Summary judgment: deciding a claim or defence without a trial

The power to give judgment on a claim or defence without a trial: the statutory no-reasonable-prospect test, the older no-defence form still used in four jurisdictions, and the qualifications and time limits that decide applications.

Learning level
Application
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
civil-procedure
Topics
interlocutory-process

Learning outcomes

  • Identify which of the two Australian forms of the summary judgment test the court in question applies, and state that court’s provision.
  • Apply the statutory test by asking whether a party has no reasonable or no real prospect of success, without substituting a judicial paraphrase for the statutory words.
  • Apply the older no-defence form, and say which party must satisfy the court of what under it.
  • Identify the qualifications that defeat an otherwise good application: an excluded cause of action, a time limit, a discretion to send the matter to trial anyway, and the limits on evidence.

A civil claim or a defence can be decided without a trial. Each of the eight Australian jurisdictions covered here confers that power on its courts, and before asking whether an application should succeed a student must ask a prior question: which test does this court apply? The Commonwealth, Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory ask whether a party has no reasonable or no real prospect of success; New South Wales, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory still ask whether the defendant has a defence, and in three of those four the rule itself tells the defendant what to show in answer. The answer decides what the applicant must establish and what the respondent must answer, and it cannot be inferred from the fact that each of these jurisdictions calls the remedy summary judgment.

What summary judgment decides, and what it does not

Summary judgment is not an interim order. The provisions below empower a court to give judgment for one party against another, not to make an order operating until trial or further order, and most of them reach part of a claim as well as the whole, the proceeding continuing for the remainder (Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01(4)2).

The strike-out rules operate on a pleading; the summary judgment provisions operate on a claim, a defence or a proceeding. The grounds overlap without being the same inquiry — see Pleading rules: content, particulars and strike-out, and Interlocutory process for why interlocutory decisions operate on lower certainty than a trial. South Australia is outside this article: the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) are not among the sources cited here, so nothing states the South Australian position and South Australia is not among the jurisdictions declared.

Where each court’s power sits

CourtGoverning provisionForm of the test
Federal Court of AustraliaFederal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A1; Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01No reasonable prospect
New South WalesUniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 13.1, 13.43No defence
VictoriaCivil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 61–644; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2025 (Vic) O 225No real prospect
QueenslandUniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 292, 2936No real prospect, and no need for a trial
Western AustraliaRules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 14, O 168No defence
TasmaniaSupreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) rr 356–359, 3679No defence
Northern TerritorySupreme Court Rules 1987 (NT) r 22.017No reasonable prospect
Australian Capital TerritoryCourt Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) rr 1146, 114710Unless a good defence on the merits

Two features of the table decide answers before any test is applied. In Victoria the power is in the Act, not the rules, so a student who reads only Order 22 will not find the test: r 22.03 merely requires a s 61 application to be made in accordance with that Order. In the Northern Territory the position is reversed, and the Commonwealth section’s words appear in a rule of court. The Victorian rules are the 2025 Rules, which commenced on 8 September 2025 and whose Schedule 1 revokes the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015.

The statutory test: no reasonable prospect, no real prospect

Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) states the test in both directions: the Court may give judgment for a party prosecuting a proceeding where satisfied that the other party “has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding”, and for a party defending it where the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it. The section does not limit the Court’s other powers and does not apply to criminal proceedings. Rule 26.01 supplies the procedure and adds three grounds the section does not contain: that the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious, that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or that it is an abuse of the process of the Court.

Northern Territory r 22.01 reproduces the operative words of s 31A and adds that the powers may be exercised at any stage in a proceeding. Victoria’s s 63(1) uses different words — “a court may give summary judgment in any civil proceeding if satisfied that a claim, a defence or a counterclaim” or part of one has no real prospect of success — and expressly allows the court to act on its own motion where satisfied that it is desirable to dispose of the proceeding summarily (s 63(2)(c)), as well as on either party’s application (ss 61, 62).

Queensland’s rr 292 and 293 impose two cumulative conditions, and an answer that stops at the first is incomplete. The court must be satisfied both that the respondent to the application has no real prospect of success and that “there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim”. The second condition is not a restatement of the first.

What the statutory test displaced

Before these provisions the threshold was the general-law one collected by Barwick CJ, sitting as a single Justice of the High Court of Australia, in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 12511. His Honour said a plaintiff ought not to be denied access to the customary tribunal unless the lack of a cause of action is clearly demonstrated, and collected the expressions the authorities had used, among them “so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed” and “manifestly groundless”. He added that the jurisdiction is not reserved for cases where argument is unnecessary: “Argument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable” that it cannot possibly succeed.

The statutory provisions set the threshold lower. Section 31A(3) provides that a defence or a proceeding or part of one need not be hopeless, or bound to fail, to have no reasonable prospect of success, and Northern Territory r 22.01(3) says the same of a defence. So do not carry General Steel into a prospects-of-success provision. In Spencer the joint reasons said of Barwick CJ’s collection of formulations that “the test to be applied was one of demonstrated certainty of outcome”, and that because s 31A(3) dispenses with certainty of failure “it is evident that s 31A is to be understood as requiring a different enquiry from that which had to be made under earlier procedural regimes” — indeed that it is “dangerous” to elucidate the statutory expression by reference to those earlier formulations.12

In Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 2812 the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a dismissal under s 31A(2), but the seven Justices did not speak with one voice about the section. Its construction was addressed in the joint reasons of Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, who held that no paraphrase of “no reasonable prospect” can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, that “The judicial creation of a lexicon of words or phrases intended to capture the operation of a particular statutory phrase” is to be avoided, and that full weight must be given to the expression as a whole: the Federal Court may exercise the power if, and only if, satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of success. Their Honours accepted that “the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly”, while emphasising that the legislative purpose revealed by the text will be defeated if the provision is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes. French CJ and Gummow J decided the matter on the narrower ground that the applicant’s case was not fanciful, and Heydon J said it was both unnecessary and undesirable to address the construction of s 31A at all.

