Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256
A company promised 100 pounds to anyone who caught influenza after using its smoke ball as directed. When a user did, the company said its advertisement was sales talk that bound it to nobody. Could a newspaper advertisement bind it?
Qualified by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 10
In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J Hutchinson Pty Ltd, Edelman J, in separate reasons, accepted that an offeror can dispense with notification of acceptance and that dispensation is easily inferred in the reward cases, and he framed the question in Bowen LJ’s terms, whether the offeror has intimated that performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification ([53]). On the timing of acceptance, however, he departed from Bowen LJ: where the need for communication of acceptance is waived, the offer will usually be understood to mean that acceptance occurs when the performance in reference to the offer begins, even if the condition for the reward is not yet fulfilled, and not, as Bowen LJ thought, when the performance is completed and the condition fulfilled ([52]). That is the view of one Justice in separate reasons; the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ do not mention Carlill. When writing about when acceptance occurs, state Bowen LJ’s view and Edelman J’s qualification separately and attribute each.
What happened?
The defendants, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, published an advertisement in the Pall Mall Gazette (A L Smith LJ). In A L Smith LJ’s reading, it said that a reward of 100 pounds would be paid by the company to any person who, after using the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with it, contracted the increasing epidemic influenza, colds or any disease caused by taking cold, and that the ball would last a family several months and could be refilled at a cost of 5s. Lindley LJ quoted a further statement in the advertisement about money deposited at a bank.
The plaintiff used the smoke ball for two weeks and went on using it until she got the epidemic (Lindley LJ); Bowen LJ described the disease as contracted during the use of the ball. She sued on the advertisement. The defendants resisted on a number of grounds, and Lindley LJ and Bowen LJ between them recorded these: that the transaction was a policy or a bet, that the advertisement was a mere puff, that it was not made with anybody in particular or was made with all the world, that its terms were too vague, that there was no check on how the ball was used, that acceptance had not been notified, and that there was no consideration (Lindley LJ; Bowen LJ).
Lindley LJ said that Hawkins J, in the court below, had come to the conclusion that nobody ever dreamt of a bet. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Lindley, Bowen and A L Smith LJJ) dismissed the appeal. No one dissented. Lindley LJ concluded that the defendants must perform their promise.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Lindley LJ began by dismissing the policy and bet points as not worth serious attention. He said that the court was not inferring a promise: “here is a distinct promise expressed in language which is perfectly unmistakable”. To the question whether the advertisement was a mere puff, he answered no, relying on the passage “1000l. is deposited with the Alliance Bank, shewing our sincerity in the matter”. He asked what that deposit was for “except to negative the suggestion that this was a mere puff and meant nothing at all”.
Bowen LJ said that the court must read the advertisement “in its plain meaning, as the public would understand it”, and that because 1000l was lodged at the bank for the purpose, it “cannot be said that the statement that 100l. would be paid was intended to be a mere puff”. A L Smith LJ held that “the advertisement was an offer intended to be acted upon”, and he treated the deposit as security for what was offered and as proof of the sincerity of the offer.
Bowen LJ answered the objection that the defendants could not have meant to pay without checking the use of the ball: “if a person chooses to make extravagant promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them”.
On the objection that the advertisement was made with nobody in particular, Lindley LJ said: “In point of law this advertisement is an offer to pay 100l. to anybody who will perform these conditions, and the performance of the conditions is the acceptance of the offer.” He pointed to a string of authorities on reward advertisements, beginning with Williams v Carwardine. Bowen LJ said the document “is only an offer made to the public” and that the contract-with-all-the-world argument contained a fallacy: “It is not a contract made with all the world. ...
It is an offer made to all the world”. The contract, he said, “is made with that limited portion of the public who come forward and perform the condition on the faith of the advertisement”. If the advertisement was an offer to be bound, he said, “then it is a contract the moment the person fulfils the condition”. He distinguished advertisements that are only offers to negotiate, such as a notice that a stock of books is for sale, from an offer to be bound. A L Smith LJ said that a person “becomes a persona designata and able to sue, when he performs the conditions mentioned in the advertisement”.
