Tulk v Moxhay

High Court of Chancery (England and Wales) · 1848

PropertyRestrictive Covenants

Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774

A landowner sold a London square’s central garden to a buyer who promised to keep it open and unbuilt. Years later a new owner, whose own purchase deed contained no such promise, claimed a right to build. Could the seller stop him?

What happened?

In 1808 the plaintiff, Tulk, owned the vacant ground in Leicester Square and several of the houses forming the square. He sold the square garden or pleasure ground, with its statue and railing, to Elms in fee. In the conveyance Elms covenanted, for himself, his heirs and assigns, with the plaintiff, his heirs, executors and administrators, to keep and maintain the garden and railing in their then form and in proper repair as a square garden and pleasure ground, in an open state and uncovered with any buildings. The covenant also provided that the inhabitants of the square, who were the plaintiff’s tenants, could on paying a reasonable rent have keys and admission to the garden.

The land passed through several conveyances to the defendant, Moxhay. His own purchase deed contained no similar covenant with his vendor, but he admitted that he had bought with notice of the covenant in the 1808 deed. He manifested an intention to alter the character of the garden and asserted a right, if he thought fit, to build on it. The plaintiff, who still owned several houses in the square, filed a bill for an injunction. The Master of the Rolls granted one, restraining Moxhay from converting or using the ground and railing for any purpose other than as a square garden and pleasure ground, in an open state and uncovered with buildings.

Moxhay moved to discharge that order. His counsel, Mr R Palmer, argued that the covenant did not run with the land so as to bind a purchaser from the covenantor at law, and relied on a dictum of Lord Brougham LC in Keppell v Bailey. He accepted that two decisions of the Vice-Chancellor of England, Whatman v Gibson and Schreiber v Creed, could not be reconciled with that argument, and pointed to the Lord Chancellor’s own order in Mann v Stephens as apparently supporting it.

What did the Court decide?

On 22 December 1848 Lord Cottenham LC, without calling on the other side, refused the motion to discharge the Master of the Rolls’ order, with costs. The report gives one set of reasons, his own. It records a motion to discharge an injunction already granted, not a final hearing of the suit.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Lord Cottenham LC held that equity could restrain a purchaser who bought land with notice of his vendor’s covenant with the owner of neighbouring land, not to use the land for any purpose other than as a square garden, from using it inconsistently with that covenant. He rejected the argument that the result depended on whether the covenant ran with the land at law: “the question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased”.

He gave reasons for that view. If it were otherwise, “it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless”. The price would be affected by the covenant, and “nothing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken”.

He added that the question does not depend on the covenant running with the land, because “if there was a mere agreement and no covenant, this Court would enforce it against a party purchasing with notice of it”, which he put as a hypothesis and not as the situation before him, and because “no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased”. On Lord Brougham’s observations in Keppell v Bailey, he said that Lord Brougham “never could have meant to lay down that this Court would not enforce an equity attached to land by the owner, unless under such circumstances as would maintain an action at law”, and that if that were the result of the observations he could only say that he could not coincide with it.

He also said that in Mann v Stephens he had not intended the injunction to depend on the result of an action, and that he thought the cases cited before the Vice-Chancellor and the decision of the Master of the Rolls perfectly right.

Why does this case matter?

A buyer whose own deed carried no such promise is a sympathetic figure, and a student who reasons from that fact, or who writes the case name with a one-line label, misses what an examiner looks for here: the step the Lord Chancellor took between the buyer’s position and the seller’s. The report is short, so an answer that attributes to it the later detail of the law of covenants attributes more to it than it contains.

Exam and application relevance

Where a purchaser promises the seller to restrict the use of the purchased land, and a later purchaser acquires it with notice of that promise, use this case to show how Lord Cottenham LC reasoned about that buyer. It is an English decision of the High Court of Chancery, so an Australian court treats it as persuasive and not as binding.

The report does not discuss which covenants qualify, how the benefit of a covenant passes to a later owner, or the effect of registration, and whether and how a covenant binds a registered proprietor in an Australian jurisdiction is a question for that jurisdiction’s registration legislation and for later authority, none of which this report addresses. Two later Australian decisions show the kind of limit those sources add. In Higgins v Australian Capital Territory (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 400 at [86]-[87], the ACT Supreme Court said that under the Torrens system a later purchaser’s awareness of a network of covenants said to form a building scheme is not sufficient notice unless the scheme and its extent appear on the registered title or on an instrument noted on it.

In Kirkalocka Gold SPV Pty Ltd v SCL AUS Ltd [2025] FCA 1490 at [172]-[175], the Federal Court said that the doctrine in Tulk v Moxhay requires a negative covenant made for the benefit of the covenantee’s land, and that a royalty obligation met neither requirement. Take the rest from the relevant statute and later cases, and use this report for what the Lord Chancellor said on the facts before him.

Check your understanding

1. What did Elms covenant in the 1808 conveyance, and with whom?

2. What did the defendant admit about his purchase, and what did his own deed lack?

3. What did counsel for the defendant argue about the covenant and the law, and which dictum did he rely on?

4. How did Lord Cottenham LC put the question, in contrast to the one counsel had put?

5. Which two consequences of the opposite view did he describe, one concerning the seller’s remaining land and one concerning the price?

6. What did he say about Lord Brougham’s observations in Keppell v Bailey?