General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)

High Court of Australia · 1964

Civil ProcedureInterlocutory Process

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125

A patentee sued the NSW Commissioner for Railways and two contractors for infringement. Before any trial, the defendants asked the High Court to strike out the claim and end the action. How clear must it be that the claim cannot succeed?

Qualified by Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28

In Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28 the High Court, constituted by seven Justices, decided a summary dismissal under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ treated General Steel as one of two decisions on which earlier summary-dismissal provisions had been understood as requiring a certain and concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail ([53]-[55]). Because s 31A(3) provides that a proceeding may have no reasonable prospect of success without being ‘hopeless’ or ‘bound to fail’, they said s 31A requires a different enquiry, and that it is dangerous to explain ‘no reasonable prospect’ by reference to the earlier cases ([56]). French CJ and Gummow J, in separate reasons, cited General Steel for the caution that must attend any summary termination and saw little distinction between the approaches in Fancourt, Batistatos and Agar v Hyde and the requirement of a ‘real’ as distinct from ‘fanciful’ prospect of success, adding that s 31A may be satisfied on wider grounds than the earlier rules ([24]). Heydon J found it unnecessary to consider the correct approach to s 31A ([62]). General Steel concerned the inherent jurisdiction and a rule of court, and it is not the test under s 31A.

What happened?

General Steel Industries sued the Commissioner for Railways (NSW) and two contractors in the High Court, alleging patent infringement under the Patents Act 1952-1960 (Cth).

Each defendant applied separately to set aside the writ or stay proceedings, saying there was no reasonable cause of action. They relied on the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, O 26 r 18, O 63 r 2, and ss 125 and 132.

The plaintiff argued against summary disposal. When is it proper?

What did the Court decide?

Barwick CJ, sitting alone, made the same order on each of the three summonses: he struck out the whole of the statement of claim and dismissed the plaintiff’s action with costs. He added that the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, was compensation under s 125(5) (at 138).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Barwick CJ said courts should not stop a case early unless the lack of a cause of action is “clearly demonstrated.” Various tests apply, like “obviously untenable” or “manifestly groundless.” Courts must use exceptional caution, whether acting under inherent jurisdiction or statutory rules.

He warned against denying a plaintiff a trial under the guise of efficiency. But he said the jurisdiction isn’t limited to simple cases—extensive argument may still be needed to show a case cannot succeed.

Applying this, he found the Commissioner was a State authority using the patent for a State service, clearly enough to block the claim. For the contractors, he held their written agreements themselves authorised the infringing acts under s 125. He did not decide if later written authorities would also have sufficed.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Barwick CJ (sitting alone)

Read judgment: pp 128–130 (opens in a new tab)

Barwick CJ states the standard he applies to the defendants’ three applications: the inherent jurisdiction, O 26 r 18 and O 63 r 2. The caution required is the same for each, a plaintiff is not to be denied the customary tribunal unless the lack of a cause of action is clearly demonstrated, and extensive argument does not prevent summary termination if the case is shown to be so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed. He says at the end that he was mindful throughout of these principles when he made the order (at 138), so they are part of the ground of decision and not a passing review of authority. The page markers follow the paragraphs, and the passage runs across pages 128 to 130.

Ratio · Barwick CJ (sitting alone)

Read judgment: pp 131–135 (opens in a new tab)

Barwick CJ asks whether it is as clear as the authorities require that the Commissioner is an authority of the State for Pt XIV of the Patents Act and that the use complained of is a use for the service of the State, answers both questions yes and holds that s 125(8) therefore precludes the action against the Commissioner. These paragraphs show the standard applied to a question of statutory construction.

Ratio · Barwick CJ (sitting alone)

Read judgment: pp 135–138 (opens in a new tab)

As to the two contractors, his Honour concludes that the agreements required the very act said to infringe, so that the contract, being in writing, was a sufficient authority; he infers that the agreements were in writing with the requisite certainty from s 22 of the Government Railways Act 1912 (NSW) and the high improbability of oral agreements. He finds it unnecessary to consider whether the written authorities given after the action began would have sufficed, and expresses no opinion on them (at 137). He then strikes out the statement of claim and dismisses the action with costs (at 137-138).

Why does this case matter?

General Steel helps students distinguish the traditional approach to summary termination from the modern statutory powers. A student who relies on its language needs to be clear about which power the problem invokes, because the same words are not the wording of the modern statutory provisions.

Exam and application relevance

Identify which power the problem invokes before using General Steel’s language.

For s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), state the statutory test first and use General Steel to describe the earlier approach, as Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ do in Spencer. For a differently worded provision, start from that provision’s own words.

Check your understanding

1. What did Barwick CJ say about whether the level of caution differs between the inherent jurisdiction and a rule of court (at 130)?

2. Why did Barwick CJ say that the need for extensive argument does not prevent summary termination (at 130)?

3. What did Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ say in Spencer about using General Steel to explain s 31A?

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.