Save Our Strathbogie Forest Inc v Secretary to the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action
Save Our Strathbogie Forest Inc v Secretary to the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action [2024] FCAFC 134
Fuel reduction burns could affect hollow-bearing trees used by gliders. What did the findings and expert evidence establish about the alleged impact?
What happened?
Save Our Strathbogie Forest sought an injunction to restrain Victoria’s Secretary to the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action from conducting fuel reduction burns in four areas of the Strathbogie State Forest. The case alleged a likely significant impact on the Southern Greater Glider, which was listed as endangered, contrary to s 18(3) of the EPBC Act. The primary judge dismissed the application ([1]-[2]).
The appeal relied on the findings made below and challenged the judge’s approach to factual proof. The appellant emphasised the potential effects on hollow-bearing trees and their relationship to the Glider. By the time of the appeal, three of the four burns had taken place ([5]-[7]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court dismissed the appeal. The appellant was to pay the Secretary’s costs as agreed or taxed, subject to an opportunity for either party to seek a different costs order by short submissions within the periods specified in the orders ([137]-[139] and the orders).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Full Court recorded that the statement of the applicable principles on significant impact and likely was not challenged on appeal. It reproduced the primary judge’s discussion, including the context-and-intensity formulation associated with Booth and the real or non-remote chance approach. It later said that the principles had been correctly stated and rejected the alleged failure to apply them ([62], [116]).
The appellant’s primary contention depended on the planned burn areas comprising or including habitat critical to the survival of the species. The argument used the broader Conservation Advice description; the Court noted that statutory registration of the burn areas as critical habitat was not suggested ([98]). The Conservation Advice’s description was qualified by its broad character, the need for regional definition by forest type, and its reference to mature hollow-bearing trees. The Court found no trial finding or apparent expert evidence establishing the critical-habitat premise.
The Secretary’s acceptance that the areas contained suitable habitat was different from accepting that they contained critical habitat ([99]-[101]). The Court added that this was not to say that reliance on a real chance of adverse effect on habitat critical to the survival of a species is unavailable in an appropriate case; its conclusion rested on the circumstances of this case, where the appellant relied entirely on findings that did not enable a conclusion that the burn areas were critical habitat ([108]).
The appellant’s secondary contention relied on the findings about tree losses together with findings about the Gliders. The Court noted that Dr Swan had accepted only that it was “reasonable to assume” a correlation between the number of hollow-bearing trees and the number of Gliders, and had given no evidence of its extent or strength ([113]); that his concession of a real chance of a reduction in Glider abundance did not extend to what proportion of the population might be affected, and the primary judge made no finding on proportion ([114]); and that there was no evidence of the number or distribution of hollow-bearing trees in the burn areas, or of how many were in use by individual Gliders ([115]).
Such a finding could not be made in the absence of any evidence as to the number of Gliders that might be affected, so the findings did not bridge the gap to the likely significant impact alleged ([116]-[118]).
Ground 2 also failed. The complaint about the primary judge’s approach to s 140 of the Evidence Act was rejected, the Court not being satisfied that his Honour erred as alleged ([119]-[122]). The Court gave further reasons in any event ([123]): the studies and expert answers did not require the primary judge to make the proposed finding about the tree-collapse rate, and Dr Swan’s evidence was general and qualified: he accepted a real chance of a reduction in abundance but expressly did not give an opinion on its quantity, so it did not establish a substantial or material reduction ([124]-[126]).
The proceeding concerned an injunction alleging infringement of s 18(3). It was not an appeal from a Ministerial controlled-action decision.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Moshinsky, Charlesworth and Kennett JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [100]–[101] (opens in a new tab), [108] (opens in a new tab)
The appellant’s primary contention depended on the planned burn areas containing habitat critical to the species’ survival. The joint reasons identify qualifications in the Conservation Advice and the absence of the necessary finding or expert evidence in this case. That reasoning helps dispose of the primary contention; it does not declare that habitat evidence can never establish a significant impact. Paragraph [108] adds that the conclusion rests on the circumstances of this case and does not exclude the approach in an appropriate case.
Ratio · Moshinsky, Charlesworth and Kennett JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [113]–[118] (opens in a new tab)
These passages reject the alleged failure to apply the real-chance principles, identify the gap in the findings relied upon, and dismiss ground1. The Court is applying principles whose statement was not challenged, rather than deciding a fresh contested construction of the statutory words.
Ratio · Moshinsky, Charlesworth and Kennett JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [119]–[126] (opens in a new tab)
The Court rejects the complaint about the primary judge’s approach to s 140 of the Evidence Act ([119]-[122]) and, further and in any event, addresses the two particular findings that the appellant said should have been made under ground 2 ([123]-[126]). The evidence did not sufficiently support the proposed tree-collapse rate or the claimed substantial or material reduction in Glider abundance. Those are reasons for rejecting that ground, confined to the record and propositions advanced.
Why does this case matter?
Strathbogie is useful when an appeal depends on which findings were actually made and on what an expert did and did not say.
Exam and application relevance
State the finding on which an argument relies and identify whether it is a judicial finding, a witness’s answer or a party’s submission. Explain each inference needed to reach the statutory result, keeping the expert’s qualifications intact.
Keep the scope of the appeal in view. An objection to the fact-finding method and a contention that an existing finding entails a further result are different arguments that need to be addressed on their own terms.
Check your understanding
1. What role did the qualifications in the Conservation Advice play in [99]-[101]?
2. What gap did the Court identify at [116]-[118]?
3. Why did the expert’s concession discussed at [125] not establish the particular finding sought on appeal?