The drafting lesson is to argue the statutory words rather than a judicial gloss on them. No authority cited here decides whether that reasoning carries over to the different Victorian and Queensland words “no real prospect”, and nothing here states that it does.

The older form: no defence, and an issue that ought to be tried

Four jurisdictions retain an older architecture in which the question is whether the defendant has a defence, not what the defendant’s prospects are. In New South Wales r 13.1(1) requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence of the facts on which the claim is based, and evidence from the plaintiff or some responsible person that in that person’s belief “the defendant has no defence to the claim or part of the claim”, or no defence except as to the amount of damages; the court may then give such judgment or make such order as the case requires, including judgment for damages to be assessed.

Western Australia and Tasmania put the burden of response on the defendant expressly. Under WA O 14 r 3 the Court may give judgment unless it dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the Court that “there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried”, or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial; O 14 r 4 lets the defendant show cause by affidavit or otherwise and lets the Court give leave to defend unconditionally or on terms as to security, time or mode of trial. Tasmania is to the same effect in rr 358 and 359, except that r 358(1) says the judge “is to give” judgment unless one of those things is shown and r 359(4) says leave to defend is to be granted where it is.

The Australian Capital Territory states the point as a condition on the court’s power: under r 1146(2) the court may give judgment for the plaintiff unless satisfied that “the defendant has a good defence to the claim for relief on the merits” or that sufficient facts are disclosed to entitle the defendant to defend the claim generally. In Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory the rule itself defines the respondent’s task. Rule 13.1 says nothing about what a New South Wales defendant must show in answer, so none of those formulas should be assumed to apply there.

A defendant’s application, and the frivolous-or-vexatious ground

A defendant’s route is a separate provision almost everywhere, and in three jurisdictions its grounds are not the mirror of the plaintiff’s. Western Australia’s O 16 r 1 requires the Court to be satisfied that “the action is frivolous or vexatious, that the defendant has a good defence on the merits”, or that the action should be disposed of summarily or without pleadings; Tasmania’s r 367(2) states the same three grounds in its own words, and the Australian Capital Territory’s r 1147(2) is to the same effect, its third ground being that the proceeding should be finally disposed of summarily or without pleadings. In Western Australia and Tasmania the orders available include judgment for the defendant with or without costs, an order that the plaintiff proceed to trial without pleadings, and, if all parties consent, final disposal of the action without appeal.

Summary dismissal is a further route. New South Wales r 13.4 allows the court to dismiss proceedings generally, or as to a claim for relief, where they are frivolous or vexatious, no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or they are an abuse of the process of the court, and r 13.4(2) allows the court to receive evidence on the application. In the Federal Court those grounds sit inside the summary judgment rule itself, at r 26.01(1)(b) to (d), so no choice between routes arises.

Qualifications that decide applications

  • A discretion to refuse despite the test being met. Victoria’s s 64 operates despite anything to the contrary in Part 4.4 or any rules of court: the court may order a proceeding to trial if satisfied that, despite there being no real prospect of success, it should not be disposed of summarily because that is not in the interests of justice or because “the dispute is of such a nature that only a full hearing on the merits is appropriate”. No equivalent appears in the other provisions cited here.
  • Excluded causes of action. Tasmania’s r 356(2) confines the plaintiff’s procedure to an action begun by writ and excludes any action that includes a claim for defamation, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, or a claim based on an allegation of fraud. Western Australia’s O 14 r 1(2) excludes probate and admiralty actions.
  • Time limits. Western Australia requires both a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s application within 21 days after appearance, or later by leave (O 14 r 1(1); O 16 r 1(1)), and Tasmania gives a defendant 10 days after appearing (r 367(1)). Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory impose no such outer limit, allowing an application at any time after the notice of intention to defend or respond (Qld rr 292(1), 293(1); ACT rr 1146(1), 1147(1)). Service periods differ again: at least 14 days before the hearing in the Federal Court (r 26.01(3)) and not less than 7 days before the return day under WA O 16 r 1(4).
  • Evidence, and cross-examination. Affidavits are usual. The Federal Court affidavit must state the grounds and the facts and circumstances relied on (r 26.01(2)). In the Australian Capital Territory evidence must be by affidavit unless the court gives leave, an affidavit may contain information and belief if the sources and the reasons for the belief are stated, and a deponent may not be cross-examined without leave (r 1149). Unless a judge directs otherwise, Tasmania disapplies the hearsay rule to a defendant’s affidavit if its source is also adduced (r 359(2)).
  • What survives the judgment. A respondent with a cross-claim may continue it and seek a stay of enforcement of the judgment until it is determined (Cth r 26.01(5); WA O 14 r 3(2); Tas r 358(2)).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the court, then find that court’s own provision — and check whether it sits in the rules of court or, as in Victoria, in the governing Act.
  2. Name the form of the test that provision uses, in its own words. Do not carry “no reasonable prospect” into a jurisdiction whose rule asks whether the defendant has a defence.
  3. Under a prospects test, state the statutory phrase and apply it, rather than substituting a formulation from an earlier procedural regime. In Queensland, apply the second condition as well and say whether there is any need for a trial.
  4. Under the no-defence form, identify what the applicant must put in evidence, then ask what the respondent can point to as an issue or question in dispute that ought to be tried.
  5. Check the qualifications before concluding: an excluded cause of action, the time limit for the application, the service period, whether evidence or cross-examination is available, and in Victoria whether s 64 would send the matter to trial anyway.
  6. If the application succeeds only in part, say what remains on foot and whether any cross-claim or stay of enforcement follows.

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