The tendency and coincidence thresholds: significant probative value and s 101

The admissibility thresholds for tendency and coincidence evidence: what s 94 keeps out of Part 3.6 altogether, the two gateway conditions shared by ss 97 and 98, the cumulative restriction s 101 places on prosecution evidence about a defendant, and the three points at which the uniform Acts do not agree.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, tas, act, nt
Subjects
evidence
Topics
tendency-and-coincidence

Learning outcomes

  • Name whether the reasoning is tendency (s 97) or coincidence (s 98), and check s 94 before either.
  • State the two gateway conditions and when notice is not required, keeping the two sections’ exceptions apart.
  • Assess significant probative value with the party’s other evidence, not in isolation.
  • Apply s 101 as a separate, cumulative question in a criminal proceeding, in the governing Act’s own words.

Tendency and coincidence evidence is not excluded because it is irrelevant. It is usually very relevant, and that is the problem: reasoning from what a person has done before to what they did this time is the reasoning the law most distrusts. The uniform evidence legislation controls it with a raised admissibility threshold, a notice requirement, and — in a criminal trial against a defendant — a further restriction on top of both.

This article is about those thresholds. For what tendency and coincidence evidence is, see Tendency and coincidence. The position stated is under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The section numbers are the same in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory, but three of the rules below are not — s 101(2) states two different tests, and ss 97A and 98(1A) exist in four of the six jurisdictions and not in the other two. Those divergences are set out below, and they are the reason to identify the governing Act before stating any threshold.5

Before either rule: what Part 3.6 does not reach

Section 94 keeps three things outside the Part altogether, and a problem answer that applies s 97 to any of them has gone wrong before it starts. The Part does not apply to evidence relating only to the credibility of a witness; it does not apply so far as a proceeding relates to bail or sentencing; and it does not apply to evidence of a person’s character, reputation or conduct, or of a tendency, where that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is itself a fact in issue. The third is the one worth dwelling on: where the tendency is the thing to be proved rather than a step towards proving something else, the tendency rule has no work to do.1

And in four of the six Acts s 94 does not stop at subsection (3). The New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts each carry a s 94(4) and a s 94(5) that the Commonwealth and Victorian Acts do not. Subsection (4) provides that any principle or rule of the common law or equity preventing or restricting the admissibility of propensity or similar fact evidence “is not relevant when applying this Part to tendency evidence or coincidence evidence about a defendant”. Subsection (5) is the one that changes answers: in determining the probative value of tendency or coincidence evidence for the purposes of ss 97(1)(b), 97A(4), 98(1)(b) or 101(2), “it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or contamination”. So in a New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT or Northern Territory court, the submission that several complainants may have contaminated one another is closed off at each of those four gateways by the section itself. The Commonwealth and Victorian s 94 ends at subsection (3) and says nothing about it.5

The two gateway conditions, which are the same for both rules

Sections 97 and 98 are built identically. Each makes the evidence inadmissible unless two things are satisfied:12

  1. Reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the intention to adduce it; and
  2. the court thinks the evidence will have significant probative value, either by itself or having regard to other evidence the party has adduced or will adduce.

Two points students lose marks on. The notice condition does not apply where the evidence is adduced under directions made by the court under s 100, or to explain or contradict evidence of the same kind adduced by another party — and the two sections keep their own exceptions: s 97(2)(b) disapplies notice for evidence explaining or contradicting tendency evidence, s 98(2)(b) for evidence explaining or contradicting coincidence evidence. They are not interchangeable. And “significant probative value” is assessed either by itself or together with other evidence of the adducing party — so an item that looks weak alone may qualify in combination, though whether the combination clears the threshold is still a question to be answered.

Notices under either section are to be given in accordance with any regulations or rules of court made for the purposes of s 99. Section 99 does not say what a notice must contain or when it must be served — that comes from whichever regulations or court rules have been made. What the Act itself requires is that the notice be reasonable and in writing, and that comes from ss 97(1)(a) and 98(1)(a), not from s 99.3

What each rule actually forbids

The two rules target different reasoning, and naming the right one matters.

Section 97 is about reasoning from a tendency: evidence of a person’s character, reputation or conduct, or of a tendency they have or had, tendered to prove that they have or had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind.

Section 98 is about reasoning from improbability of coincidence: evidence that two or more events occurred, tendered to prove a person did an act or had a state of mind on the basis that, given similarities in the events or their circumstances, it is improbable they occurred coincidentally.

So s 97 asks what the person is like; s 98 asks how unlikely the pattern is. The same facts can found both, and an answer should say which reasoning it is applying.

Section 101: the second threshold, prosecution only

Section 101 applies only in a criminal proceeding, and in addition to ss 97 and 98. Tendency or coincidence evidence about a defendant that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the defendant unless its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant.4

That wording is Commonwealth and Victorian wording, and it is not the scheme’s common test. In New South Wales, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory, s 101(2) requires only that the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Dropping “substantially” and recasting the counterweight as a danger of unfair prejudice sets a lower bar. The common numbering hides the split, so a student must cite the Act governing the court and use its own words.6

Three things follow:

  • It is cumulative. Satisfying s 97 or s 98 does not satisfy s 101; both must be worked.
  • It is one-directional. It does not restrict the defendant’s tendency or coincidence evidence, and ss 101(3) and (4) disapply it where the prosecution adduces the evidence to explain or contradict tendency or coincidence evidence the defendant adduced.
  • It is about use. Section 101 speaks of evidence that cannot be used against the defendant, where ss 97 and 98 speak of admissibility.

