’s task before applying the case to a present-day problem. The deportation power in issue was s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 as it was in 1978; that section now deals with a different subject, so do not use the case to state present deportation law.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices wrote the passage about the correct or preferable decision, and how does it differ from asking whether the original decision-maker’s decision was correct or preferable?
2. What did Bowen CJ and Deane J say the Tribunal should do if it concludes that the correct or preferable decision is the one that results from applying the Minister’s policy?
3. On which grounds did the Justices agree, and on which did they divide?
4. What did the Court order, and what did Bowen CJ and Deane J say about whether the deportation should be affirmed on the rehearing?