Griffith University v Tang

High Court of Australia · 2005

Administrative LawAdministrative Action

Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99

A university created by statute excludes a student from her PhD. Statutory body, serious consequences — so a court can review it?

What happened?

Ms Tang was excluded from Griffith University’s PhD programme for “academic misconduct” — undertaking research “without regard to ethical and scientific standards”. The finding was made by an Assessment Board, a sub-committee of the University’s Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee, and an internal Appeals Committee dismissed her appeal. She sought review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), alleging breaches of natural justice, failures to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, improper exercises of power and errors of law at both levels ([1]).

What did the Court decide?

The University’s appeal was allowed and Ms Tang’s application for statutory review was dismissed. Her allegations about the exclusion process therefore remained untried ([97], [105]). Kirby J dissented.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

A decision is “made under an enactment”, and so reviewable under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) and its cognates, only if two criteria are both met: the decision is expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment, and the decision derives from the enactment the capacity to confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations. The rights so affected need not pre-exist the decision and need not themselves owe their existence to that enactment; what must come from the enactment is the decision’s power to affect them. A decision whose capacity to bind comes from contract or another private-law source is not made under it.

The joint judgment of Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ states the two criteria and their qualifications at [89]. In applying them, identify both the authority for the decision and the source of its legal effect. Here the committees’ decisions were authorised by the University Act, but affected no relevant legal rights or obligations and had no impact on matters to which that Act gave legal force and effect ([96]). The contract distinction explains the test beyond these facts: no contractual relationship was suggested in this proceeding ([81]–[83]).

An expectation or lost opportunity does not, without more, establish the requisite legal effect. On the application as framed, Ms Tang’s consensual relationship and expectation of fair treatment supplied no relevant substantive rights. She would still have had to satisfy the degree requirements; the joint judgment left open whether doing so might give her a right to the award ([91]–[93]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [89] (PDF p 38) (opens in a new tab), [96] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab)

The two criteria supplied the ground for allowing the appeal: statutory authorisation was satisfied, but the exclusion affected no relevant legal rights or obligations and had no statutory legal effect. That distinction was necessary to reject review under the Judicial Review Act. Paragraph [89] also explains that the test concerns the statutory source of the decision’s legal effect, rather than requiring pre-existing rights or rights created by the same enactment.

Obiter · Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ

Read judgment: [81] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab), [82]–[83] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)

The proposition’s statement about decisions binding through contract or another private-law source is an explanation of the test beyond the facts decided. At [83] their Honours expressly say that the contract discussion cannot determine the outcome because no contractual relationship was suggested here. The opening rule at [81] and the analysis at [82] are their own reasoning; the passage from Lewins quoted within [81] remains Lehane J’s words.

Why does this case matter?

Look at what went untested. Ms Tang alleged denial of natural justice, breach of mandatory procedures, improper purpose and error of law, at two internal levels, in a process that ended her doctorate. As Kirby J recorded, her claim for relief and her contentions on the merits “have never been tried”, and would not be ([105]). The case was decided at the threshold, and the threshold question is not about the quality of the decision — a perfectly sound process and an outrageous one fail or pass it alike.

Kirby J thought that a mistake worth naming. He called it the second time in under two years that the Court had taken “an unduly narrow approach to the availability of statutory judicial review directed to the deployment of public power”, following NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd, and described the result as eroding “one of the most important Australian legal reforms of the last century” ([99]–[100]). You do not have to agree with him to need him: a dissent that identifies what the majority’s line costs is the fastest way to see where the line actually runs.

Exam and application relevance

Apply Tang to a university’s refusal to award a degree after a student has completed all academic requirements. What further information about the governing legislation and the student’s relationship with the university would you need before advising on statutory review?

Check your understanding

The University Act authorised the committees that excluded Ms Tang, and they followed a delegation made under it. Why was the decision still not “made under” that Act?