On vagueness, Lindley LJ said the language was uncertain in some respects, and his preferred construction was that the reward was payable to anybody who used the ball as directed and who got the influenza or a cold “within a reasonable time after so using it”. Bowen LJ said he thought it more probable that the protection was to last during the use of the ball; he had “some difficulty” with Lindley LJ’s reading but found it unnecessary to consider the point further because the disease was contracted during use. A L Smith LJ identified three possible limits of time and said that, whichever was correct, there was a sufficient limit “so as not to make the contract too vague on that account”.
On notification, Lindley LJ said: “Unquestionably, as a general proposition, when an offer is made, it is necessary in order to make a binding contract, not only that it should be accepted, but that the acceptance should be notified.” But he thought cases of this kind were an exception, or open to the observation that notification need not precede performance. He said that this was “a continuing offer” that was never revoked, that if notice of acceptance was required he doubted it very much, and that the offeror gets notice of the acceptance together with notice of the performance.
His own view was that the maker of such an offer shows “that he does not expect and does not require notice of the acceptance apart from notice of the performance”. Bowen LJ said that “as notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who makes the offer, the person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so”. He drew from the nature of the advertisement transaction the inference that the offeror impliedly indicates that no notification is required, so that “performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification”.
He illustrated this with the person who advertises a lost dog and does not expect the finder to write first. A L Smith LJ said there was no clause in the advertisement requiring notice before use and “no such clause can be read into it”, and that this was one of the cases in which performing the condition by using the smoke balls for two weeks three times a day was an acceptance.
On consideration, Lindley LJ said that the use of the ball, if the public could be got to have confidence in it, would react and produce a sale, so that “the advertisers get out of the use an advantage which is enough to constitute a consideration”, and that there was also “a distinct inconvenience, not to say a detriment, to any person who so uses the smoke ball”. Bowen LJ said that there was a request to use involved in the offer, adopted a definition of consideration that covers an act from which the defendant derives a benefit or a detriment or inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff with the defendant’s consent, and said: “Inconvenience sustained by one party at the request of the other is enough to create a consideration.”
He added that the defendants received a benefit because use of the balls would promote their sale. A L Smith LJ gave the same two considerations: the inconvenience of using the ball for two weeks three times a day and the money gain likely to accrue to the defendants from the enhanced sale of the balls.
Why does this case matter?
Contract problems that involve a promotion, a reward or a competition ask whether the person who made the statement meant to be bound, and by whom it could be enforced. A student who cites this case without saying what in the wording and surroundings of the statement mattered, and how each of the defendants’ objections was met, gives an examiner very little to credit. The case also shows three Lord Justices reaching one result by routes that are not identical, and an answer that attributes each step to the right judge shows closer reading than one that treats them as a single voice.
Exam and application relevance
Where a problem turns on a promotional statement, a reward or a prize, work through the same questions the defendants’ objections raise: what in the words and the surrounding statements bears on whether the maker meant to be bound, who could take advantage of the statement and how they become identifiable, what conduct the statement calls for and whether notice of it is called for, and what the maker asked for or received in return. Compare each with the facts of this case rather than citing the case as a conclusion.
Attribute each statement to the Lord Justice who made it. This is a decision of the English Court of Appeal in 1892 and is persuasive, not binding, in an Australian court.
Check your understanding
1. What did the advertisement promise, on what conditions, and what did it say about money at the bank (A L Smith LJ; Lindley LJ)?
2. What did Bowen LJ say was the fallacy in the argument that the contract was made with all the world?
3. Which Lord Justice used the example of a lost dog, and what point was he making?
4. What construction of the time limit did Lindley LJ prefer, and why did Bowen LJ say it was unnecessary to decide between his own view and Lindley LJ’s?
5. What two considerations did A L Smith LJ identify as supporting the promise?