The child sexual offence presumption, in four jurisdictions only

New South Wales, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory each carry an s 97A that the Commonwealth and Victorian Acts do not. It applies in a criminal proceeding in which the commission by the defendant of an act constituting, or possibly constituting, a child sexual offence is a fact in issue, and it reverses the usual direction of the gateway: tendency evidence about the defendant’s sexual interest in children, or about the defendant acting on such an interest, is presumed to have significant probative value for both s 97(1)(b) and s 101(2). The presumption applies whether or not the interest or act was directed at a complainant in the proceeding, at another child, or at children generally.

The presumption is rebuttable, but narrowly. The court may find the evidence does not have significant probative value if satisfied there are sufficient grounds to do so — and s 97A(5) then bars a list of matters from grounding that finding unless the court considers there are exceptional circumstances: differences between the tendency act and the alleged act or their circumstances, differences in the subject’s age, sex, gender or relationship to the defendant, the time between the two, the absence of distinctive or unusual features, and the level of generality of the tendency. Those are the arguments a defendant would ordinarily run against significant probative value, and in these four jurisdictions they are presumptively unavailable. In a Commonwealth or Victorian court they remain available, because there is no s 97A to displace them.5

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Check s 94 first: credibility-only evidence, bail and sentencing, and a tendency that is itself a fact in issue are outside the Part.
  2. Identify the reasoning: tendency (s 97) or coincidence (s 98), and say which.
  3. Check notice, and check whether an exception to notice applies — s 97(2)(b) for tendency, s 98(2)(b) for coincidence.
  4. Assess significant probative value, expressly considering the evidence together with the party’s other evidence rather than in isolation, and for each charge it is tendered on. In a New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT or Northern Territory court, check whether s 97A supplies a presumption before assessing it at large, and remember that s 94(5) in those four Acts puts the possibility of collusion, concoction or contamination outside the assessment.
  5. If it is a criminal proceeding and the prosecution adduces it about the defendant, apply s 101 as a separate step and use the governing Act’s own words — “substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect” under the Commonwealth and Victorian Acts, “outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice” under the New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts.
  6. Only then consider the general discretions.

Self-check

  • Do I check s 94 before applying either rule, and can I say what it keeps out — including, in four of the six Acts, the collusion, concoction and contamination argument that s 94(5) excludes from the probative-value assessment?
  • Can I state the two gateway conditions without conflating them?
  • Do I know when notice is not required, and which section’s exception answers which route?
  • Can I explain why s 101 is a second question rather than a restatement of s 97?
  • Do I know which party s 101 does not restrict?

A worked application

A defendant is charged with three separate frauds against three employers, tried together. The prosecution wants to use each as supporting the others.

Name the reasoning first. If the argument is that the defendant is the kind of person who defrauds employers, that is a tendency argument under s 97. If it is that three near-identical schemes are improbably coincidental, that is coincidence under s 98. The prosecution may run both, but it must say which it is running, because the gateway questions are asked of each.

Then the gateways. Reasonable written notice to the defendant, unless the evidence is adduced under s 100 directions or — and here the two sections part company — to explain or contradict tendency evidence the defendant adduced, which is s 97(2)(b), or coincidence evidence the defendant adduced, which is s 98(2)(b). Each route carries its own exception, and an answer running both must say which exception answers which route.

And significant probative value — assessed, importantly, “either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party”. So the prosecution is entitled to have the three incidents weighed together rather than one at a time. That is permission to combine, not a conclusion: whether the combination has significant probative value is still to be established, and it has to be established for each charge the evidence is tendered on, because the evidence may be strong on one count and weak on another.

Then s 101, separately. This is prosecution evidence about a defendant in a criminal proceeding, so the probative value must clear the s 101 threshold in the words of the Act that governs — here, substantially outweighing any prejudicial effect.

Name the prejudice carefully. Reasoning from a proved tendency to the charged conduct is not itself the prejudice — that is the inference the scheme permits once the thresholds are met. The prejudice is the irrational or disproportionate use of the same evidence: giving the tendency more weight than it can bear, treating it as though it must have operated on the occasion charged, or convicting out of disapproval of the other conduct rather than from the evidence to the fact in issue. Satisfying s 97 does not answer that question; it is a separate one, and an answer that treats s 101 as a restatement of s 97 has skipped the step where the argument is actually won or lost.

Then the discretions. Section 101 does not displace s 137.

Where the authority sits

Tendency and coincidence are governed by Part 3.6 of the uniform Acts, bounded by s 94, with s 101 adding a criminal-only restriction. Subsections 94(1)-(3) and ss 97, 98 and 99 operate to the same effect across the scheme, though not in identical words — the ACT Act says “present” where the others say “adduce”, and the ACT and Tasmanian s 99 are each drafted differently again. Four things are not common, and all four run the same way. Section 101(2) states two different tests. Section 98(1A), confirming that the coincidence rule reaches the combined evidence of several complainants, and s 97A, presuming significant probative value for tendency evidence of a sexual interest in children, both exist in New South Wales, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory and in neither the Commonwealth nor Victoria. So do ss 94(4) and 94(5), the second of which takes the possibility of collusion, concoction or contamination out of the probative-value assessment. Identify the court before stating any of them: Queensland and South Australia have not enacted the uniform scheme for their own courts, and Western Australia has enacted it but has not commenced it — the Evidence Act 2025 (WA) was assented to on 25 September 2025, but under its s 2 only Part 1 and s 384 are in operation and the substantive Parts commence on 18 September 2027. So in all three, propensity and similar fact evidence is for now governed by the common law and those jurisdictions’ own statutes.5

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