Ryan v The Queen
Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205
His finger tightened on the trigger before he knew it, he said. Which act does the law ask about?
Qualified by Harkins v R [2015] NSWCCA 263
In New South Wales, self-induced intoxication has been removed from the voluntariness inquiry by statute. Section 428G(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that “[i]n determining whether a person has committed an offence, evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be taken into account in determining whether the relevant conduct was voluntary”; s 428G(2) preserves the position where intoxication was not self-induced. Macfarlan JA (R A Hulme and Wilson JJ agreeing) sets the section out and notes that it “is concerned with the determination of whether the relevant conduct was voluntary” rather than with mens rea -- and quotes Brennan J’s statement, itself citing Barwick CJ in Ryan, that “voluntariness and general intent are distinct mental states”. That is the same distinction Ryan draws, now with a statutory bar on one route to it. Other jurisdictions have their own intoxication provisions; identify the applicable one rather than generalising.
Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 428G, from 16 August 1996
Section 428G(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) excludes evidence of self-induced intoxication when determining whether the relevant conduct was voluntary. Section 428G(2) provides that a person is not criminally responsible if the relevant conduct resulted from intoxication that was not self-induced. Harkins v R [2015] NSWCCA 263 sets out the provision and explains its distinction from the inquiry into intention. This qualifies the use of Ryan in New South Wales intoxication cases.
What happened?
Ryan, 20, robbed a service station, holding a loaded, cocked rifle while tying up attendant Taylor. Taylor moved; the rifle fired, killing him. Convicted of murder; he argued the trigger-press was involuntary.
What did the Court decide?
The application for special leave was dismissed. The reasons differ, and the difference is the point of the case.
The way the defence had conducted the trial mattered to the refusal of leave. The separate reasons should be read with that procedural setting in view.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Homicide needs a voluntary act — a willed act. Voluntariness describes the act, not the accused’s intention. But courts must first identify which act is in question. That is where these judgments differ.
Taylor and Owen JJ said if the act causing death is not really the accused’s act, there is no murder or manslaughter. But here, they held, wounding and death came from a combination of acts done to commit the robbery.
Barwick CJ reasoned differently. A jury finding the gun’s discharge involuntary could still find the voluntary act was presenting the cocked, loaded gun. Identifying that act needed careful attention, which the summing up lacked.
Windeyer J thought the trigger press itself was voluntary. He distinguished compulsion (will exercised under pressure) from convulsions or sleep-walking (no control or awareness) — neither applied here.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Classification unresolved · Taylor and Owen JJ
Read judgment: pp 231–232 (opens in a new tab)
Their Honours distinguished an unwilled act from an unintended injury and treated the deliberate handling of the rifle as part of the conduct causing death. But they expressed doubt, rather than a concluded finding, about whether a jury could entertain reasonable doubt on voluntariness, then refused leave because the issue had not been raised at trial or on appeal. The combination-of-acts analysis should therefore not be presented as an unqualified majority ratio necessary to the refusal of leave.
Separate reasoning · Barwick CJ
Read judgment: pp 218–220 (opens in a new tab)
Concurring in the refusal of leave, Barwick CJ rejected aggregating all the evening’s events as the fatal act. The jury had to identify that act: presentation of the rifle could suffice if its unwilled discharge ought to have been contemplated. This was a distinct route from Taylor and Owen JJ’s combination of acts. His criticism of the directions did not require leave because the defence had conceded responsibility and confined the trial issues.
Separate reasoning · Windeyer J
Read judgment: pp 244–246 (opens in a new tab)
Concurring in the refusal of leave, Windeyer J treated the discharge itself as the accused’s act. A conscious response to the threatened man’s sudden movement, however spontaneous, was not involuntary in the exculpatory sense. That conclusion answered the proposed voluntariness ground without adopting either the combination-of-acts analysis or Barwick CJ’s earlier-act route.
Why does this case matter?
The accused won the principle but still lost, special leave was refused. How the trial was run mattered: judges doubted the defence’s framing and found the jury disbelieved the account. Keep the refusal reasons separate from the merits debate—only the merits analysis is the citable part.
Exam and application relevance
Compare the trial directions with the defence actually advanced. What questions did the jury have to decide, and what would have changed if the defence had contested responsibility for the discharge? Explain how each set of reasons approaches that procedural difficulty.
For a problem involving intoxication, identify the jurisdiction and check its applicable statutory provisions before applying the case.
Check your understanding
Your client’s finger genuinely moved before he could stop it. Name two reasons that might still not be enough.