Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28
A landowner sued the Commonwealth over restrictions on clearing his farm, and the Commonwealth asked the Federal Court to end the case without a trial. What must a judge be satisfied of before using that summary power?
What happened?
Peter Spencer owned a farm at Shannons Flat in New South Wales. Restrictions on clearing native vegetation on the farm were imposed under state legislation. He sued the Commonwealth in the Federal Court. He claimed that the restrictions acquired property from him other than on just terms, that the acquisition was made in furtherance of agreements between New South Wales and the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth laws that authorised those agreements were invalid under s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. ([1])
On the Commonwealth’s motion, Emmett J dismissed the proceedings under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). He held that Mr Spencer had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting them. ([2]) The Full Court dismissed his appeal. ([3])
ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth was decided after both of those decisions. When the application for special leave came before this Court, the Court asked counsel to address first whether the case was suitable for a s 31A dismissal at all. The Court then decided that the proceedings were not appropriate for summary dismissal under s 31A. ([4])
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders dismissing the proceedings under s 31A were set aside. The Commonwealth’s motion for that dismissal was dismissed, and the Commonwealth was ordered to pay the costs of the motion. ([35])
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Under s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), a party may be given judgment against another only if satisfied that the other has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, in joint reasons, said that no paraphrase of the phrase “no reasonable prospect” is a sufficient explanation of it, that a lexicon of words to stand for it should be avoided, that the power may be exercised if and only if the court is satisfied of no reasonable prospect, and that it is not to be exercised lightly. Their reasons added that the provision’s purpose would be defeated if it were read as confined to cases of the kind that fell within earlier procedural regimes. ([58]-[60])
French CJ and Gummow J discussed the section in their own terms. They said that s 31A(2) requires a practical judgment whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success ([25]), and that describing the criterion as a “real” rather than “fanciful” prospect adds little to the words of s 31A ([22]). They decided the appeal on a narrower ground. After ICM, the pleaded case was not fanciful, and so could not be said to have no reasonable prospect of success. ([34]) The joint reasons agreed in that result, adding that the ICM point meant the summary dismissal could not stand. ([40]) Heydon J agreed in the orders and said it was unnecessary and undesirable to say anything about the construction of s 31A. ([61]-[62])
The two sets of reasons do not describe the inquiry in the same way. The joint reasons said that “no real prospect” and “no reasonable prospect” convey very different meanings ([51]) and that the content of “reasonable” is not illuminated by contrasts such as “frivolous” or “untenable” ([59]), while French CJ and Gummow J used the contrast between a fanciful and a real prospect ([22], [25], [34]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ and Gummow J ([34]); Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ ([40])
Read judgment: [34] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [40] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
The appeal was allowed because, after ICM Agriculture, the pleaded case was not fanciful and so could not be said to have no reasonable prospect of success. French CJ and Gummow J put the point on that footing ([34]), and the joint reasons accepted that the summary dismissal could not stand in light of ICM ([40]). This is the ground on which the orders rest.
Classification unresolved · Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
Read judgment: [58]–[60] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons at [58]-[60] say how the statutory phrase is to be understood, and they wrote separately principally to address s 31A ([36]). Neither a ratio label nor an obiter label fits cleanly. The result in the appeal rests on the ICM ground that all of the Justices accepted ([34], [40], [61]-[62]), and the construction is not needed for that ground. But four Justices set it out as the way to approach the section, and French CJ and Gummow J expressed the inquiry differently in their own reasons ([22]-[26]), while Heydon J declined to consider it ([62]). It should be presented as the joint reasons’ statement, not as the Court’s single construction of s 31A.
Why does this case matter?
Applications to end a case without a trial are common, and an examiner expects an answer to explain what the court must be satisfied of before it grants one. The question is how far the statute’s own words control that inquiry, and what may be taken from the older summary-judgment decisions and from other jurisdictions. Spencer is where the High Court considered s 31A at length.
Exam and application relevance
For a question about an application for summary judgment or dismissal, start from the words of the power relied on and identify what the court must be satisfied of. Then decide which reasons you rely on for each step, and say whether other Justices put the point differently. Apply the inquiry to the facts you are given, including anything decided after the first-instance decision, and say why the position of the party facing dismissal is or is not enough. Check any shorthand description of the test against the statutory words before you use it.
Check your understanding
1. Why could the dismissal ordered by the primary judge and affirmed by the Full Court not stand when the matter came to this Court?
2. How did the joint reasons say the phrase in s 31A(2)(b) should and should not be explained, and what did they say about relying on earlier summary-judgment cases?
3. Compare how French CJ and Gummow J described the statutory inquiry with the joint reasons’ account of it, and say what Heydon J did about the question.