Provisional relevance and inferences about relevance
How relevance is determined when it depends on a finding not yet made: the reasonably-open standard in s 57(1), the distinct permission s 57(2) gives the court to use the evidence of an act in deciding whether a common purpose existed, the different words Victoria uses for it, and the court’s power under s 58 to examine a document or thing and infer authenticity.
Learning outcomes
- Apply s 57 where relevance depends on another finding, on the reasonably-open standard.
- State what s 57(2) permits the court to do with the evidence of the act itself.
- Explain what s 58 permits the court to do with a document or thing.
- Quote s 57(2) from the governing Act, because Victoria’s common-purpose wording is not the Commonwealth’s.
Relevance is usually taught as a single question asked once: could this evidence rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fact in issue? In practice the question often cannot be answered when it is asked, because whether the evidence is relevant depends on something not yet established. The Act anticipates that, and two short provisions do the work.
This article assumes the basic test. For that, see Relevance. The position stated is under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Subsection 57(1) and s 58 are enacted to the same effect, under the same numbers, in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory. Subsection 57(2) is not worded the same way in Victoria — that divergence is set out below, and the Victorian Act states it on its own face.3
When relevance depends on a finding not yet made
Section 57(1) applies where the determination of relevance depends on the court making another finding — including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. The court may find the evidence relevant:1
- if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or
- subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage that will make it reasonably open to make that finding.
That is the mechanism behind evidence admitted “subject to relevance” or on a party’s undertaking to connect it up later. What the subsection requires is that the finding be reasonably open, not that it be made — so a party need not prove the underlying fact in order to have the evidence received.
Section 57(2) does not merely extend subsection (1) to common purpose; it grants a distinct permission. Where the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on a finding that the person and one or more others had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose, the court may use that evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed. That is the point of the subsection: the evidence whose relevance is in question is expressly made available to decide the very finding its relevance depends on.
The words of s 57(2) are not the same in Victoria. The Commonwealth Act, and the New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts, describe the common purpose as one “whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise”. The Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) reads “whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or as part of involvement in the commission of an offence or otherwise”. The Victorian Act flags the difference itself, in a note recording that its subsection (2) “differs from section 57(2) of the Commonwealth Act and New South Wales Act”, and a second note pointing to the complicity provisions of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
What the texts establish is the difference in wording. They do not establish that the five Acts exclude a common purpose formed as part of involvement in an offence — their formulation closes with “or otherwise” — and neither do they establish how much the Victorian words add. That question is not answered by the provisions, which is exactly why a quotation of the subsection has to be taken from the Act that governs rather than from whichever Act is to hand.4
Letting the court look: s 58
Section 58(1) provides that where a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity. Section 58(2) makes clear this does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn.2
This is more significant than it reads. It means a party need not always prove authenticity by extrinsic evidence before the document can be considered: the court may look at the thing itself and infer. Sections 57 and 58 are about relevance, though, not admission. Establishing that a document of uncertain provenance is relevant leaves every other requirement of the Act still to be met, and s 58(2) is express that subsection (1) does not limit the matters from which inferences may properly be drawn — so it is one route to the inference, not the only one.
Why both provisions matter to the order of argument
Relevance is the gateway — irrelevant evidence is inadmissible and no discretion saves it. If relevance had to be established conclusively before anything else, a party would have to prove its case backwards. Sections 57 and 58 let the court take relevance provisionally and on reasonable inference, so the proceeding can run in a sensible order.
An answer that treats relevance as a single, final determination made once has missed the structure the Act actually provides.
Applying this in a problem question
- State the relevance question: which fact in issue, and how the evidence bears on it.
- If the answer depends on another finding, say which one, and apply s 57 — is it reasonably open, or will later evidence make it so?
- For a document or thing whose authenticity or identity is in question, note that the court may examine it and infer under s 58 rather than requiring extrinsic proof first.
- Do not treat a provisional finding of relevance as a final one; it can fall away if the connecting evidence never arrives.
- If the finding is one of common purpose, quote s 57(2) from the governing Act, because the Victorian wording is not the Commonwealth wording.
Self-check
- Can I state the two alternative bases in s 57(1)?
- Do I know what standard s 57 applies, and that it is not proof?
- Can I explain what s 58 lets the court do that it could not otherwise do?
- Do I know which jurisdiction’s s 57(2) is worded differently, and in what respect?
A worked application
A party tenders a handwritten note said to have been written by the defendant, to prove the defendant knew of a defect. The defendant denies writing it, and there is no handwriting expert.
Assume the note’s only connection to the defendant’s knowledge is that the defendant wrote it. On that assumption the note is relevant only if the defendant wrote it. So relevance depends on another finding, and s 57(1) is the provision that lets the proceeding move. The court may find the note relevant if it is reasonably open to find the defendant wrote it; it need not finally determine authorship at this stage. That is a low bar deliberately: the question being decided is whether the evidence can be received while authorship is resolved, not who wrote the note.
Alternatively the court may admit it subject to further evidence being led later that would make the finding reasonably open: the familiar “admitted subject to relevance”, with the risk that if the connecting evidence never comes, the provisional foundation falls away.
Section 58 then adds something easy to overlook. Because a question has arisen as to the relevance of a document, the court may examine the note itself and draw any reasonable inference from it, including as to its authenticity. Letterhead, internal references, handwriting that matches an admitted exemplar already in evidence — the court may reason from the thing, rather than requiring the party to prove authenticity first by extrinsic evidence.
Change the facts: the relevance of an act by one conspirator depends on a common purpose with another. Section 57(2) applies the same provisional approach to that finding, and the court may use the evidence of the act itself in deciding whether the common purpose existed. In a Victorian court the subsection would be quoted in its own terms, which expressly reach a common purpose formed as part of involvement in the commission of an offence.
Where the authority sits
Relevance is governed by Part 3.1 of the uniform Acts — s 55 defining it, s 56 making relevant evidence admissible except as otherwise provided, and ss 57 and 58 supplying the machinery above. Subsection 57(1) and s 58 are enacted to the same effect across the scheme, so the position stated above holds in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory; the differences in those provisions are drafting ones — the ACT says “1 or more other people” and “deciding” where the others say “one or more other persons” and “determining”, and Tasmania heads s 58 “Inference as to relevance”. Subsection 57(2) is the exception: Victoria’s text carries a limb the other five do not. Identify the court before quoting it. Queensland and South Australia have not enacted the uniform scheme for their own courts. Western Australia has enacted it but has not commenced it, and the two are different questions: the Evidence Act 2025 (WA) was assented to on 25 September 2025, but under its s 2 only Part 1 and s 384 are in operation and the substantive Parts commence on 18 September 2027. So in all three, relevance is for now governed by the common law and those jurisdictions’ own statutes, and there is no operative Western Australian section number to cite for it.3