TL v The King
TL v The King (2022) 275 CLR 83
A toddler is fatally injured while three people are at home, and the prosecution wants the jury to hear about earlier harm to her. Does that earlier harm have to look like the fatal injury before it can help identify who inflicted it?
What happened?
The appellant was convicted of murdering his two and a half year old stepdaughter, who died of blunt force trauma to the abdomen in the early hours of 21 April 2014 ([1], [5]). Only three people had the opportunity to inflict the fatal injury: the appellant, the child’s mother and the appellant’s 14 year old nephew ([5]). The prosecution case was that the injury was inflicted while the child was solely in the appellant’s charge for about sixteen minutes, between about 7.33 pm and 7.49 pm, while the mother and nephew were out buying food ([6]). At trial the live issue was whether the prosecution had excluded the reasonable possibility that the mother or the nephew inflicted the injury ([4]).
The prosecution adduced two kinds of tendency evidence for the tendency to “deliberately inflict physical harm on the child” ([15]). The first was the burns evidence: that on 10 April 2014, ten days before the fatal injuries, the appellant placed the child in scalding water ([16]). The second was complaint evidence: three items in which the child, or her mother in a text message, attributed hurt to the appellant ([19]). The single ground in the High Court was that the evidence lacked significant probative value under s 97(1)(b) because it did not bear close similarity to the fatal injury ([2], [36]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed ([39]). Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ gave a single joint judgment and there were no separate reasons. The Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeal’s result on the single ground argued.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The joint judgment held that there is no general rule that demands close similarity between the conduct evidencing the tendency and the offence. Similarity is relevant to probative value but not determinative of it ([29]). The observation in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 263 CLR 338 to the contrary “should be understood as postulating a situation in which there is little or no other evidence of identity apart from the tendency evidence, and the identity of the perpetrator is “at large”” ([30]). Here there was important evidence of identity, and so it “could not be assumed” that close similarity was required ([30]).
The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the tendency had to be able to distinguish him from the other possible perpetrators, because that “tends to conflate probative value and proof” ([31]). The question is still the two-part one: how far the evidence supports the tendency, and how far the tendency makes the facts sought to be proved more likely ([31]). In concluding that the threshold was met the Court relied on the tendency’s being directed at a single victim, on its being abnormal and so unlikely to be shared by others in the case of a very young and defenceless child, and on the close timing of about one month ([37]).
It was not necessary for the prosecution to neutralise or disprove the same tendency in the other possible perpetrators ([37]). The Court said this was a case in which the threshold “was capable of being met without the close similarity insisted upon by the appellant” because there was strong evidence identifying the appellant that was independent of the tendency evidence ([38]).
The decision is bounded in two ways. First, the Court said that without the additional elements of violence and serious physical harm it was “doubtful” that the tendency evidence could have met the threshold, but the appellant did not complain of those elements being added ([37]). Second, the Court said that generality matters: other things being equal, a more generally expressed tendency is less likely to satisfy the threshold ([29]).
The reasons also record that reformulation of the tendency without a fresh notice under s 97(1)(a) “should not be condoned” ([33]). The dismissal did not endorse the prosecution’s notice practices.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ
Read judgment: [29]–[30] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [37]–[38] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
These passages supply the reasoning necessary to reject the sole ground of appeal: the asserted need for close similarity before the tendency evidence could have significant probative value on identity. The joint reasons explain that Hughes addressed identity being at large, then assess the tendency alongside the independent evidence narrowing opportunity and pointing away from the other possible perpetrators. That reasoning supports the admission of the burns and complaint evidence and dismissal of the appeal. Its application depends on the violent infliction of serious physical harm on this victim; the Court doubted that the more general tendency alone would suffice. This is not a holding that generality or similarity is irrelevant.
Why does this case matter?
The short interval when the child was alone with the appellant gives students a concrete chronology to work with. Mapping that chronology alongside the competing accounts provides practice in identifying the evidentiary disputes in an identity problem.
The litigation also offers practice in comparing the tendency described in a notice with the tendency discussed in judicial reasons. Keep a separate account of the procedural objections and the ground actually argued on appeal.
Exam and application relevance
How should the evidence about opportunity and the other possible perpetrators affect your admissibility analysis?
Identify the applicable evidence provision and the tendency described in the notice. Compare the statutory wording with s 97(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) before applying this decision in another jurisdiction.
Check your understanding
1. On the Court’s reading of Hughes at [30], in what situation does the close similarity observation apply?
2. What evidence of identity, apart from the burns and complaint evidence, did the Court rely on at [38]?
3. How did the Court respond to the argument that the tendency had to distinguish the appellant from the other possible perpetrators?
4. Why is this case not authority that a tendency may be pleaded as generally as the prosecution wishes?